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Introduction 
The extension of the Empire in what may be called middle-Asia, whether under the Indian 
administration or the Colonial, must of necessity extend the use of Hindustani, India’s lingua 
franca. […] [It] has already to a small extent found its way in the bazaars on the Gulf shores, 
where many petty Indian traders have gone and settled. If trade follows the flag, language 
follows trade and this fact will now be largely developed by the immense influx into middle-
Asia of Indians whether as soldiers, civilians, camp followers and office-dependents, almost all 
of whom more or less speak Urdu, making it the necessary means of their communications and 
intercourse with their new fellow-subjects. […] At the same time one may well look to some 
sort of bilingual mélange or mésalliance resulting from the extensive intercommunion of the 
Indian and Arab population in ‘Mesopot’ and round about that way.1 
 
Amidst the ongoing Mesopotamian campaign of World War One, the retired judge of 
the Bombay High Court, Cursetjee Manockjee Cursetjee, set out in early December 1916 for 
a month-long sea voyage onboard the freighter S.S. Zayanni from Bombay to the head of the 
Persian Gulf and back. Calling at numerous Persian and Arab Gulf ports upstream, the 
Oxford-educated Parsee experienced at first hand the gradual proliferation of the British 
Empire, also evoking speculations about future prospects and implications of close relations 
between British India and the Gulf shores. While acquainting himself with considerable India-
trade and dealings of Indian merchants in ports of Bahrain and southern Persia, the arrival in 
war-transformed Basra and encounters with Indian shopkeepers and craftsmen in the city’s 
port Ashaar left the greatest mark. 
Despite British and Indian forces experiencing a severe defeat at Kut-al-Amara only 
months earlier, the partly occupied territory of Ottoman Iraq, or Mesopotamia as some called 
it, arguably offered the greatest prospects for future Indian expansion. Cursetjee observed that 
Hindustani would extend into this area following the immigration of diverse groups, hence 
serving as communicative interface between Indians and Arabs to keep the acquired lands 
within easy reach of British India and its subject population “out of compliment […] for her 
sacrifices and services opening out these ancient derelict lands to a new life of happy 
betterment, progress and prosperity.”2 For Cursetjee, a future prominent British Indian role in 
Iraq seemed justified given its services to Empire and its prime concern with regard to the 
country’s commercial and political considerations. Whilst fully supporting its annexation to 
Empire, he was tellingly critical of British attitude in the occupied areas. A recent cartoon in 
the Basra Times of a British officer manhandling his Hindu attendant enticed him into 
warning that “the Arab is not likely to be so long-suffering as the Indian has so far been.”3 
                                                
1 Cursetjee, C.M. (1996), The Land of the Date. A recent Voyage from Bombay to Basra and back, fully descriptive of the 
ports and peoples of the Persian Gulf and the Shat’-el-Arab, their conditions, history and customs, 1916-1917. Introduction 
by Robin Bidwell. Reading: Garnet Publishing, 189-190. 
2 Ibid., 190. 
3 Ibid., 172. 
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1. Focus and Research Questions 
Such an acquaintance with occupied territories of Mesopotamia and ideas were part of a 
larger story of interregional exchange between the Indian subcontinent and the Persian Gulf 
region for a long time pre-dating and succeeding the period of the First World War. 
Nevertheless, this juncture ushered important changes in the respective regions themselves 
and in the modes of exchange between them by introducing certain actors and aims, which 
had not existed likewise before. We might not be able to fully interpret in retrospect whether 
Cursetjee then overemphasized the future use of Hindustani and in general of cultural and 
commercial contact between the two regions. His report is at least tainted in that it exposes a 
strong affinity towards Empire, advocating and defending its extension into these territories 
also for the greater good of Indian commercial gains. In addition, Cursetjee belonged – 
although aged seventy – to British India’s contemporary elite and actively took a stake in the 
affairs of Bombay’s Parsee community that held commercial and cultural contacts into the 
region. However, aware that British self-importance would not work with Arabs for long, he 
unconsciously predicted later events. Despite these and other limitations, we can retrace bits 
and pieces of a larger narrative that connects developments in the arena of international 
politics with the everyday practices, occupations and activities of individuals and groups 
across this region. 
Taking a closer look at a variety of human and other interconnections and especially at 
processes of migration and exchange, this paper focuses on the entangled histories evolving 
between British India and the wider Persian Gulf region during the period of transition from 
informal British Indian imperialism in the area to its gradual retreat and the inception of 
nation-states, spanning more than fifty years between 1880 and 1935. In this connection, the 
paper will particularly focus on political, economic and social interactions in the Gulf rather 
than in the Indian subcontinent, although developments within the latter were of course a 
constitutive part of such processes. The paper more directly asks for transformations of 
people’s lives in immediate or more distant connection to the advancing and later retreating 
British Empire during this period. The questions are why and under what circumstances 
migration and exchange processes started, and why and under what circumstances they ceased 
to exist. From a broader spatial, yet rather unusual perspective, the mapped terrain of this 
study geographically encompasses the maritime and land routes connecting British India with 
the wider Persian Gulf region and notably the landmass forming the northern and southern 
shores of the Gulf and its immediate and more distant hinterland. 
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Map 1. British India and the Wider Persian Gulf Region4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map 2. The Persian Gulf Region5 
                                                
4 The Imperial Gazetteer of India. New edition, published under the authority of His Majesty's secretary of state for India in 
council. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Vol. 26, Atlas 1909 edition, India and Surrounding Countries, 2. 
5 Persian Gulf Region, Political, 1981. Accessed at http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east.html on 24 Sept 2009. 
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2. Concretisation 
The extent of entanglement of these two regions is scrutinized at re-occurring junctures 
throughout the text in four specific areas, which were important for the evolution of 
interregional connections and the British Empire in the period under review. Although 
forming fields quite apart from each other, they are yet closely connected to one another. The 
first aspect deals with the extent of legal formations impinging or affecting the Gulf region, 
which partly pre-dated the arrival of the British Empire, and partly evolved during its 
consolidation. Law in this regard had nothing or very little to do with the populations of local 
rulers, but became important for the management, maintenance and expansion of 
communities of British Empire’s subjects residing in these realms. The second aspect includes 
a historical scrutiny of the commodity oil whose distinct processes of safeguarding, 
production and distribution established an important link between the Indian subcontinent and 
the Persian Gulf region. The third field of inquiry can be regarded as fragment of a social 
history of war at the instance of the Mesopotamian campaign of World War One. Wars are 
usually waged with a clear objective, in this instance to safeguard British oil interests in the 
Gulf, and they are peculiar in that they allow, under the exigencies of a war economy, what is 
not done during other periods. In this regard, the question is whether and if so how 
interregional relations changed with the inception and end of World War One. Again in 
conjunction with all three afore-mentioned aspects, the fourth field of inquiry concerns an 
interregional history of employment and occupations, for which the label ‘labour history’ 
would not suffice as this history encompassed a diversity of skills and knowledge. 
These aspects are dealt with in three subsequent chapters. The first chapter relates the 
evolution of British influence in the Persian Gulf during the late 19th and earliest 20th century 
and its relation to imperial subjects. It argues that the aim of British informal influence in the 
Gulf was to achieve the strategic aim of defending India from advances of other Great 
Powers. The presence and growth of economic activity and actors proved one proper means to 
establish this influence in its various dimensions on land and sea. Expanding British and 
Indian business interests towards the end of this first period also resulted in recruitment of 
Indian labour towards the Gulf, addressing Indian emigration laws for the first time. The 
second chapter takes a combined look at the emerging oil economy in southern Persia and the 
Mesopotamian campaign of the First World War that started out as just another immediate 
step by the Indian Empire to safeguard an oil complex. Both theatres, inhomogeneous of 
course when comparing their size, subsequently relied heavily on resources, especially labour 
of various forms, from the Indian subcontinent for several reasons. This chapter tries to shed 
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light on efforts of the colonial state in ensuring a constant flow of labour and resources to 
these areas, as much as on the subsequent histories of migrant labour in these realms. Finally, 
the third chapter looks at the gradual onslaught of nationalism in the places referred to, the 
disentanglement of the Indian subcontinent from parts of the Gulf and partial continuance in 
other parts. It shows that the reduction of Indian staff and labour in countries of the northern 
Gulf was slow and unsteady, as their skills were still a necessity, while the evolving oil 
economy in the southern Gulf provided yet another field for Indian employment. 
 
3. Sources 
This paper owes its existence to a variety of primary and secondary sources. It is mainly 
based on research in the official archives of the former Government of India established at the 
National Archives of India in New Delhi. This includes correspondences of a number of 
governmental departments responsible for relations with foreign governments, other matters 
of external relations such as emigration, or the army during the period under review. In 
addition, it includes consular records of the Baghdad Residency and High Commission 
maintained by the Government of India during the 19th and early 20th century. Other sources 
consulted encompass primary documents, such as correspondences, parliamentary and 
command papers of the British government available online or via published archive editions. 
Moreover, travelogues, official histories or private recollections concerning the period under 
review were consulted. 
Despite this large archive at hand, one has to point out its limitations on different levels, 
and therefore the constraints of views and perspectives expressed on their behalf in this paper. 
These documents written in English represent the perspective of British colonial authorities 
and allow only an insight into their views. I did not consult any archives of Indian states or 
provinces in English or vernacular languages, nor did I consult private papers, local histories 
or archives of those state formations in the Gulf that this work is concerned with. I also did 
not consult any records of companies that I frequently refer to, hence giving only a 
fragmentary view of their considerations. What needs to be done in future is to include such 
archives of other state formations and companies, local histories, and private papers. As much 
as Cursetjee’s account was tainted, this colonial archive itself is tainted by the position of 
those recording and deciding over processes at stake. Colonial state’s officials had various 
reasons for and means of avoiding information in the official or even confidential archive. 
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4. Historiography 
Apart from primary sources, this paper has draws on previous historical writing and 
literature touching on issues at stake more immediately and remotely. At the outset of any 
consideration lies a scrutiny of the ‘containers’ and theoretical backgrounds that one avails 
oneself of in order to best conceptualise and present a theme. For some time now, historians 
have increasingly recognized the limitations of ‘old-fashioned’ histories whose central node 
once was the modern European nation-state and the political class immediately connected 
with its erection and maintenance. In an effort to divest themselves of such limitations while 
not disregarding the importance of nation-states, historians have ventured into various realms 
that transcend state formations and instead look at the interstices between them. This is true 
for various forms of international, transnational, imperial and global history, despite disputes 
remaining among exponents of these ‘new traditions’ as to the importance or place of nations 
and states within such histories.6 
However, some of these historical ‘containers’ are too vast for and often do not fit when 
trying to write just the interconnected histories of two regions or of a limited regional space 
without studying comparisons at the same time. In addition, many studies in the framework of 
imperial and world history attribute the initiative power to a larger extent to the imperial 
“metropolis”, regarding developments in the “periphery” as a reaction, not more. We can 
argue that these approaches are potentially too wide in scope and necessarily focus only on 
primary movers and moves of history, so that minor developments whose impact was 
confined to a few countries are not observed or remain untouched.7 Comparatively low 
quantity of exchange and interconnection in this regard becomes a reason for neglect. Others 
will have to judge whether this is desirable at all, or whether it is a fruitful task in the end. Far 
from seeking exceptions and building up a new teleology after leaving behind the one of the 
nation-state, the enterprise of writing interregional histories might be evocative and give new 
insights as well. This kind of ‘container’ seems especially necessary when developments in a 
region are not or only to a limited extent of global or transnational reach, but yet go beyond 
imperial reach, and are in their immediacy restricted to a region or an interregional space. 
This enterprise is already under way to some extent in an endeavour to define and write such 
inter-relational or entangled histories more generally.8 Still, these approaches often frame 
                                                
6 For a discussion, see AHR Conversation (2006): On Transnational History. The American Historical Review, 111, 5. 
7 Although an important contribution to the field of study, one example of such an approach is Bayly, C.A. (2004), The Birth 
of the Modern World, 1780-1914: Global Connections and Comparisons. Blackwell Publishing. 
8 Examples of such works are Osterhammel, Jürgen (2001), Geschichtswissenschaft jenseits des Nationalstaats: Studien zu 
Beziehungsgeschichte und Zivilisationsvergleich. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Conrad, Sebastian/ Randeria, Shalini 
et al (Eds.) (2002), Jenseits des Eurozentrismus: postkoloniale Perspektiven in den Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaften. 
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their histories in the context of colonising and colonised formations, leaving out for example 
histories emerging between two colonized formations. Moreover, connections cannot only be 
studied between Europe and Asia but to a considerable extent also only within Asia 
themselves.9 
Theoretically, this paper aims at establishing and analyzing connections between and 
entangled histories of two regions within Asia, British India and the Persian Gulf region, that 
were both objects of colonizing and imperial formations, albeit in different periods and to 
different extents. Thereby, it tries to go beyond recent trends in writing Asian histories that 
somehow overemphasize all things Asian and exclusively look at ‘Asian’ actors, thereby 
leaving out that ‘non-Asian’ actors were pretty much active in Asia as well. Some of these 
studies perceive of inter-Asian relations only on the level of ‘-isms’.10 However, especially 
the study of such ‘-isms’ is misleading and depicts histories of social relations only to a very 
limited extent. Ultimately, they can explain respectively the emergence of nationalist ruling 
elites in countries of Asia, or overrate threats that imperial formations thought they were 
facing. They remain, however, within a paradigm of old-fashioned histories in studying state 
formations and their elites, their paranoia and measures of control. 
For various reasons, many of these historical schools seem not apt for what is 
scrutinized here. Given its design and parameters, another historical tradition in existence 
roughly since the 1980s might afford a more suitable environment for studying the theme at 
hand. Indian Ocean History reveals to us that processes of migration and exchange between 
the Indian subcontinent and the Persian Gulf necessarily involved the transgression of natural 
and imperial boundaries within and adjacent to the ocean’s basin. This basin and its branches 
such as the Persian Gulf or the Red Sea constituted a ‘seascape’ allowing various people on 
the move to settle and sojourn in various places.11 Partly invigorated through seminal works 
of the Annales School,12 several scholars were inspired to focus on various forms of 
interconnections of countries along the coastal line of the Indian Ocean. Many works on the 
Indian Ocean overwhelmingly focussed on the time of the onslaught of European economic 
                                                                                                                                                   
Campus Verlag. Werner, Michael/Zimmermann, Bénédicte (2006), Beyond Comparison. Histoire Croisée and the Challenge 
of Reflexivity. History and Theory, 45, 30-50. 
9 Van Schendel, Willem (2005), The Bengal Borderland: Beyond State and Nation in South Asia. London: Anthem Press. 
10 Some studies specifically highlight the transnational character of such movements, be they Pan-Asianism or Pan-Islamism. 
For Asianism, see Fischer-Tiné, Harald (2008), “The Cult of Asianism“: Asiendiskurse in Indien zwischen Nationalismus 
und Internationalismus (ca. 1885-1955), in: Frey, Marc/Nicola Spakowski (Eds.) (2008), Asianismen seit dem 19. 
Jahrhundert, Comparativ. 18, 6, 16-33. Also Saaler, Sven/J. Victor Koschmann (Eds.) (2007), Pan-Asianism in Modern 
Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders. London and New York: Routledge. For Pan-Islamism, see Low, 
Michael Christopher (2008), Empire and the Hajj: Pilgrims, Plagues, and Pan-Islam under British Surveillance, 1865–1908. 
International Journal for Middle East Studies, 40, 269-290. 
11 Reinwald, Brigitte/Jan-Georg Deutsch (Eds.) (2002), Space on the Move. Transformations of the Indian Ocean Seascape in 
the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag. 
12 Braudel, Fernand (1996), The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
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and naval power with their temporal frameworks ceasing before or in 1800.13 With these 
frameworks at times assuming that various interconnections abruptly ceased to exist with the 
onslaught of European economic power, we can possibly assess that historians themselves are 
complicit in creating retrospectively a perception of the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf as a 
‘British lake’ from the 19th century onwards. A number of historical accounts in recent years, 
though, have ventured with new vigour into the history of interconnections in the Indian 
Ocean during the 19th and 20th centuries, conceptualising the region of study as an 
‘interregional arena’ that can be positioned between general features of a world system and 
specific treats of particular regions.14 This view challenges both regional categories of area 
studies in Western Academia and the macro-model of a world-systems perspective enabling 
us to perceive of a region that is usually not featured in maps and teleologies of states. In 
addition, the paradigm of ‘entangled boundaries’ set forth in this paper is apt to show the 
entangled histories of interconnections between two regions while not omitting that different 
boundaries might possibly arise between them over time. 
When turning to actual accounts of an interregional perspective hitherto written, one 
can witness that concepts discussed above have been applied already to some extent to the 
study of the Indian subcontinent and the Persian Gulf region. Historians have extensively 
addressed the political and diplomatic history involving Britain, India and Gulf state 
formations, elaborating on the period before, during and after the First World War.15 Already 
during the late 1960s and early 1970s, historians found that the British imperial stronghold in 
the Gulf was a reason but also depended to a large extent on its ownership of the Indian 
subcontinent. Recent studies in this field do not substantially add information to this idea, but 
rather point to specific institutions or junctures important in shaping these histories. They 
address the establishment of British Indian imperialism in the Gulf, the inter-imperial and 
disputed relationship between Britain and India over the Gulf as well as India’s contributions 
during the Mesopotamian campaign that benefited India’s industrial complex.16 
                                                
13 Chaudhuri, K.N. (1985), Trade and Civilisation in the Indian Ocean: An Economic History from the Rise of Islam to 1750. 
Cambridge University Press. Das Gupta Ashin/M.N. Pearson (Eds.) (1987), India and the Indian Ocean, 1500-1800. Calcutta: 
Oxford University Press. Das Gupta, Ashin et al (2001), The World of the Indian Ocean Merchant, 1500-1800. Collected 
Essays of Ashin Das Gupta. Oxford University Press. 
14 Bose, Sugata (2006), A Hundred Horizons. The Indian Ocean in the Age of Global Empire. Delhi: Permanent Black. 
Metcalf, Thomas R. (2007), Imperial Connections. India in the Indian Ocean Arena, 1860-1920. Ranikhet: Permanent Black. 
15 Of these only a few are mentioned. Kumar, Ravinder (1965), India and the Persian Gulf Region 1858-1907 - A Study in 
British Imperial Policy. London: Asia Publishing House. Bush, B. C. (1967), Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1894-1914, 
Berkeley: University of California Press. Ibid. (1971), Britain, India, and the Arabs, 1914-1921. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. Greaves, Rose (1991), Iranian relations with Great Britain and British India, 1798–1921. From Nadir Shah 
to the Islamic Republic. Cambridge University Press. Sluglett, Peter (2007), Britain in Iraq: Contriving King and Country, 
1914-1932. Columbia University Press. 
16 Onley, James (2007), The Arabian frontier of the British Raj: Merchants, Rulers, and the British in the Nineteenth-Century 
Gulf. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Blyth, Robert J. (2003), The Empire of the Raj: India, Eastern Africa and the Middle 
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Fortunately, this was by far not everything that has been written on this interregional 
perspective, although other studies have and continue to appear rarely in comparison to the 
diplomatic and political complex. Thus, studies addressing diplomatic and political relations 
have been importantly supplemented by works particularly focussing on more immediate 
economic, social and cultural implications of exchange and impact between the two regions. 
Within historical writing, these topics are covered by interests in economic exchange and 
traders operating between the two regions, lives and trajectories of pilgrims travelling to and 
sojourning in the Indian Ocean, the employment of soldiers and migration of camp-followers 
during the First World War and to some extent the emerging labour migration to Gulf 
countries connected to oil exploitation. We are yet to sketch a comprehensive overview of all 
these forms of Indian migration to localities in question over an extended period. However, 
we can assess various interconnections with the Persian Gulf resting on a 'circulatory regime' 
encompassing pilgrims, traders and workers in the period under review.17 
Despite the fact that British companies and businessmen commanded much more 
capital quantitatively, the emergence and existence of several transnational merchant 
communities commanding and operating capital in the Gulf and between the Gulf and the 
Indian subcontinent is looked upon as important instance in interconnected histories. 
Merchant capital was not only important for opening up new markets, but it was ultimately 
the basis for contemporary multinational companies and other business houses in India and 
the Gulf. Several Gulf port cities of southern Persia and Mesopotamia, such as Bushehr, 
Bandar-Abbas and Basra altogether comprised a few hundred British Indian and British 
protected subjects, mostly traders or those connected to trading businesses and their families. 
In the southern Gulf, Indian merchants were especially active in Muscat and in Bahrain in 
connection to the pearling industry.18 
                                                                                                                                                   
East, 1858-1947. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Satia, Priya (2007), Developing Iraq: Britain, India, and the Redemption 
of Empire and Technology in the First World War. Past and Present, 197, 211-255. 
17 The term 'circulatory regime' is discussed for the South Asian context in Claude Markovits et al (Eds.) (2003), Society and 
Circulation: Mobile People and Itinerant Cultures in South Asia, 1750-1950. Permanent Black. 
18 Lorimer, John Gordon (1908), Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia, Vol. II, Geographical and 
Statistical. Calcutta: Superintendent Government Printing, India, 10-15, 276, 345-349. For a study of Muscat’s Indian 
merchant community, see Allen, Calvin H., Jr. (1978), Sayyids, Shets and Sultans: Politics and Trade in Masqat under the Al 
Bu Sa’id, 1785-1914. Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Washington, esp. 99-177. For a study pertaining to 
merchants from Sind in Persia, see Markovits, Claude (2000), The Global World of Indian Merchants, 1750-1947: Traders of 
Sind from Bukhara to Panama. Cambridge University Press. The latter points to the early operations of the Hinduja family in 
Iran that represents today a multinational conglomerate. One important route of the mentioned Shikarpuri network ran from 
Karachi along the Mekran coast and then towards Meshed in northern Persia and further to Central Asia. A more general 
survey of Indian merchant communities is given in Ibid. (1999), Indian Merchant Networks outside India in the Nineteenth 
and Twentieth Centuries: A Preliminary Survey. Modern Asian Studies, 33, 4, 883-911. For one particular Persian merchant 
family in contacts with Bombay, see Onley, James (2005), 'Transnational Merchants in the Nineteenth Century Gulf: The 
Case of the Safar Family'. In: Madawi Al-Rasheed (Ed.), Transnational Connections and the Arab Gulf. London: Routledge, 
59-89. For the early emergence of Arab merchants on India’s western coast, see Benjamin, N. (1976), Arab Merchants of 
Bombay and Surat (c. 1800-1840), Indian Economic Social History Review, 13, 85, 85-95. 
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In addition to traders, historians have emphasised the histories of Persian and Indian 
pilgrim communities especially in Shia holy cities such as Najaf, Karbala and Kadhimain in 
Mesopotamia or Meshed in Persia and the institutions allowing for this circulation. The 
overall number of Indians permanently residing in Mesopotamia in 1882, for example, 
amounted to some 3,000. In addition, a considerable floating population of visitors to the holy 
cities existed who returned to India after a few months.19 This strong presence in Shia holy 
cities of southern Mesopotamia had specific reasons. The British Government channelled 
financial remittances and donations from officials and individuals of the former Shia state of 
Awadh, the so-called Oudh Bequest, to Ottoman Iraq. Distributed by the British resident in 
Baghdad, it was partly used for maintaining the shrines and for the support of pilgrims. It 
enhanced the coming and staying of large numbers of Indian pilgrims, with many deciding to 
settle and earn their livelihood in petty-trade, profiting from this influx. Some historians have 
argued that this device was partly used by consuls and residents to ask for and establish 
British influence in these cities.20 The pilgrimage to holy cities in the Hedjaz fed in the 
pilgrim population of the Persian Gulf as well. Many pilgrims to Mecca and Medina used to 
travel through Persian Gulf ports in order to get there. Of lower monetary means, these 
pilgrims utilized the fact that deck passages to the Gulf were cheaper than directly to Red Sea 
ports. This lasted until 1912, when shipping companies increased ticket fares following the 
introduction of pilgrim ship rules disallowing the overcrowding of ships.21 
A third migrant group addressed by historians are different forms of labour. These were 
recruited and employed from the 1910s onwards for the Mesopotamian campaign of the First 
World War and the nascent oil economy in southern Persia and later in the Arab Gulf. For the 
first two years, the Indian army led the campaign in Mesopotamia owing to political and 
commercial interests in the region that had built up over the previous century. This also 
caused the mobilisation and recruitment of various forms of Indian labour resources for the 
military complex and infrastructural development in the war theatre. As argued already, this 
                                                
19 Consul-General, Baghdad to Secy, Foreign Department (FD), Government of India (GoI), 13 Feb 1882, FD, General 
(Gen.), Apr 1882, 14 B. All primary sources are from the National Archives of India (NAI), New Delhi unless otherwise 
stated. Most of these residents came from Lucknow and the North Western Provinces, to a smaller extent from Kashmir, 
Punjab and Madras and included by far more women and children than men. The majority of them, resided in Kerbala 
(1700), followed by Kadhimain (1000), north of Baghdad, with one thousand. Smaller Indian communities also existed at 
Baghdad and Najaf. In regard to the floating population, on a particular day at Kerbala this made up “three hundred - not 
counting women and children - of these temporary residents; the number varies according to the season of the year.” 
20 Nakash, Yitzhak (1994), The Shi'is of Iraq. Princeton University Press: Princeton. Litvak, Meir (1990), Continuity and 
Change in the Ulama Population of Najaf and Karbala, 1791-1904: A Socio- Demographic Study. Iranian Studies, 23, 1/4, 
31-60. Ibid. (2000), A Failed Manipulation: The British, the Oudh Bequest and the Shi’i Ulama of Najaf and Karbala. British 
Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 27, 1, 69-89. Ibid. (2001), Money, Religion, and Politics: The Oudh Bequest in Najaf and 
Karbala, 1850-1903. International Journal of Middle East Studies, 33, 1, 1-21. 
21 Singha, Radhika (2008), Passport, Ticket, and India-Rubber Stamp: “The Problem of the Pauper Pilgrim” in Colonial India 
ca. 1882-1925, in Harald Fischer-Tine and Ashwini Tambe (ed.) Spaces of Disorder: The Limits of British Colonial Control 
in South Asia and the Indian Ocean. Oxon: Routledge, 49-83. 
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mobilisation was of a broad nature, addressing several ends of the Indian labour market, and 
took place under the exigencies of war that partly allowed for circumventing existing 
emigration laws.22 The labour supply for the oil economy in southern Persia and the Arab 
Gulf has been scrutinised as well to some extent. With regard to the oil economy in the whole 
Gulf during the first half of the 20th century, one historian argues that Indian labour in the oil 
economy was not used primarily for commercial, but owing to strategic and political 
concerns, as it was more agreeable in some circumstances than other potentially available 
labour.23 Looking at a juncture during the early 1920s, another account argues that increasing 
training for Persian labour aimed at replacing Indian labour.24 However, alongside the vast 
labour resources for Mesopotamia, the state of war also allowed a lapse of emigration laws 
for recruitment connected to the early oil complex, a fact that sheds some new light on the 
company’s history. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
22 For a lucid account of labour recruitment for the war in Iraq, including prison inmates, see Singha, Radhika (2007), 
Finding Labor from India for the War in Iraq: The Jail Porter and Labor Corps, 1916-1920. Comparative Studies in Society 
and History, 49, 2, 412-445. For a broader discussion of military labour used different campaigns, see Ulrichsen, Kristian 
Coates (2006), The Logistics and Politics of the British Campaigns in the Middle East, 1914-1922. Unpublished PhD 
dissertation, University of Cambridge, esp. Chp. 6. 
23 Seccombe, I.J./Lawless, R.I. (1986), Foreign Worker Dependence in the Gulf, and the International Oil Companies: 1910-
50. International Migration Review, 20, 3, p. 548-574. 
24 Dobe, Michael Edward (2008), A Long Slow Tutelage in Western Ways of Work: Industrial Education and the 
Containment of Nationalism in Anglo-Iranian and ARAMCO, 1923-1963. Unpubl. PhD Dissertation, Rutgers University. 
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I. Empires of Trade and Religion, Questions of Nationality and Jurisdiction 
Between August 1910 and April 1911, a severe diplomatic dispute ensued between 
British and Ottoman officials over various sites of British property in the Ottoman cities of 
Baghdad, Karbala and Kadhimain, including the British Residency grounds as well as 
corporate and private property belonging to British and British Indian subjects. The cities' 
administrations had planned and put into action the partial destruction of these and more 
properties also belonging to other nationals because of their alleged dangerous conditions and 
in order to improve infrastructure. Suspecting a malicious and political intention on the part of 
local authorities, the British Consul-General in Baghdad, John Gordon Lorimer, represented 
the subjects' grievances to the British Ambassador in Constantinople asking for intervention 
at the Sublime Porte to halt the action. However, these representations did not yield much 
effect. Finally, property worth several thousand pounds was destroyed and British officials 
were able only to demand payment of compensation for some of the damages caused.25 
Despite other nations being affected, the incident seemed to have dealt a blow principally to 
British prestige at these places. In November 1910, Lorimer reported that “[...] British 
reputation at Baghdad has fallen to a very low ebb, and I find that British subjects are 
seriously alarmed, seeing that their rights have never hitherto been so tramped upon here.” 
Moreover, Abdul Ali, a prosperous Indian merchant running an ice-factory at Baghdad, talked 
of renouncing his British nationality for Turkish, while several British Indian pilgrims had 
done so already, owing to the apparent inability of British authorities to afford them proper 
protection. Lorimer expressed his conviction that a more intelligent man should replace the 
responsible present Wali, Nazim Pasha, adding that the Baghdad municipality loan should not 
be entrusted to local authorities until compensation for British subjects was decided upon.26 
Arguably, a range of motives – both of subjects and states – characterized this series 
of incidents. While subjects were anxious to secure protection, regardless of the authority 
presiding over them, authorities tried to keep up their wards’ status and the privileges granted. 
With states being held accountable to their promises, the British also feared and actually 
experienced a loss in reputation if they could not. Yet, explaining the conjuncture solely in 
this perspective seems insufficient. It would attach immense importance to a rather negligible 
number of subjects living beyond the formal outskirts of the British Empire that would 
probably not matter otherwise. In contrast, one might argue that rarely, if ever, subjects’ fates 
                                                
25 Demolition of property belonging to British subjects at Karbala and Kadhimain. FD, External (Ext.), Jul 1911, 236-242 B. 
Turkish encroachments on British owned property at Baghdad, Karbala, etc., FD, Ext., Jul 1911, 243-322 B. Attempt of the 
Turkish Authorities to encroach on the grounds of the British Residency at Baghdad. Demolition of the property of British 
subjects at Baghdad, Karbala and Kadhimain. FD, Secret (Sec.) Ext., Jul 1911, 566-597. 
26 Consul-General, Baghdad to British Ambassador, Constantinople, 12 Nov 1910. FD, Ext., Jul 1911, 243-322 B. 
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prompted such reactions between authorities. Situated within a highly politicized region 
belonging to the Ottoman Empire and almost naturally considered as British Indian sphere of 
interest and influence, they rather served simultaneously as indicator of British prestige and as 
a premise of increased political intervention. 
 
1. Multiple Imperialisms and Subjects of Empires 
More generally, this peculiar case in Ottoman Iraq is but just one example of larger 
entangled histories of empires and subjects in the Persian Gulf region in decades preceding 
the First World War. Political-strategic and economic ideas and the interests of a multiple 
states intersected here, often colliding with each other. As chief actors, the Ottoman, Persian 
and British empires clearly emphasized the importance of the Persian Gulf and adjacent lands 
in their broader political-strategic approach and increasingly wrestled for authority and 
legitimacy among the subject population. Smaller formations in the Gulf with relatively less 
power in turn often became objects of imperial designs or were in subordinate relations to 
empires.27 Also other Great Powers such as Russia and Germany took an increasing interest in 
developments in the Gulf towards the end of the 19th century, but only the latter was 
perceived of as a real threat to the British position in the Gulf.28 As a result of its imperial 
designs on the region, the overall political and economic influence of the British Indian 
Empire in the Gulf gradually increased towards the end of the 19th century reaching its zenith 
with World War One. While this advancing drive resulted in many smaller formations 
successively becoming part of the British Empire, the larger territorial states bordering to the 
north of the Gulf indeed stayed independent of formal subjugation, but constituted most 
crucial spheres of British imperial interests.29 
Most especially, the Ottoman regime of Sultan Abdulhamid II (1876-1909) suspected 
the British of such designs and actions, which a series of reports of high-ranking Ottoman 
officials and administrators beginning as early as 1889 reflect. Pointing to British power in 
the Persian Gulf and Iraq that materialised, for instance, in the safeguarding of interests of 
British Indian merchants through a British corvette being placed in the Muscat harbour, they 
                                                
27 Constantinople’s Sunni central authorities contested Persian-Shiite spheres in southern Iraq. Deringil, Selim (1990), The 
Struggle against Shiism in Hamidian Iraq: A Study in Ottoman Counter-Propaganda. Die Welt des Islams, 30, 1/4, 45-62. 
During this time, Persia often laid claim to Bahrain at the instance of Persian subjects residing there. Kelly, J.B (1957), The 
Persian Claim to Bahrain. International Affairs, 33, 1, 51-70. 
28 Especially the German-led Baghdad railway scheme frightened the British, who were able to avert the establishment of 
direct communication between Germany and Basra. Cohen, Stuart (1978), Mesopotamia in British Strategy, 1903-1914. 
International Journal of Middle East Studies, 9, 2, 171-181. 
29 For a recent discussion of this, see Onley, James (2009), The Raj Reconsidered: British India’s Informal Empire and 
Spheres of Influence in Asia and Africa. Asian Affairs, 40, 1, 44-62. 
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made suggestions as to how this position of dominance should be contested.30 Arguably, 
British colonial authorities used, inter alia, the presence of British Indian subjects throughout 
the region resulting from extensive economic and religious ties with the subcontinent as 
leverage to argue for continued authority and intervention. Furthermore, the incident initially 
depicted seemed contiguous with increasing tensions and Ottoman objections to British 
privileges in the larger Gulf area, and in Baghdad in particular, after the coming into power of 
the Young Turks in 1908.31 However, when British authorities faced Ottoman encroachments 
they often succeeded in resisting these objections to their dominant regional position, at times 
even by threat of force.32 
Similarly, Persia had been fully inscribed into this orbit of late 19th century British 
imperialism. Allegedly, it was the fear of a possible Russian advance via India’s North-
Western Frontier that particularly determined imperial interests in its neighbour to the west. 
The conclusion of the Anglo-Russian Convention in 1907, usually seen as end to this great 
power rivalry, secretly apportioned Persia’s northern zone to Russia and its southern zone to 
the British Empire.33 By this time, British imperial power had already attained a comfortable 
position in the Gulf. When travelling the country during 1889 and 1890, George Nathaniel 
Curzon, then Member of the British Parliament and later the most determined advocate of 
forward British imperial policy in the Gulf, was able to observe the extent to which British 
India’s role had already increased in southern Persia, also imagining its future economic and 
political stakes there. In Bushehr, for example, he observed the high share of Anglo-Indian 
trade, the wide circulation of the Indian rupee, and overall a position “not of British power, 
but of British influence […] whose unwritten authority is among the many silent monuments 
to the British name.” This authority was invested to a great extent in the position of the 
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, a senior officer of the Indian Political Service and 
subordinated to the Indian government, who was allegedly treated like the “uncrowned king 
                                                
30 Other critical observations included the system of political officers reporting to the Indian government, the influence 
attained by British officers in Bushehr and Baghdad, and the extent of foreign trade. Cetinsaya, Gökhan (2003), The Ottoman 
View of British Presence in Iraq and the Gulf: The Era of Abdulhamid II, Middle Eastern Studies, 39, 2, 2003, 196-198. 
31 Besides the size of the residency grounds, they objected to several other British privileges at the time, such as the 
Residency’s Indian Sepoy guard, the presence of the gunboat ‘Comet’ and the flying of British flags on steamers of Messrs. 
Lynch Brothers, a British merchant house operating ships in Mesopotamia and Persia. Field Notes (1917), Mesopotamia. 
General Staff, India. Calcutta, 2. Coke, Richard (1927), Baghdad: The City of Peace. London: Thornton Butterworth, 284. 
32 When workmen reached the grounds of the British Residency and intimated that they would cut right through it, the 
Resident telegraphed to India for orders, being directed to hand out ammunition and resist by force any attempt of destroying 
the wall. On hearing this, the city’s authorities immediately decided to realign the road. Willcocks, Sir William (1935), Sixty 
Years in the East. London: William Blackwood & Sons, 251. 
33 Hopkirk, Peter (1992), The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia, Kodansha International. Others argue 
that a Russian advance was never likely to happen and Anglo-Russian rivalry as regards the defence of India was hence 
magnified. Far more important were internal threats in British India. See Yapp, Malcolm (2001), The Legend of the Great 
Game. Proceedings of the British Academy, 111, 179-198. 
‘Entangled Boundaries’: British India and the Persian Gulf Region 
 15 
of the Persian Gulf”.34 While several British business houses started operations here, Curzon 
encountered British Indian and Parsee traders having extensive connections in places of the 
interior such as Yazd and Kerman as well as on the Gulf littoral at Lengeh and Bandar-
Abbas.35 Finally analyzing the commercial and political situation in Persia with regard to 
Russian competition with British Indian interests, he foresaw a generally positive 
development. However, he strongly supported further British commercial and political 
ascendancy in the southern zone, without usurping any territory, in order to oppose possible 
Russian advances into the country’s north. As Viceroy of India, Curzon paid another visit to 
the Gulf in 1903, this time halting at other ports as well such as Muscat, Bahrain and Kuwait, 
where he similarly encouraged British Indian traders to further push trade in their places. 
This story is part of a larger narrative of different formations existing and competing 
in the Gulf. In yet another perspective, imperial formations and political considerations in the 
Gulf also intersected with movements and lives of various individuals and communities from 
different regions in the Indian Ocean, that partly pre-dated the arrival of British imperialism 
in the Gulf. Among these were traders, pilgrims, and, more so at a later stage, various forms 
of labourers who travelled, sojourned and settled in these realms. Such individuals, usually 
subjects or protected persons of one of the empires and thus under their consular protection, 
had a special legal status in their places of foreign abode, for example in regard to 
jurisdiction, exemption from military service and taxation. The implications of empires 
mentioned above definitely had repercussions on the way people of different origins lived 
together and certainly impinged on the socio-economic status of subjects as well. Port cities 
and urban spaces in the interior of the Persian Gulf region were the most important localities 
in this regard. They were focal points where different individuals and communities of the 
Indian Ocean anchored and settled for various reasons and for varying amounts of time. 
While no neat pattern of national, ethnic or religion-based alliances existed across the region, 
it was precisely because of the presence of communities from different backgrounds that 
urban spaces were also the site where foreign residents and consuls took up their office. Thus, 
these cities were localities of cohabitation as much as of controversy and contestation of 
imperial power between officials and subjects of different empires.36 
                                                
34 Curzon, George N. (1966), Persia and the Persian Question. Vol. I, II. London: Frank Cass & Co., 236, 451. 
35 Ibid., 240 f., 244 f., 333 f., 407. 
36 Some Ottoman cities have been studied in this regard. Hanley, Will (2007), Foreignness and Localness in Alexandria, 
1880-1914. Unpubl. PhD dissertation, Princeton University. Constantinople and Smyrna are scrutinised in Berchtold, 
Johannes (2009), Recht und Gerechtigkeit in der Konsulargerichtsbarkeit. Britische Exterritorialität im Osmanischen Reich 
1825-1914. Oldenbourg Verlag. For a Gulf city, see Fuccaro, Nelida (2005), Mapping the Transnational Community. 
Persians and the Space of the City in Bahrain, c. 1869-1937. In: Madawi Al-Rasheed (Ed.), Transnational Connections and 
the Arab Gulf. London/New York: Routledge, 39-58. 
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Often, this special status according to the most-favoured nation status allowed subjects 
to settle and prosper in foreign lands, claiming consular assistance when needed. However, 
the mechanism of enabling subjects through extraterritorial jurisdiction and rights was a 
complex issue. It could be, and actually was, used as well to disable their lives. Far from any 
uni-dimensionality, exceptions occurred, as the initial case clearly shows, and a neat picture 
of affinity towards empires was disturbed time and again. Subjects were able to negotiate 
their affinity and nationality with the situation they were in and imperial formations were at 
times deeply unstable. At the same time, British residents and consuls for example contested 
claims to British nationality and rejected petitioners as British subjects for only rightful 
claimants to British nationality were to enjoy the protection and extra-territorial rights granted 
to the British Empire in this region. Negotiations of affinities vis-à-vis the region’s empires 
were nothing new, thus one question is whether and if so what changed with the coming of 
British Imperialism.37 I dwell in the following on some of the implications of late 19th and 
early 20th century British imperialism in the Gulf with regard to law and the subjects of 
empires. 
 
2. Legal Implications of British Imperialism in the Gulf 
Arguably, Indian traders and pilgrims, as British subjects or protected persons, as well 
as other European Empire’s subjects, held a special status nominally conferred only on them 
and not on the remaining population of the territory, thus being able to prosper in countries 
surrounding the Persian Gulf.38 While several reasons were probably attributable to this fact, 
one important factor was a special legal situation in which they found themselves. Certain 
legal provisions partially existed since the early modern period, but were interpreted 
differently during the 19th century, while other implications developed in the wake of British 
Empire’s advances into the Gulf region. In this context, the aforementioned implications of 
political and economic imperialism were directly connected to various legal forms playing out 
deferentially over time. To use a simple differentiation between direct and indirect 
imperialism, British power in the Persian Gulf was not used directly to acquire and to subject 
their populations to European rule, as was the case in parts of India and China; instead, it was 
applied indirectly in order “to further the economic interests of the inhabitants of the 
                                                
37 Questions of allegiance occurred under Mughal, Safavid and Ottoman rulers as well, and contentions appearing between 
the British and Ottoman empires were resonant of disputes over trade and sectarian differences in the nexus of three early 
modern Muslim empires. Pearson, M.N. (1994), Pious Passengers. The Hajj in Earlier Times. London: Hurst & Company. 
38 In effect, this special status was not at all conferred only on subjects of European states. In regard to British action, one can 
definitely say that also others came to be regarded as their subjects and protected persons, either because they satisfied 
British requirements, or whose becoming protected was a viable imperial interest. In several cases the British Empire 
effectively claimed persons as subjects, probably for commercial and prestigious reasons. 
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European State.”39 Thus, legal forms in the way of treaties and agreements were techniques to 
safeguard economic interests of Empire’s subjects in foreign countries, without annexing any 
such territory. 
Throughout the 19th and early 20th century, the British Empire concluded a substantial 
number of treaties with almost all existing state formations in the Persian Gulf region 
regarding a number of points critical to imperial politics. The very nature and contents of 
these treaties depended on the reasons and environments finally leading to their conclusion 
(whether out of war or cooperation) and depended on the type and size of state of the opposite 
party. Occasions for such treaty conclusions had different origins, some took place as 
peaceful incidents of two high governments deciding over their political and commercial 
aims, others took place clearly showing which of the two parties was the stronger one, which 
profited more from the provisions. Among these were also treaties that indirectly or directly 
touched upon questions of imperial subjects in a number of ways. 
One example of treaties indirectly addressing subjects aimed at securing trade routes 
by land and sea towards the Gulf. Some of these were concluded very early on. In 1820, a 
treaty was concluded with the smaller Arab Gulf states addressing the suppression of piracy 
in the Gulf, which the British Empire perceived of as menace to British and international 
trade and shipping interests. It referred to imperial subjects by stipulating that any offender 
against it shall be “accounted an enemy of all mankind and shall be held to have forfeited 
both life and goods.”40 With later treaties in 1843 and a perpetual peace in 1853, Trucial states 
agreed to end intertribal hostilities among them and between their subjects and dependents, as 
the treaty text professed primarily for their own subjects’ uninterrupted carrying on of pearl 
fisheries in the Gulf. However, the treaties provided as well for a regulation in case of any of 
the Sheikhs’ subjects committing offences on imperial subjects. The assailants were to be 
punished, and the rulers had to afford full redress upon the case.41 The provisions allowed for 
and quite effectively facilitated the emergence especially of British and British Indian trade in 
the Gulf, lasting even into and beyond the period under review here. During the later 19th 
                                                
39 Woolf, Leonard (2006), Economic Imperialism. Read Books, 13. Woolf had been cadet in the Ceylon Civil Service from 
1904, rising to the position of assistant government agent before resigning and marrying famous author Virginia Woolf in 
1912. He was later on recognized as exponent of the theory of Idealism in International Politics. Glendinning, Victoria 
(2006), Leonard Woolf: A biography. New York: Free Press. 
40 Aitchison, C.U. (1983), A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads Relating to India and Neighbouring Countries, 
XI, Pt. 2. Delhi: Mittal Publications, 245, 248. The phenomenon of and British reactions to piracy in the Persian Gulf are 
highly debated. Some argue the British East India Company merely constructed the threat, in order to police the Gulf, thereby 
furthering its trade and defend India from French plans. Al-Qasimi, Sultan bin Mohamed (1988), The myth of Arab piracy in 
the Gulf. Routledge. Others hail British interventions on piracy as resulting in a ‘Pax Britannica’ actively sought for by local 
rulers in need of protection. Onley, The Arabian Frontier of the British Raj. 
41 Following the treaty in 1843 with the Trucial Arab Shaikhs for preserving the maritime peace of the Gulf for a period of 
ten years, a treaty was instituted in 1853 in which the rulers of the Trucial Coast agreed to maintain in perpetuity the 
maritime peace of the Gulf. Aitchison, Treaties, XI, II, 250, 252. 
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century, further treaties were concluded with smaller Gulf States, which put them into 
subordinate relation to the British Empire.42 
Overall, these and later treaty regulations with states of the lower Gulf also expressed 
their inferior position and/or subordinate relation to the British Empire. In fact, with Bahrain 
(in 1880), the Trucial States (1892) and Kuwait (1899) several of these states became British 
protectorates during the 19th century, from then on they were represented in all foreign 
matters by the British crown. In fact, they were considered part of the Indian Empire and were 
in effect administrated by the Gulf Residency that was subordinated to Bombay or the Indian 
government. While the British resolved not to interfere with internal matters, they actually did 
by having a decisive impact at least on local commercial courts dealing with disputes between 
British subjects and subjects of the local rulers. While treaties provided for similar action, 
such cases were not held in this way in the Ottoman and Persian empires. Thus, the fact that 
the British Indian hold in the southern Gulf was stronger also resulted in better conditions for 
Indian merchants in these places. 
The above regulations regarding piracy and maritime peace applied, of course, only to 
the lower part of the Gulf and its adjacent regions, with British authorities having no such 
power on analogous cases in territorial waters of the Ottoman Empire and Persia to enhance 
their political and economic position there. With other state suzerainty reigning supreme in 
these places, British officials were, at least legally, only bystanders when these states’ 
officials proceeded against piracies in their own waters.43 But local British authorities 
somehow objected to this reality, also voicing such pretensions after an attack on the Indian 
buggalow ‘Ganesh Persad’ in October 1879 just a few miles south of Basra that killed two of 
her crew and seized its property.44 British observations to the case were illustrative of the low 
esteem of Ottoman jurisdiction and prosecution, and their wishes to have a higher influence 
on such cases. They assessed the incident merely as a result from the impunity with which 
piracies in these parts of the Gulf had been carried on for a longer period, allegedly owing to 
the weakness and indifference of Turkish authorities.45 With Ottoman authorities still 
unsuccessful in their efforts of catching assailants by late 1880, British authorities felt 
compelled to press for more vigorous measures, so that British prestige was further kept up 
and no one ought to be able to say “that a British vessel can be plundered and British subjects 
                                                
42 For Bahrain and the Trucial States, see Ibid., 237-238, 256 f. 
43 Some observations were directly in the opposite. Towards the end of the 19th century, the Inspector of the 6th Army, 
Nusret Pasha, submitted a report to the Sultan complaining that local Ottoman officials in the Gulf acted as “neutral 
bystanders, as if these regions’ entire administration had been handed over to Britain.“ Quoted in Cetinsaya, Ottoman View 
of British Presence in Iraq and the Gulf, 199. 
44 Piratical outrage on British Indian buggalow ‘Ganesh Persad’ and murder of two of her crew on the 29th October 1879. 
Baghdad Residency Records (hereafter, BRR), Files, 1879-1885, 75. 
45 Consul-General, Baghdad to Foreign Secy, GoI, 19 Nov 1879, Ibid. 
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killed almost within sight of a British Consulate and that no satisfaction can be obtained.”46 
Earlier British suggestions to institute a special commission with one of them partaking to 
investigate into the case were not admitted by the Wali of Basra. Later, the British gathered 
that the rejection was based on him being anti-English in sentiment, and that such a 
commission with a British official taking a leading role would have resulted in an increase of 
British local influence.47 
In conjunction to this, another interesting observation arose long after the culprits had 
finally been arrested and sentenced. The Indian owner of the ship represented his case 
claiming some 4,000 Rupees that had allegedly been settled – after representations by the 
former British Consul at Basra – by the ruling Ottoman authority as indemnification for 
damages caused, remaining unpaid in the British Treasury at Basra since.48 British authorities 
responded in the negative, with the allegation that no such arrangement had been arrived at. 
While trade and traffic were regarded as safer in future, no room for action in this particular 
case appeared to have been discovered or indeed to exist.49 This latter account possibly shows 
that British authorities in the Gulf were effectively more concerned about establishing British 
influence there on behalf of concerns over the security and protection of trade, rather than 
actually indemnifying British subjects for losses occurred in the Gulf. 
 
Capitulary rights and extra-territorial jurisdiction 
On the other hand, treaties, or rather agreements between European Empires and 
respective state formations of the Gulf directly touched upon and addressed British subjects 
and protected persons in these realms. Among the most important were capitulary rights 
which were freely granted to subjects of European Empires for several centuries past, mostly 
as a measure by rulers to attract trade to their Eastern empires. Another reason for granting 
these privileges seems to have been that rulers were at times unwilling to preside over 
subjects of non-Muslim denominations. The rights included financial benefits in the form of 
tax exemptions, exemption from military service and overall, the institution of consular 
jurisdiction.50 The underlying idea was that European (Christian) merchants residing in 
territories in the East were used to laws of their home countries and not amenable to local 
                                                
46 Consul-General to Assistant Political Agent, Basra, 22 Oct 1880,16 Nov 1880, Ibid. 
47 Assistant Political Agent, Basra to Consul-General, Baghdad, 19 Nov 1879, 2 Dec 1880, Ibid. 
48 Parshotam Kahanjee Jawan, Custom House, Porbandar, Kathyawar to Consul-General, Basra, 1 Apr 1885. Ibid. 
49 Consul-General, Basra to Parshotam Kahanjee Jawan, 1 Apr 1885. Memo, 27 Nov 1885, Ibid. 
50 The system of capitulations, dating back to the 14th century in the case of the Ottoman Empire, meant that foreign subjects 
remained under the respective laws of their empires once the capitulary favour had been granted. Foreign subjects in Ottoman 
realms also enjoyed full exemption from taxes and customs duties. Quaetert, Donald (2000), The Ottoman Empire, 1700-
1922. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 77. For the system of capitulary rights in Iran see Floor, Willem (1983), 
Change and Development in the judicial system of Qajar Iran (1800-1925). In: Bosworth, Edmund/Carol Hillenbrand (Eds.), 
Qajar Iran. Political, Social and Cultural Change, 1800-1925. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
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laws existing in these places. This meant that whenever disputes arose between two subjects 
of European Empires, these were referred to their representatives’ consular and not to local 
courts. Mixed cases between a British subject and a subject of the respective ruler were 
usually referred to local authorities, or to mixed courts presided over by a representative of 
each of the subjects. Here existed a fundamental difference within the Gulf. Ottoman and 
Persian authorities showed a tendency to bring cases in front of their local authorities and not 
to mixed courts. On the other hand, cases were referred to mixed courts in places of the 
southern Gulf, but they were mostly carried on under the supervision of local British consuls 
or agents, whose authority was probably decisive in such cases. 
Certainly, there was no attempt to fully impose British and Indian laws on entire 
populations in the Gulf at no time during the British colonial period, except for the period of 
World War One in Ottoman Iraq; likewise, consular jurisdiction had no direct connection 
with territorial expansion.51 However, this was also not the aim of British Imperialism in the 
Gulf during the early 19th century, as discussed earlier. Rather, their aim was to uphold British 
Indian influence in these places in general, and in particular to safeguard the interests of 
British Indian trade. In this regard, capitulary rights and consular jurisdiction seemed to have 
played quite an important role for individuals, such as merchants and pilgrims trying to gain 
redress for losses occurred, as much as for the British Empire to carve out ever more rights 
from decaying empires. In another aspect, consular jurisdiction came to be used also on 
subjects of other empires. However, quite often British policy seemed to follow a directive of 
letting subjects of other empires and states participate in their legal provisions. There was a 
clear difference in regard to the British policy of claiming subjects of other empires between 
the Ottoman Empire in Europe and in Asia. In European provinces, their policy was to keep 
British communities rather small, while in Asian territories it was a much more aggressive 
policy.52 
The actual system of Foreign Jurisdiction in the territories surrounding the Gulf 
played out quite differently. In the case of Muscat, for example, the Sultan agreed in 1873 to 
the extension of British jurisdiction to subjects of Indian native states, especially subjects of 
the Rao of Kutch, resident in that place. All other British Indian subjects in these places and 
in trade relations with India had already come under British jurisdiction during the 1830s. 
                                                
51 Fisch argues that there was a tendency in European consular jurisdiction in general throughout the colonial period to 
encroach upon mixed cases, as European subjects preferred this privilege and their representatives wanted to control their 
subjects. But the institution of consular jurisdiction had nothing to do with legal or territorial expansion. Fisch, Jörg (1992), 
Law as a Means and as an End: Some Remarks on the Function of European and non-European Law in the Process of 
European Expansion. In: W.J. Mommsen/J.A. De Moor (Eds.), European Expansion and Law. The Encounter of European 
and Indigenous Law in 19th- and 20th-Century Africa and Asia. Oxford/New York: Berg Publishers, 22 f. 
52 Berchtold, Recht und Gerechtigkeit in der Konsulargerichtsbarkeit, 279. 
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Henceforth, those British Indian subjects residing in the Sultan’s territory coming from 
British India as well as those subjects from Kutch were considered as British subjects and 
thereby under the jurisdiction of the local British Political Agent, a member of the Indian 
Political Service and subordinate to the Resident in the Persian Gulf.53 In other Gulf States, 
extra-territorial jurisdiction was introduced and started to work at different times. Rulers of 
Muscat and Bahrain had already officially conferred on the British the right to jurisdiction 
over British subjects during the 1830s for the former, and during the 1860s for the latter. For 
the other states, these rights were probably as well conferred, but they were not stipulated. 
They started working in Kuwait in 1925, in Qatar in 1939, and in the Trucial States in 1946.54 
In contrast to the smaller Gulf state formations, the large territorial states of the 
northern Persian Gulf were independent of any formal subjugation to the British Empire. 
Instead of direct means, European powers and especially the British Empire, made use of a 
combination of factors to reach imperial goals. In these countries, one can observe a 
considerable change in the notion of extra-territorial rights from the earlier voluntary granting 
in an effort to avoid the burden of administering justice to foreign merchants to the later 
granting that resulted from military pressure by European states. Now, capitulations were a 
resource of humiliation, seen as undercutting the authority and sovereignty of the Ottoman 
and Persian states.55 However, given financial constraints and the granting of loans from 
foreign powers, Ottoman and Persian rulers held back from abolishing the system. Demands 
of the British Empire in regard to the position of its subjects in the foreign domains were not a 
singular occurrence. Other empires, such as the Austrian-Hungarian and Russian, also 
claimed special rights for their subjects.56 Yet, besides the gradual winning over in 
commercial areas and the increasing influence it seems that the British Empire was more 
successful in this regard than others. This position of privilege of British and British Indian 
subjects in the Persian Gulf during the later 19th century was, however much contested, to last 
for another two decades. While capitulations in the Ottoman Empire were suspended during 
the First World War and finally abolished in the Turkish republic in 1923, capitulary rights in 
Persia existed until 1928, and in some smaller Arab Gulf states into the late 1960s and early 
                                                
53 Agreement regarding Muscat Consular Jurisdiction over subjects of Native States in India residing in Muscat dominions. 
FD, Political (Pol.), Oct 1873, 218-220 A. Also, Aitchison, Treaties, Vol. XI, Pt. III, 309. These subjects were morally 
entitled to receive in foreign territory all privileges enjoyed by Natives of British India in the same locality. Foreign Secy, 
GoI to Secy, Government of Bombay (GoBomb), 3 Feb 1866. FD, Pol., Feb 1866, 9-11 A. 
54 Al Baharna, Husain M. (1998), British Extra-Territorial Jurisdiction in the Gulf 1913-1971. An Analysis of the System of 
British Courts in the Territories of the Gulf during the Pre-Independence Era. Archive Editions: Slough, 10-12, 24-26. 
55 See for example, Hershlag, Zvi Yehuda (1980), Introduction to the Modern Economic History of the Middle East. Brill 
Archive, 151 ff. Also, http://p2.www.britannica.com/eb/article-9020158/capitulation accessed on 2 May 2008. 
56 Deringil for example shows this for subjects of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. Deringil, Selim (1991), Legitimacy 
Structures in the Ottoman State: The Reign of Abdulhamid II (1876-1909), International Journal of Middle East Studies, 23, 
3, 345-359. 
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1970s when they finally received their independence from Britain.57 Provisions of these 
capitulations and the extra-territorial jurisdiction granted were important from after the 1910s, 
when migration processes and the composition of migrant groups from the Indian 
subcontinent started to change. Then, most Indian migrants explicitly served British imperial 
institutions in the region as workers and clerks, and thus the provisions were also used to their 
disadvantage. The regulations in place, especially those in regard to extra-territorial 
jurisdiction, regulated the lives of British imperial subjects and protected persons. In the 
following, I address their mode of operation and consequences for these subjects. 
 
3. Claims to British Nationality: Empire’s Subjects and Protected Persons 
In December 1911 Abdul Samad alias Mir Samad Khan, Son of Habeeb Khan, a 
Pathan of Peshawar, about 45 years of age and a tea maker by profession, had to give ample 
reasons why he wanted to be acknowledged as a British subject residing in the Baghdad 
vilayat (province) of the Ottoman Empire. In an affidavit he explained his life trajectory to 
officers in the Residency. He said he left Peshawar about twenty-five years earlier. He came 
to Baghdad for pilgrimage and stayed there for several years before he moved on to Aleppo 
and Damascus. After travelling this area he finally came to Baghdad in 1908 and married an 
Arab woman who bore him a son. Intending to settle in Baghdad forever, Abdul Samad asked 
for a registration certificate enabling him in future to give proof of his nationality. In order to 
substantiate his claim he produced a discharge certificate from the Commanding Officer of a 
squadron of the Bombay Lancers where he served for little more than four years in the 1890s. 
Abdul Samad gave further verbal proofs of his origin and finally, in May 1912, the Consul at 
Baghdad, John Gordon Lorimer, accepted him “without difficulty” as a British subject.58 
Abdul Samad's case is just one of several instances in which migrants from the Indian 
subcontinent made efforts to register themselves with British Consulates in the Persian Gulf 
before the First World War.59 Different British, Ottoman and Persian regulations at the time 
necessitated such a move and the success or failure to register finally decided to a great extent 
on the applicant's future in the new country. Over the course of long and arduous journeys 
migrants lost their identity documents or never possessed such. Inevitably, at the time of 
application then many were not able to produce veritable documents as required by 
                                                
57 Quaetert, The Ottoman Empire, 78. Al Baharna, British Extra-Territorial Jurisdiction in the Gulf, 10-12. 
58 Papers regarding nationality of British subjects discussed with and admitted by the Turkish Government. BRR, Nationality 
Questions, A.23, 1911-1913. 
59 Given that I had only access to the records of the Baghdad Residency I can make statements solely for this locality. 
However, as will be seen later on in the paper, the process of registration was true for the Persian Gulf in general. A rough 
estimate of the documents available suggests that some two hundred similar cases were dealt with. However, this number 
includes only cases in which applicants did not possess regular identity documents and thus had to prove their nationality by 
other means. 
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regulations. Under such circumstances, registering with the British Consulate still left subjects 
in an ambiguous position. Who would be granted – by way of a registration certificate – the 
status of a British subject and who would not? Most claimants succeeded in the efforts of 
retaining their status as British subjects, while other claims to British nationality – rightfully 
or not – were disputed, at times rejected.60 In a larger framework, this policy expressed the 
concern that only rightful claimants to British nationality were to enjoy the protection and 
extra-territorial rights granted to the British Empire in this region. It also expressed the 
assumption of empires at that time that “each state possessed its own unique laws too exalted 
for others to enjoy.”61 Of course, a grey zone existed in which such considerations were 
secondary. Former Ottoman and Persian subjects, for example Jewish traders, could obtain 
British protection and subject status. In return, the British Empire secured their trade and 
thereby gradually expanded its economic strength and political influence in the region. We 
can also trace singular cases in which British Indians tried to become Ottoman subjects.62 
As stated above, British and British Indian subjects as well as commodities circulated 
to a considerable extent between the Indian subcontinent and the Persian Gulf region. For 
British Indian migration to and living in the Persian Gulf, in the period under review, was 
inevitably of a different kind compared to what contemporaneous forms of coerced and 
indentured migration in the Indian context for example to the West Indies meant. British 
imperial and colonial policy within the Persian Gulf during this early period was rather 
particular about carving out a special status for all those who had rightful claims to being a 
British subject or to enjoy any other form of British protection. Most importantly, the British 
Empire had immanent interests in the economic fortunes of its subject people and the smooth 
functioning of their economic sphere. This policy was, of course, part of a larger effort to 
ensure and increase vital political and economic interests in the region. Eventually, it 
challenged the sovereignty of the respective rulers over their territory. Thus a picture evolves 
in which the British colonial system, in a sense, took on paternalistic role that enabled 
subjects residing in its overseas territories to circulate under the provision of extra-territorial 
rights and jurisdiction. However, especially Ottoman administrators from the late 1880s and 
certain parts of the Persian public from the early 20th century onwards increasingly contested 
this position of privilege, especially of British subjects. In some instances this was regardless 
of religion or race and sometimes British Indian subjects became targets of these resentments. 
                                                
60 Doubtful cases of Nationality of British subjects. BRR, Nationality Questions, Vol. 13, A.25. 
61 Quaetert, The Ottoman Empire, 77. 
62 Mirza Mohammad Mohsin Ali Khan, a fugitive from justice: his attempts to become a Turkish subject. BRR, Files, 464, 
1902-1913. Mirza Mohammad Mohsin Ali Khan had been convicted at the Faizabad court to imprisonment but managed to 
flee to the Ottoman Empire, where he applied for Ottoman nationality. 
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Provisions and operations of the Orders in Council 
On the side of the British Empire the special rights granted by the Ottoman and 
Persian Empires as well as by smaller Gulf state formations resulted into several successive 
Orders in Council for different places, working somehow as executive orders and delineating 
more specifically the rights and duties of British subjects in the foreign country, and several 
other important provisions. The earliest Ottoman Order I found dates from 1873, the earliest 
Persian Coast and Islands Order from 1889. Political and judicial developments in Britain, 
India and in these territories made it necessary time and again to repeal former orders and 
replace them through updated ones. In addition, these Orders were also issued for other places 
during the 19th and 20th centuries, for example for Muscat in 1867, Bahrain in 1913, Kuwait 
in 1926 and Qatar in 1936. However, the substance of all these legislations did not change 
considerably over time. Given shortage of time and space I shall focus here only on the stated 
Ottoman and Persian Coast and Islands Order. 
Judicial relations of a criminal, civil and administrative nature between parties 
involved were regulated according to British or British Indian laws. While one order extended 
only British laws to the Ottoman dominions, two separate orders extended British and British 
Indian laws on the one hand to the southern littoral part of Persia, running from the Mekran 
coast of the Gulf of Oman to the Shatt-al-Arab in the Persian Gulf thus comprising the 
Persian coast and islands, and to the remaining part of Persia on the other hand.63 In fact, the 
provisions of several Acts such as the Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1890 were herewith 
transferred to the countries around the Persian Gulf “as if they were a British colony or 
possession.” 
Certain provisions in these orders allowed for the administration of British subjects in 
the foreign territory. It was thus compulsory for British subjects permanently residing in the 
foreign realms to register themselves once in the beginning of every year with the Consulate 
of the district they lived in. Newcomers had to register within one month after arrival. This 
process involved that applicants, as in the case of Abdul Samad, whom we encountered 
earlier, had to produce either a passport or any other veritable identification document if they 
wanted to receive a certificate on completion of the registration process. Migrants were at 
times not able to produce such documents and thus did not receive a registration certificate. In 
1903, the Government of India warned Indians proceeding to the Ottoman Empire, except to 
                                                
63 Ottoman Order in Council, 1899 (hereafter OOiC). FD, Extl., Nov 1899, 97. Persian Coast and Islands Order in Council, 
1907 (hereafter PCIOiC). FD, Sec. E., Jan 1908, 546. 
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Medina, to carry with them passports or identification documents.64 However, the granting or 
denial of certificates had implications for their future life and the relation to the host society 
too. Ottoman officials demanded proofs of nationality in a number of cases, for instance in 
matters relating to property.65 Another provision in the orders regulated the proceedings after 
the death of a British subject. This implied for example that the Political Resident in the 
consular district was to take into his possession the property of the deceased as long as 
relatives did not make any claims. 
Both orders made it necessary for the Political Residents in the respective domain to 
report to the Governor General or the Secretary of State on the operation of the Order in 
Council every year, showing among others the numbers and circumstances of civil and 
criminal cases and the number of registrations. I was able retrieve these reports only for the 
Persian Coast and Islands Order. The under-mentioned diagram shows for various years the 
number of British and British Indian subjects residing in the area of the Persian coast and 
islands and the number of civil and criminal cases and deaths. 
 
Year Br. subjects Br. Indian Subjects Total subjects Criminal Cases Civil Cases Deaths 
1901 - - - 1 1 1 
1904 3 86 89 2 - 2 
1907 5 93 98 2 2 3 
1909 19 112 131 4 1 4 
1911 23 267 289 - - - 
1913 36 216 252 1 1 - 
 
Table 1. Number of registered British and British Indian subjects, court cases and deaths in the area 
of the Persian coast and islands in various years, 1901-191366 
 
Apart from the different origin and extent of laws that were applied to the respective 
dominions, the Orders contained similar provisions for the jurisdiction over British subjects 
residing in the foreign realms, comprising both natives of any British Protectorate as well as 
other persons enjoying British protection.67 Additionally these provisions extended to the 
property and all personal or proprietary rights and liabilities of all British subjects within the 
                                                
64 Steps taken to inform British Indian subjects proceeding to Turkey of the necessity of providing themselves with passports 
or some similar documents showing their identity. FD, Ext., Dec 1903, 77-80 B. 
65 This was necessitated by an 1867 legislation, which admitted foreigners to possess immovable property on the same title as 
Ottoman subjects and under the same laws and regulations provided a registration certificate was produced. Law conceding 
to Foreigners the right of immovable property in the Ottoman Empire, 7th Sepher 1284 (10 June 1867 accordingly). BRR, 
Files, 25, 1868-1909. 
66 Reports on the operation of the Persian Coast and Islands Order (various years), FD and FPD, various Branches (General, 
Establishment, Secret....). I was not able to trace the reports for several years and could therefore not include them. 
67 OOiC, Art. 5, para. 1-5. PCIOiC, Art. 5, para. 1-5. Persons that enjoyed British protection often included religious or other 
minorities such as Jews and Armenians. But also European traders such as Germans were at times included, especially when 
their respective governments did not have a representation in the country and thus applied for British protection of their 
subjects. 
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limits of the order; to Persian or Ottoman subjects and foreigners under certain circumstances; 
and finally to British ships with their boats, the persons and property on board or belonging 
thereto.68 Another provision made it possible for Ottoman and Persian subjects to file a case 
against a British subject in a British court in the territory of the foreign country;69 in return, 
British subjects were able to file a case against native subjects in the established British courts 
as also in Ottoman or Persian courts.70 
These provisions of course helped to build an informal sphere of the British Empire in 
the territories and impinged in a number of ways on the sovereignty of the respective rulers 
over their territory and subjects. Together with these orders British courts were established in 
several cities over the region with the respective Political Residents acting as judges in these 
courts. This resulted to an almost duplicate system of jurisdiction. Given the fact that native 
and British subjects could file cases against each other at British courts or at Persian and 
Ottoman courts that were divided into religious ('shar) and civil ('urf) courts meant a real 
blow to the rulers of the territories.71 
There were a number of reasons for persons, whether eligible to the status of British 
Indian subjects and protected persons or not, to enrol and register with the local authorities. 
On the one hand, it was a way to prevent, or forego, conscription into the Ottoman Army. It 
seems to have been common practice of the army to go through the streets and to enrol 
whoever was not able to make representations otherwise.72 A registration certificate taken out 
from the consular establishment was thus a way to secure protection from claims of foreign 
authorities, and a way to represent grievances to the resident or consul in the foreign country 
of abode. This included on the one hand business claims of British subjects and protected 
persons against Arab and Persian merchants, and on the other hand claims against the 
respective governments because of local tribes who frequently looted caravans, native crafts 
and other establishments of merchants. 
As regards the process of applying for British nationality, local British officials often 
inquired quite meticulously into claims of British nationality in order to strictly verify their 
correctness before admitting them. This included interviews of claimants and witnesses 
conducted by residents, consuls and subordinate residency staff, the proof of relevant identity 
                                                
68 Ibid. 
69 OOiC, Art. 150, para. 1. PCIOiC, Art. 38. 
70 OOiC, Art. 150, para. 1, Art. 152. PCIOiC, Art. 40. In either case, respective subjects had to abide to decisions of the 
courts. 
71 For a discussion as regards jurisdiction in Persia see Floor, op. cit., p. 133-137. 
72 Nationality of Allowee Ibn Abdul Hussain and his sons. FD, Pol., Jul 1881, 219-227 A. Nationality of certain men in 
Turkish Arabia who are claimed by the local authorities as Ottoman subjects. FD, Pol., Aug 1881, 607-613 A. Forcible 
enrolment in the Ottoman Army of two British Indian Subjects. FD, Pol., Feb 1882, 73-83 A. 
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documents and giving of affidavits, as well as gathering information from other authorities, 
whether foreign or British Indian. 
The Baghdad resident, for example, noted the need for such procedure when inquiring 
for information from the government of Bengal about one particular claimant. Accordingly, 
the advantages of being recognized as British subject in Turkish lands (i.e. the exemption 
from military service and from certain taxes) were sometimes fraudulently claimed by persons 
not entitled to it, and were also frequently contested by the local Turkish authorities. 
Consequently, claims were not consented to until the consulted authorities responded, or 
rejected in case they responded negatively.73 
 
4. Socio-Economic Aspects of Nationality and Jurisdiction 
The regulations were of course also reaching into the economic sphere as personal and 
proprietary rights of British subjects were explicitly stated in the orders. We can account for a 
number of instances in which the British Empire, or the Political Residents at the places, 
demanded the payment of liabilities that either the Governments or their subjects had with 
British and British Indian merchants and traders. Also in other peripheral cases the 
jurisdiction had implications for subjects. If a subject had been convicted to imprisonment 
before a British or a native court they were handed over to the respective Consulate to further 
deal with them. Sometimes they were interned in the jails that some Consulates possessed or 
they were sent to Bombay for imprisonment. 
However difficult it is to make specific remarks on the Ottoman perception of British 
and British Indian subjects in the Persian Gulf we can account for several situations in which 
these subjects became the aim of an Ottoman administration in Mesopotamia that was 
marked, in certain ways, by bureaucratic power and ill-will. As indicated above, foreign 
subjects in the Ottoman Empire in general were not exclusively independent from Ottoman 
administrative authorities and procedures but had to relate to them in a number of instances, 
for example in cases including real estate or marriages with Ottoman subjects. Here these 
subjects were dependent on the goodwill of the singular administrators who could delay the 
processes involved or comment on the subject's origin. 
We come across one instance of administrative delay, possibly for political reasons, in 
the case of the British subject Ibrahim son of Hasan Panjabi, originally from Peshawar, whose 
                                                
73 Consul-General, Baghdad to Secy, Government of Bengal (GoBeng), Pol. Dep., 3 Oct 1913. BRR, Nationality Questions, 
A.311-A.320, 1909-1914. This was the case of Saiyid Muhammad Ali, who had allegedly come from Calcutta for pilgrimage 
as well as to find a job in the Baghdad Railway works in 1913. The Bengal authorities were neither able to trace the address 
nor the family relations which the claimant had given in his affidavit. Under Secy, GoBeng to Consul-General, Baghdad, 9 
Dec 1913, Ibid. He had probably left Baghdad by January 1914. Note, 16 Jan 1914, Ibid. 
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plan was in 1898 to marry his brother Muhammad Ali to an Arab woman. In such cases, 
Ottoman regulations made it necessary to apply to and receive from local authorities 
permission to marry a Turkish subject. Within a period of several years, Ibrahim and consular 
officials addressed letters to various institutions including the Wali (Governor) of Baghdad. 
An initial reply totally rejected the case saying that Indians and Afghans in general were like 
Persians, prohibited from marrying Turkish subjects. Only in 1903, four years after Ibrahim's 
initial request, a final answer issued that the marriage could take place on the ground that 
foreign Muslim subjects could marry women of the same sect. However, Shia Muslims in 
general were not allowed to marry Sunnis.74 
Subjects and protected persons of the British Empire received similar treatment from 
Persian authorities, which had to do with commercial considerations. In this regard, one also 
witnesses British Indian and Persian attempts to claim subjects of other states, either residing 
in their territory or not. This was common British practice also in the Asian parts of the 
Ottoman Empire.75 One particular case spoke volumes in these regards. While travelling in 
Egypt, Abdul Hussein Shirazi, reportedly a rich merchant residing in Bombay, and his son 
Mirza Mohamed were claimed by the local Persian Consul General as Persians, although 
bearing a passport issued by the Bombay government that recognized them as British 
subjects. Enquiring information from superior authorities about the merchant’s status, the 
British Consul at Cairo expressed the undesirability of conceding to his Persian colleague’s 
wishes unless evidence would suggest otherwise, especially since this could form a dangerous 
precedent for the future. His caution was also based on previous experience with yet another 
British Indian in Cairo, Mirza Fadlullah, whom the Persian authorities frequently claimed. He 
was prompted to ascertain that “Persian Consular officials in the East are only too desirous of 
claiming rich Indians of Persian origin as their own nationals, as it is from such sources that 
they are enabled by exaction to derive the greater part of their incomes.”76 
Subsequent enquiries from Bombay authorities brought to light that Abdul Hussein 
Shirazi had resided in Bombay ever since arriving there in about 1856. His father, Haji 
Zynool Abidin, had become a naturalized British subject in 1858, when he was still a minor 
aged eight, which carried with it the dependent’s naturalization as well. Later on, he was a 
merchant and agent to the Bombay Persian Steam Navigation Company and created a Justice 
                                                
74 Marriage of a British Indian subject with an Arab woman. BRR, Files, 398, 1898-1906. 
75 However, quite often British policy seemed to follow a directive of letting subjects of other empires and states participate 
in their legal provisions. Arguably, there was a difference in regard to the British policy of claiming subjects of other empires 
between the Ottoman Empire in Europe and in Asia. In European provinces, their policy was to keep British communities 
rather small, while in Asian territories it was a much more aggressive policy. Berchtold, Recht und Gerechtigkeit in der 
Konsulargerichtsbarkeit. 
76 Persian Consul, Cairo to Consul-General, Cairo 4 May 1888. Consul-General, Cairo to Secretary of State (SoS) for Foreign 
Affairs, 20 May 1888. FD, Ext., Dec 1888, 158-173. 
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of the Peace for the Presidency town in 1884, which according to section 23 of the Criminal 
Procedure Code presumed that he was not the subject of a foreign state. As all his intentions 
suggested, Abdul Hussein had elected a British Indian nationality, the Indian authorities 
considered him being correctly treated as a British subject.77 
Authorities in Britain acknowledged the peculiarities of the case. Accordingly, British 
Indian naturalization had no legal effect beyond the limits of British India, and despite the 
naturalized subject being entitled to diplomatic and consular protection in foreign countries, 
the naturalization did not strictly withdraw “him from Persian jurisdiction in Persia nor from 
the jurisdiction of the Persian Consular Courts in the Ottoman dominions when those Courts 
have extra-territorial jurisdiction.” However, based on the fact that the Russian government 
had been allowed for some time by Persian authorities to treat those Russian subjects 
formerly being Persian even in Persia as Russian subjects, the British Foreign Office scented 
a possible loophole. Citing stipulations of the Treaty of Paris of March 1857, which had 
ended the Anglo-Persian War and conferred the most-favoured nation status on both parties, 
they demanded rights for their subjects and commerce equal to the ones Russia was able to 
acquire, and directed their Cairo representative to properly insist on Abdul Hussein Shirazi 
being considered and treated as a British protected subject.78 
 
5. Early Labour Migration and Legal Implications 
At the turn of the century, the international position of the Ottoman and Persian 
Empires was characterized simultaneously by high debts to European powers, as well as an 
underdeveloped industry and commerce. On the contrary, European empires backed by 
economically lucrative possessions such as British India were able to develop and invest 
abroad and played on these empires’ plight. The dependent powers were left to buy European 
technology and services for the erection of necessary infrastructure.79 In the Gulf region, this 
circumstance obviously facilitated British business presence, and major British and small-
scale British Indian enterprises started operating in these parts. The former were active in 
works connected to large-scale industrial projects in Ottoman and Persian parts of the Gulf, 
such as the building of railways and roads, irrigation works, and shipping, while Indian 
                                                
77 SoS for India to Governor-General, 28 June 1888. Under Secy, FD to Secy, PD, GoBomb, 27 July 1888. Secy, GoBomb to 
Foreign Secy, GoI, 17 Aug 1888 Ibid. Secy, GoBomb to Foreign Secy, GoI, 15 Oct 1888. Statement of Abdul Hussein 
Shirazi, 26 Sept 1888. Viceroy to SoS for India, 27 Nov 1888, Ibid. 
78 SoS for Foreign Affairs to Consul-General, Cairo, 11 Jan 1889. FD, Ext., May 1889, 8-12. 
79 Quaetert, The Ottoman Empire, 71 f. As for railways, with a few exceptions foreign capital built almost all lines in the 
Ottoman Empire. Ibid., 121. 
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enterprises connected to this stream were more of an intermediary character.80 Contrary to the 
traditional trading businesses then prevalent, these new operations included more 
industrialized forms of production that necessitated different sets of skills. Moreover, the 
local labour supply was thought of as insufficiently skilled and scarce by imperial firms and 
companies. In concession agreements concluded with the respective governments, the 
companies promised to adhere to certain principles in regard to their operations. 
Thus, expanding business interests in the Gulf triggered in part considerations within 
British enterprises and beyond, and at times actually led to the implementation, of importing 
labour from various places in India. Individual contractors, private enterprises and officials 
asked for and Indian governmental officials discussed the possibilities of Indian labour 
migration to certain Gulf destinations. Within these consultations, some of the legal 
implications depicted above came into the picture, with other legal aspects of the colonial 
state adding. Most especially, the Indian Emigration Act of 1883 posed major problems in 
regard to proposed endeavours. It principally stipulated that Indian ports from and countries 
to which emigration was lawful had to be specifically notified as such. But none of the Gulf 
countries were notified accordingly, and only Calcutta, Madras and Bombay were ports from 
which emigration was generally lawful.81 Although parts of the Indian government were quite 
hesitant initially to allow labour emigration to such places, small spaces opened up 
nevertheless to accommodate decisions in the colonial legal apparatus favourable to private 
enterprises, the commercial position of ports, and regional and governmental interests. 
One of the earliest discussions in this regard was over the recruitment of labour for the 
erection and extension of residency and consulate buildings in Muscat, Persia and 
Mesopotamia. In November 1903, the Bombay government pleaded to the central authorities 
to allow future emigration to these places from Karachi under sections 7 and 8 of the Indian 
Emigration Act of 1883. Several contractors for government works had earlier asked for 
permission to despatch necessary coolies and artisans to such destinations, but legal 
restrictions then only allowed emigration from Karachi under special provisions to East 
                                                
80 One important British company, among others, was Messrs. Lynch Brothers who operated the Euphrates and Tigris Steam 
Navigation Co. in Mesopotamia as well as a line on the Karun river since its opening up to foreign trade in the late 1880s. At 
least in Persia, they were also active in building and managing of roads. Shahnavaz, Shahbaz (2005), Britain and the opening 
up of South-West Persia 1880-1914: A Study in Imperialism and Economic Dependence. London: Routledge, Chp. 6-7. 
Irrigation projects in Mesopotamia are invariably connected to Sir William Willcocks, a British Indian engineer and then 
Adviser to the Turkish government for irrigation projects, and several British companies, who implemented his plans. One 
example is Sir John Jackson Ltd. Co., London. Indian enterprises are less known by name, while their existence is shown in 
the following case of Karachi firms. 
81 Section 7 and 8, Indian Emigration Act of 1883. In: Royal Commission on Labour. Foreign Reports. Vol. II. The Colonies 
and the Indian Empire. House of Commons Parliamentary Papers, C. 6795-XI, 1892, 234. 
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Africa, in connection to the building of the Uganda Railway, and to the Seychelles.82 
Allegedly, these and various other firms as much as Sind authorities had viable commercial 
and economic interests in such an amendment that would spare the former additional costs for 
channelling labourers to the Gulf via Bombay, and overall improve regional trade links with 
the Gulf.83 The Indian government was quite reluctant initially, though. Various officials of 
the emigration branch strongly objected to any action on the lines proposed and expressed 
fears it would allow also emigration apart from that connected to government and its 
contractors. For the time being, the central government suggested that other provisions of 
emigration law should be used in the case of artisans, while requesting more information on 
the extent of proposed coolie emigration before taking any decision.84 Further representations 
as to the urgent necessity of an amendment met with replies that labour could be obtained 
easier from Bombay instead.85 
Within this process, the Indian Foreign Secretary, Louis William Dane, 
compassionately argued for an amendment on proposed lines, if no other solution was 
available. Commenting that coolies and artisans, as British subjects, were sure of fair 
treatment because of capitulations effective in the places mentioned, he thought it 
[…] rather ridiculous that the provisions of the Emigration Act intended for the benefit of 
the Indian artisans and coolies should work to deprive them of a chance of making honest 
money and Government of their services on Government works where other skilled 
labour is not readily available. […], [and that] a little judicious illegality is desirable if the 
object cannot be achieved otherwise […].86 
 
Principally, he argued that the protection and efficient safeguarding of Indian labour 
migrants was provided for by British imperial rights over its subjects, for example in regard to 
jurisdiction, as well as the wide-spread presence of British officials in northern Gulf 
countries. Admittedly, his view contrasted existing law. The Indian Emigration Act of 1883 
clearly stipulated that in order to notify a country for emigration, the Governor General had to 
officially confirm that laws and provisions of the country to which emigration was to be 
sanctioned were sufficient for the protection of emigrants during residence therein.87 In 
                                                
82 GoBomb, General Department (GD) to Secy, Revenue and Agriculture (RA), GoI, 25 Nov 1903. RA, Emigration (Emi.), 
Jan 1904, 1. Note, Emi., Jan 1904, 1-5. 
83 Collector, Karachi to Commissioner, Sind, 8 Feb 1904. Commissioner, Sind to GD, GoBomb, 12 Feb 1904. RA, Emi., Jul 
1904, 6 A. Several merchant houses showed interest in recruiting Indian labour. Among these were Messrs. B.R. Herman and 
Co., the Swiss-based coffee and cotton traders Messrs. Volkart Bros., Seth Jewanji Ibrahimji and Co., Seth Sheikh Adamji 
Jewanji, Seth Jesraj Valiji, Mr. Edulji Lodawalla. Protector of Emigrants, Karachi to Commissioner, Sind, 25 Jan 1904, Ibid. 
84 An official pointed out that the laws and provisions prevailing in Muscat would adhere to the necessary statement to allow 
out-migration, but expressed doubts for Persia and Turkey. Note, Ibid., p. 1. See also Note, J.O. Miller, Ibid. Note, Denzil 
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9 Dec 1903. RA, Emi., Jan 1904, 2-5. 
86 Note, L.W. Dane, Ibid., p. 5. 
87 Indian Emigration Act, Royal Commission on Labour, 234. 
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another observation on the proposed amendments, we can not only witness arguments of 
procedure pertaining to the case, but also that departments within the Indian government held 
quite opposing views, and diverse intentions and explanations on issues of emigration. 
Officials in the emigration branch, thus, were less optimistic about the case and wanted more 
and precise information about the extent of emigration. As one officer noted: “Even if it is 
decided to venture on a little judicious illegality, it is as well to know precisely to what extent 
the law is being exceeded.”88 
The issue still being under discussion in March 1904, Bombay brought forth strong 
support from several Sind authorities to dispel any fears held by the Indian government. 
According to them, the Epidemic Diseases Act would prevent unrestricted coolie emigration 
from that port following its opening to emigration, while sparing Karachi-based contractors to 
send artisans five hundred miles to embark from Bombay.89 Further statements voiced these 
present restrictions’ negative economic effects for the business of Karachi firms and the 
general interests of that port. The former had been sending workmen to the places already for 
years, fearing a loss in their operation now if they were to abandon their competitive 
advantage of proximity to the Gulf over rival Bombay firms.90 
While the Protector of Emigrants in Karachi also pleaded for an amendment, the city’s 
collector seemed to have the most intriguing arguments favouring the procedure. He pointed 
to the constant flow of labour between Karachi and the Gulf ports, especially a number of 
artisans, chiefly masons, that migrated every year to Basra and Muscat in expectation of 
obtaining employment there. He professed that they merely went in search of employment 
and not under a contract, thus not being covered under the provisions of the Emigration Act. 
Attributing this to restrictions in place that allegedly drove artisans to emigration without 
certainty of employment, he argued instead for a system of assuring labourers of their future 
under a contract. He estimated that the dangers arising from the present system were greater 
than those to be apprehended from the possibility of men being occasionally engaged on 
objectionable terms or of the employees not fulfilling the terms of the contract.91 He 
substantiated his argument through two instances and left it rather rhetorically for government 
to decide whether they would give reasonable facilities to Karachi firms for sending labour 
                                                
88 Note by R.E.V. Arbuthnot, Ibid. 
89 GD, GoB to RA, GoI, 11, 13 March 1904. RA, Emi., July 1904, 5-13 A. 
90 Commissioner, Sind to GD, GoBomb, 12 Feb 1904. Collector of Karachi to Commissioner, Sind, 8 Feb 1904. Ibid. 
91 Collector, Karachi to Commissioner, Sind, 8 Feb 1904. Ibid. One case referred to some 225 artisans, riveters, carpenters, 
and masons recruited from Karachi for the construction of buildings connected to the residency at Baghdad and of steamers 
that the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company built at Basra. The offenders were punished for recruiting labour to 
these places. The second case referred to an advertisement of the company Jewanji Ibrahimji & Co., wherein they advised 
artisans to proceed to Muscat on the distinct understanding that the advertising firms of contractors will employ them there at 
certain specified rates of wages. 
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overseas, or to further tolerate adopting modes of evasion. If the law was not amended as 
proposed, he prophesied detriments “to the interests and welfare of the very class of persons 
whom it is the object of […] the Emigration Act to protect.”92 
Overall, the arguments in favour of amendment on proposed lines had convinced the 
Indian government. Towards the end of March 1904 they declared the port of Karachi to be a 
port from which emigration was lawful, providing for a cancellation as soon as the need for it 
no longer existed.93 In this particular case we see unravel a number of reasons and 
environments for legislation to finally take place. In this particular case, considerations were 
less about the needs of government to procure labour, but the adherence to commercial 
interests of certain regions and business interests of certain merchants. 
In other circumstances, similar discussions took place as well, albeit under different 
pretexts. Considerations of the British Indian engineer William Willcocks over several years 
during the early 1900s to import Indian coolie labour for irrigation projects in southern 
Mesopotamia afford a particularly astonishing example. A graduate from Thomason 
Engineering College at Rurki in India in 1872, Willcocks started his career in the irrigation 
department of the United Provinces, and subsequently continued to work in Egypt and South 
Africa. Becoming adviser to the Turkish government for public works some time during the 
early 1900s, he actually stayed in Mesopotamia only from 1908 and 1911 to oversee the 
works finally sanctioned by the Ottoman administration.94 While still employed by the 
Egyptian government, Willcocks already professed a clear vision for the re-transformation of 
the Tigris region and its surroundings into the flourishing and prospering land it had been 
some two and a half millennia earlier. This, however, seemed inevitably connected to 
“labourers from India and possibly from Egypt [who] will dig the canals, construct the 
weirs and regulators, and then settle down in millions to reclaim and cultivate these lands 
potent with future wealth, just as though they were in another Punjab or another Egypt.”95 
 
In his vision, the scope of future immigration of “thousands and tens of thousands of 
industrious labourers from British India, and possibly from Egypt […] flocking to the Delta of 
the Tigris” also benefited the construction of railway connections that could in turn transport 
“men and materials from the Persian Gulf to the irrigation canals, renovated fields, and rising 
                                                
92 Ibid. 
93 Notification, 23 Mar 1904. RA, GoI to GD, GoBomb, 26 Mar 1904. Under Secy, RA, GoI to Legislative Department (LD), 
6 May 1904. Ibid. 
94 For his autobiography, see Willcocks, Sixty years in the East. The importance of Indian irrigation engineering within the 
empire is closer scrutinised in David Gilmartin (2006), ‘Imperial Rivers: Irrigation and British Visions of Empire’. In: 
Ghosh, Durba/Kennedy, Dane (Eds.), Decentring Empire: Britain, India and the Transcolonial World. New Delhi. 
95 Willcocks, William (1903), The Restoration of the Ancient Irrigation Works on the Tigris, Or, The Recreation of Chaldea. 
Cairo: National Printing Department, 16. 
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towns of Upper Chaldea.”96 In 1904, William Morgan Moylan, a negotiator for some of the 
large irrigation works under Willcocks, obtained information from the Indian government that 
the Commerce and Industry Department had to be applied to for sanctioning the emigration of 
coolie labour for works outside India.97 
By 1905 at the latest, Willcocks had a clearer view of designs and estimates that 
possible irrigation works in Mesopotamia would entail. These first plans resulted in a book 
publication during the same year in which he dwelled on necessary work processes, giving 
descriptions of the general population of Iraq and specifically referring to the types of 
craftsmen needed to carry out the building work, with the number of builders available in 
Baghdad and rates of pay.98 However, the text did not at all refer to Indian labour. Again, a 
similar report a couple of years later included a section concerning labour, but stated that it 
was available plentiful, although periods existed in spring and autumn when people were busy 
with ploughing, sowing and harvesting. Local Sheikhs were engaged to give guarantees to the 
government of supplying workmen.99 
Despite the absence of references to recruitment of external labour in these reports, 
Willcocks was still interested and he himself acquired further information on the possible 
supply of Indian labour. In 1909, for example, Willcocks foresaw that he might require about 
15,000 Indian labourers, in case the proposed works were sanctioned and entrusted to him by 
the Ottoman government, after which the Baghdad resident sounded out Indian authorities on 
whether any legal difficulties existed in obtaining such labour.100 Shortly afterwards, 
Willcocks officially addressed the Resident on the idea of importing Indian labour, which he 
thought necessary for it would be “[…] the first occasion on which foreign labour, provided 
by British subjects, will have been imported into this country.”101 The Indian government’s 
response was not overwhelming. Alongside a copy of the Indian Emigration Act of 1908, they 
stated with reference to its section 4 that they were not ordinarily disposed to allow 
“emigration under indenture to countries not under the British flag.” Permitting it in the case 
                                                
96 Ibid., p. 31. 
97 William Morgan Moylan to Under Secy, FD, GoI, 18 Oct 1904. FD, Gen., Oct 1909, 97. Slightly later than Willcocks 
(AMICE 1885, and MICE 1887), Moylan became associated member of the Institution of Civil Engineers in 1902 and a 
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98 Willcocks, Sir William (1905), The Irrigation of Mesopotamia. Cairo: National Printing Department, 45, 122. 
99 Willcocks, Sir William (1911), The Irrigation of Mesopotamia. London: Spon, 95. 
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of Mesopotamia would depend partly on the political situation at the time, while it would 
require the Ottoman Government itself to put forward diplomatically any such proposal and to 
take responsibility for the proper treatment of labourers and the fulfilment of terms on which 
they were to engage.102 
Works on the Hindiya barrage, the major project proposed by Willcocks and 
commenced under him in 1911, were transferred to the London-based Sir John Jackson Ltd. 
Co. after some time and finalized before commencement of World War One.103 The available 
archive does not reveal whether Indian labour was employed at any time during completion of 
the works.104 Nor does it say whether the Ottoman government undertook any such proposal, 
nor whether Indian labour was recruited otherwise. That Willcocks did not mention the idea 
of using Indian labour in reports and proposals submitted to the Ottoman government possibly 
demonstrates that it was a contentious issue, or not an issue at all. Given the tense political 
situation at the time and the concession agreements concluded between government and 
enterprises, which often stipulated the strict use of local labour, Indian labour probably did 
not come into the country. After all, these projects were also sites of prestige even for a 
dependent power like the Ottoman Empire, for which the employment of one’s own labour 
resources might have seemed an inevitable necessity, given that enterprises engaged were 
necessarily European. This was to be different only a few years later during the 
Mesopotamian war campaign, when many Indian labourers and technical staff were engaged 
on irrigation and dam projects in the country.105 
These two examples show that the colonial state allowed and facilitated under certain 
circumstances emigration, under indenture or otherwise, to places not unequivocally notified 
as such, thereby foregoing emigration laws in force. Permissions depended however, inter 
alia, on the exceptional status of the proposed scheme, the future employer’s application for 
such cases, the nature of the laws and provisions in the country of immigration, and a 
guarantee by the importer of treating the migrant labourer according to contract. Mobilising 
Indian labour was also conditioned by the political will of elastically interpreting respective 
policies, which were higher the higher regional or imperial interests were. While voicing the 
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will and aim of the colonial state to mobilise labour, it was rather of a clandestinely 
facilitating nature, neither putting it directly nor inscribing it into legislation. This had to do 
with considerations of ordinarily allowing emigration to countries under the British flag only, 
and not to others. Although most of them were independent state formations, it proved more 
viable to allow emigration to certain Gulf destinations, such as Muscat, that were in closer or 
more subordinate relation to the British Empire, than to parts belonging to sovereign states, 
such as the Ottoman Empire and Persia. Above examples elide, however, that apart from 
facilitating a decision to emigration extra-territorial British rights more directly impacted on 
Indian labour in countries of immigration as well. Whenever disputes arose between a British 
employer and an employee being a British subject in regard to labour contracts, they were 
referred for decision according to British Indian laws to the closest British diplomat 
concurrently holding magisterial powers to preside over a consular court. The next chapters 
also ask for effects this procedure finally resulted in. 
While permissions were granted to some enterprises for importing labour from the 
Indian subcontinent already during this period, labour migration on a more considerable scale 
took place only with developments initiated by the exploitation of oil and the war campaign. 
These conjunctures marking new environments and circumstances for labour requirements 
allowed for increasing exceptions and their necessary transcription into legal forms rendering 
possible the obtainment of a wide array of Indian labour resources for the Gulf. 
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II. Mobilising Resources, Securing Empire’s Commodity: Oil and War Economy 
The political order in the Persian Gulf underwent a dramatic transformation after the 
first decade of the twentieth century. During the period sketched above, various imperial 
formations were first of all concerned with the region’s political and geo-strategic importance. 
Mercantile and/or religious activities and exchange played an important role, yet mostly in the 
sense that political actors appropriated them as justifications for increased regional 
engagement and wrestling for greater authority, and not as motives in and of themselves. The 
discovery and exploitation of oil raised the economic stakes that directly affected British 
political and strategic designs in the Gulf. Hence, international powers were increasingly 
interested in the region’s resources, even to the extent of waging war and occupation. 
Overall, the inception of oil exploitation and the First World War considerably altered 
British India’s Gulf connection, and vice-versa. Definitely, the coming of oil and the 
numerous immediate and more distant processes enabling its production, distribution and 
consumption, fundamentally changed interregional links between the Indian subcontinent and 
the Gulf.106 Yet, the rise of oil economies in Arab Gulf countries and related patterns of 
production and consumption during the late 1930s was not without precedent. Rather, these 
formations built on previous patterns of labour migration and consumption proving crucial to 
the exploitation and marketing of Gulf oil from the early 20th century. Within the 
transformative processes that were about to set in and prevail for several years, British India 
enjoyed a particularly important stake. As a central hub from which the British Empire 
exerted power over the Persian Gulf, its position rose to higher importance than ever before. 
Besides providing empire, in a political-strategic sense, a proxy from which to usurp the 
adjacent Gulf, it moreover contributed vast economic and human resources crucial to imperial 
aims. These materialised within the oil operations of southern Persia and in the 
Mesopotamian campaign of World War One and its aftermath to the extent that both 
enterprises ran to a considerable extent on Indian resources, material and human. 
 
1. Oil Operations and their Imperial Link 
When receiving word of the first oil strike at Masjid-i-Sulaiman in Persian Khuzestan 
in late May 1908, the Indian government was yet to discover that resource’s broader 
implication for Empire’s near and more distant future.107 The search for oil had started in 
1901 under a sixty-year concession given to the British businessman William Knox D’Arcy, 
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remaining unsuccessful initially. When D’Arcy ran out of money in 1905, the British state – 
fearing other competitors would obtain the concession – induced the Burmah Oil Company 
(BOC) to gain a majority stake in the undertaking and thus support further exploration in 
Persia. With the Indian government’s considerable intervention on supply and demand in the 
oil market, the latter company had been operating virtually without competition Burmese 
oilfields already for a decade or so, its Glasgow-based owners pocketing large profits through 
their near-monopoly market position on the Indian subcontinent and as the sole source in the 
entire Empire for the Royal Navy’s early fuel demands.108 
 
 
Picture 1. Early geological survey party in Persia, 1910109 
 
Following the Persian oil strike in 1908, the new group of concessionaires instituted 
the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) in 1909 and started erecting the company’s 
installations in Abadan and other places. However, it was not before 1913 that the company 
commenced production in viable commercial numbers, breaking even only some time 
afterwards.110 During the initial years, the company was not directly involved in local 
operations, but handed these to their managing agents of Strick, Scott & Co., a business joint 
venture already established in the Gulf with offices in Basra, Mohammerah, Ahvaz and 
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Baghdad.111 Another important company was Shaw Wallace & Co., a British Indian trading 
house firmly established in the subcontinent. It had been acting for the BOC as its 
commodity’s distributor and simultaneously as recruiting agent throughout India already 
since the 1890s, later assuming these tasks for APOC as well.112 After the 1920s, this system 
of managing and recruiting agents was dispensed with and the companies’ own branches took 
over responsibility for production, distribution and recruitment. 
Finding and commanding its own oil resource and constant supply within the empire 
was of quite an importance to Britain, which had otherwise very little at its command. 
Furthermore, the oil quality for example of Burma was not such that it could be easily refined 
into benzine and petroleum for purposes of heating machines, then increasingly used for ships 
and railways, as was the Persian oil. In this way, Persia’s oil resources were regarded as 
highly important to imperial politics. On the other hand, APOC along with several other oil 
companies constantly lobbied for business-friendly decisions of the British government and 
repeatedly attempted placing themselves under state control, willing to fulfil strategic 
needs.113 With such close connections between the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and British 
imperial politics emerging, the next step was not too far. In 1913, company managers started 
negotiating with the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, about oil supplies for the 
Royal Navy. In exchange for future secure supplies to its fleet, the British government 
suggested to inject new capital into the company. In May 1914, the government bought more 
than half of the company’s shares from BOC, and, in doing so, acquired a controlling interest 
in APOC.114 Simultaneously, the Admiralty signed the first contract with the company to 
supply a certain amount of heating oil to the Royal Navy’s fleet for 30 years at fixed prices.115 
British Navy ships increasingly switched from coal to oil burning from 1912 onwards, but it 
took several more years to complete this process, giving APOC ample scope for further 
prosperity.116 Other channels of distribution opened up soon after, one important being the 
Indian railway system that started using oil instead of coal progressively from 1917 
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onwards.117 Throughout the war campaign, the company also supplied British and Indian 
forces in the field, which greatly demanded petroleum products. 
 
Safeguarding the company’s operations 
With APOC thus closely connected to the British government and of greatest 
importance to its larger strategy within the Indian Empire, imperial authorities had substantial 
material interests in securing the company’s precincts, the oilfields and operations thereon as 
well as the product’s land and maritime transport routes. While not ruling out dissonances 
within Indian authorities regarding the policy to be pursued towards the oil company, many of 
the local British officers and officials of the Indian government apparatus were particularly 
concerned about the company’s well being and its fortune. British Indian military might and 
capabilities had been crucial from the outset to defend the undertaking, even when oil was 
still to be explored and APOC not yet floated. In 1907, for example, soldiers of the 18th 
Bengal Lancers under the command of Captain Arnold Wilson were sent to Ahvaz from 
Bombay in order to reinforce the local consular guard. In reality, they protected British 
drillers searching for oil from local people trying to defend their grazing grounds.118 
Furthermore, the officer’s responsibility included making surveys of the areas under 
concession and negotiating with local rulers further specifics of the company’s operations, 
such as the lease of additional land. Noting the company’s brisk rise, Wilson wrote later on 
that he was privileged to assist in the company’s “prenatal creation and subsequent birth”, 
being able to observe at closer quarters its “rapid growth to healthy maturity”.119 
Shortly before and throughout the war period, the company also constantly voiced 
concerns over their installation’s internal and external security, asking British and Indian 
authorities to help out, mostly encountering positive response. In April 1914, the British 
consul at Mohammerah, Major Haworth, represented to the Political Resident in the Persian 
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Gulf the need of an Indian guard for the Abadan refinery. The company had become quite 
nervous after several outrages, a particularly recent one that included five hundred employees 
of the Lurs community who had destroyed company property after one of them died in an 
accident involving an Indian engine driver. Reportedly, the guard of thirty men provided by 
the local Sheikh was not able to cope with the volatile situation, necessitating the Consul to 
arrive with escorts borrowed from other places. Although the local guards seemed unreliable, 
Haworth subsequently explained company officials the necessity of retaining them “to mark 
the ultimate responsibility of the Local Government.” However, in order to take action, he 
suggested a guard of Indians to “strengthen the backbone of the Sheikh’s men.” This being 
their main task, the consul thought it more expedient, when referring the question to the 
Sheikh, to explain the necessity for additional guards to be present as a measure to control the 
Indian labour employed in Abadan. The Sheikh would certainly not object since he had 
complained about the Indians’ immoral conduct of drinking and gambling earlier. Given that 
Indian authorities would possibly object to taking up any such responsibility, the Resident 
suggested that the company’s agent in India could be introduced to Indian military authorities 
for help in recruiting.120 
 
Picture 2. Oil-pumping station at Tembi. Tents of Indian soldiers in foreground, about 1916.121 
 
The company’s installations had to be further protected during the war, especially 
from repeating attacks of the Tangsir, Kashgai and other local tribes instigated and lead by the 
notorious German diplomat Wilhelm Wassmuss. These insurrections, probably consented to 
                                                
120 Consul, Arabistan to Political Resident, Bushehr, 25 Apr 1914. Political Resident, Bushehr to FPD, GoI, 10 May 1914. 
FPD, Extl., Jun 1914, 421-424 B. One APOC official stated that they would require five posts at different points of the 
works. Haworth suggested subsequently recruiting 37 men, including one jemadar and hawaldar, five naiks and thirty 
ordinary men. Retired soldiers of Punjabi regiments, preferably Punjabi Muslims, who were to be private employees of the 
company, were seen as most desirable. 
121 BP Archive, University of Warwick. Archival Ref. 170431_019. 
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by German authorities, addressed the company’s installations as well as sites of British local 
authorities in the region. While rewards were offered for his capture, Wassmuss rose to 
particular fame as ‘Britenschreck’ and was ultimately termed the “German Lawrence of 
Arabia”.122 Primarily in response to these activities, Indian authorities agreed to send 
Brigadier-General Percy Sykes, member of the Indian Army and British diplomat in the Gulf, 
to Persia in order to raise the South Persia Rifles in 1916. This special force consisted of some 
British officers, several hundred Indian soldiers and to the largest extent of locally enlisted 
men, that fought the aggression and captured Wassmuss at war’s end.123 As alluded to above 
already, concerns of the company from its earliest history surely found somewhat equivalent 
positions of concern within British and Indian government authorities. This was even more so 
after the British government had acquired a majority stake in the company in 1914 when the 
importance of securing a continuous fuel supply to the Admiralty became a major issue in 
British politics. The circumstances signalled that the British Empire would eventually go to 
war in order to secure the uninterrupted stream of this commodity. 
 
2. Indian Expeditionary Force ‘D’ and a War Theatre Managed on Indian Lines 
Unlike before, the eve of the war signalled a new departure from previous 
interventions. Imperial oil interests were perceived under threat as the political situation in 
Europe forecasted the beginning of a worldwide conflict. War broke out in Europe at the end 
of July 1914, and the presence of the German cruiser Emden plying in the Indian Ocean in 
September alarmed British and Indian authorities. Subsequently, authorities in India 
despatched the Indian Expeditionary Force ‘D’, initially consisting of the 6th Pune Infantry 
Division, to Bahrain in October, ordering them to wait for further orders. Within one day after 
war had been declared on 5th November, these pre-positioned and reinforced Indian troops 
advanced to the head of the Persian Gulf, taking Fao and APOC’s installations. Immediately 
afterwards, British and Indian forces marched towards Basra, occupying the city on 23rd 
November. From thence on, the city became the hub for all future advances of the occupying 
British and Indian forces towards the north. Reinforcements and all other supplies of various 
sorts from Bombay were landed at the city’s harbour. Subsequently, the cityscape 
transformed technologically, but also culturally by the supplies trickling in and the large 
garrison stationed there. Ostensibly, at least, the advance’s purpose was to take the Shatt-el-
                                                
122 For accounts of Wassmuss see Sykes, Christopher (1936) Wassmuss “The German Lawrence”. New York: Longmans, 
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123 Sykes, Percy (1969), A History of Persia. Vol. II. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, chp. 85-90. Wynn, Anthony 
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Arab and to secure the territory of and surrounding APOC’s refinery installations at Abadan 
and the oilfields in general. With troops soon reaching and securing the company 
installations, the task set out for was nominally accomplished. But what had started as 
advance of not more than several thousand troops in November 1914 soon transformed into 
the Mesopotamian campaign, a full-fledged war with its theatre being shouldered and 
operated considerably from India and by Indian resources, human and material.124 
As time passed, the changed political status in the territories hitherto occupied by the 
advancing forces became noticeable. Soon after seizing Basra, the Chief Political Officer, 
Percy Cox, another officer of the British Indian Army experienced in several pre-war Gulf 
assignments, issued a proclamation, announcing the future conduct under British occupation: 
The British Government has now occupied Basra but, though a state of war with the 
Ottoman Empire still prevails, yet we have no enmity or ill-will against the population, to 
whom we hope to be good friends and protectors. No remnant of Turkish administration 
remains in this region. In place thereof the British flag has been established under which 
you will enjoy the benefits of liberty and justice both in regard to your religions and 
secular affairs.125 
 
It was true that now British reigned supreme at least in Basra and that the administration 
was put on a new footing. Yet, instructions from London were clear in ordering to maintain as 
much of the pre-war local administration as possible, and not to make any attempt to 
transform the occupied territory into an Indian district.126 But the latter virtually took place, 
despite the warnings and apprehensions. Especially Percy Cox and his deputy Arnold Wilson 
seemed to favour such course, starting to extend British Indian legal codes to Mesopotamia, 
organising administration and revenue systems on an Indian basis, and drawing into the 
occupied territories a large number of Indians of different backgrounds to run these systems. 
In fact, only rarely was Turkish civil law applied; instead several justifications existed for 
applying Indian laws, the most cogent being “the underlying desire to pave the way for the 
painless absorption of lower Mesopotamia to India.”127 
While British authorities never agreed to any such undertaking officially, thus keeping 
the future of Iraq and the question of its administration undecided for the time being, the 
bureaucracy in the occupied territory was largely Indian-run, with Indian bureaucrats 
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regulating different questions according to English models.128 The new authorities introduced 
the Iraq Occupied Territories Code, which replicated Indian civil and criminal laws, in August 
1915 along with courts, judges, and magistrates from India and under the administration of 
the Indian political department. The code even declared explicitly the Iraqi territories to be the 
equivalent of “a district […] of Bombay.”129 Even in other areas, the influence from India was 
furthermore felt, and seen by the local population. Indian rupees substituted the earlier 
Turkish money that had been banned by proclamation. Indian banks opened up branches in 
the occupied territories and the forces as well as the local population used Indian postage 
stamps.130 The authorities also imported Indian policemen, several hundreds in number, to 
keep order by patrolling streets and running jails, or enforcing order in critical localities such 
as the Basra docks.131 All this more and more seemed to suggest that Mesopotamia had been 
morphed into “an Indian appendage.”132 Even after the war, in 1919 a trade report advised, 
“Stress must be laid upon the organic connection which already exists between Mesopotamia 
and India.”133 
Yet, there was another important factor in all these considerations. It was more exactly 
an intention never officially outspoken, but desired by some and nourished by the connections 
arising during World War One of annexing the newly occupied territories to India. Plans of 
this sort had been voiced already in the early 1900s, for example by the engineer William 
Willcocks, but took on a totally new meaning under circumstances of the ongoing war. It 
seemed almost a necessity and desirability in the eyes of many. Shortly after the occupation 
of Basra in November 1914, Wilson privately wrote about a possible repopulation of the 
occupied territory by Indians: 
“I should like to see it announced […] that Mesopotamia was to be annexed to India as a 
colony for India and Indians, that the government of India would administer it, and 
gradually bring under cultivation its vast unpopulated desert plains, peopling them with 
martial races from the Punjab.”134 
 
In fact, developments after 1914 and throughout the war campaign somehow professed to this 
idea, as Indian migrants indeed poured in to a very large extent for the development of the 
occupied territories. However, this migration system once initiated was brought to an end 
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when political decisions were taken on Iraq’s future, which would not lie within the Indian 
Empire. 
 
3. Indian Labour during the Mesopotamian Campaign 
Well-acquainted with British India through his professional experience there in the 
pre-war period, the correspondent Edmund Candler seemed not at all astonished to bump into 
a crowd of Santal coolie labourers on the Bridge of Boats in Baghdad in 1917. In a later 
article he understood the group’s occurrence almost as a natural implication of British India’s 
subservient role to empire.135 A British officer, who supervised this group here, spoke about 
the process of their procurement. Raised in their districts, they had been paid a month’s wage 
in advance and made to go to the nearest railway station. Contrasting other coolies who 
slacked off if not properly watched, these Santhals would “go their own pace, but do their 
day’s work all right.”136 The pensioned Indian officer then in charge of the group spoke very 
fondly of their generally good conduct, instigating Candler to immediately contrast the 
Subedar’s earlier experience as staff member of a convict labour corps. Candler was quite 
uncritical of coolies being employed in this theatre of war, unlike many others in Britain and 
India at the time voicing discontent over such engagement overseas.137 After all, it was not so 
easy to keep coolies away from the firing line and prevent them from being killed or getting 
hurt. Candler seemed oblivious to the kind of duties Santhals would have to perform if 
engaged on a contract in India. A pay of twenty rupees a month, received back home in 
family allotments, was also not enough for family members to prosper. The bits and pieces of 
Candler’s report depict but a smaller clipping of a much larger effort of the colonial state 
during the war to mobilise various parts of the subcontinent’s labour resources for the war. 
 
Extent and sources of labour 
Overall, the extent and amount of labour necessary for and during the campaign was 
tremendous. Arguably then, people from the hill-tracts of eastern India were only one group 
among many of coolies and other labourers, whether considered unskilled and skilled, 
recruited internally and externally for the ongoing war efforts in Mesopotamia. Unskilled 
labour was employed in the building of roads, bunds and houses, loading and unloading of 
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steamers and trucks, supplying carpenters, smiths, and masons, improving communications 
and the like. Even works considered menial jobs such as sweeping, latrine cleaning et cetera 
required labour. On the other hand, a diverse quantity of skilled labourers, including 
carpenters, blacksmiths, riveters, drivers, were employed in different occupations and sites 
such as workshops. The workforce of these various types of labour requirements came from a 
variety of origins and with different skills. A diverse amount of internal coolie and corvee 
labour, sometimes contracted from tribal leaders or obtained as forced labour, provided large 
contingents throughout the time of occupation and after.138 While Chinese, Egyptian and 
Persian immigrant labour figured prominently during the time of occupation as well, 
authorities reverted to Indian labour heaviest among all migrant workers. All in all, besides 
295,565 Indian soldiers employed in the war campaign, non-combatants to the amount of 
293,152 including camp followers, skilled and unskilled labourers were as well engaged 
there.139 This high amount of Indian non-combatants being employed is magnified by the fact 
that they derived from different regional sources and from different ends of the Indian labour 
market with backgrounds in a variety of professions. In this regard, one could effectively 
speak of an India-wide engagement of the Mesopotamian campaign, including all sorts of 
labour from unskilled to skilled and professional/office work and from different regions in 
British India. 
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Picture 3. Indian military engineers in Mesopotamia, no date140 
 
Picture 4. Indian sappers with diving equipment recovering Turkish war materiel which had been dumped in the 
Tigris River, Mesopotamia141 
 
Picture 5. Giving out winter clothing to Indian Followers, between 1917-1919142 
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Authorities also tried to procure labour whenever necessary and possible from various 
levels in subordinate relations to the Indian government, whether Indian princely states or 
authorities in close connection to the administration, such as, for example, the different 
regional sections of the Indian railways under the Railway Board or Port Authorities. In 1916, 
approximately 250 artillery-riding drivers to drive army wagons and 65 mule drivers for pack 
transport where badly needed in Mesopotamia. With no reserves of either of these two classes 
available in India, the Adjutant-General’s branch was considerably pressed by overseas 
demands for these men. They ultimately asked the Foreign and Political Department to assist 
in the matter and to address Indian native states.143 Punjab was quick to answer, with the Jind 
Darbar offering to lend 12 artillery and seven mule drivers for war service. Even sawars 
(mounted orderly, escort or guard) of the local cavalry volunteered for service and the 
Maharaja was willing to lend them in case government was in need.144 
Concurrently, the Indian Railway Board informed agents of different railway 
companies throughout the country to ascertain whether any of their staff would volunteer for 
duty in Mesopotamia, showing especial interest for drivers, guards and subordinates for 
workshops. They wanted to be prepared and be able to send labour as soon as possible for 
work on the Baghdad Railway, just in case advancing military forces were able to obtain its 
control and put it back to work. Pitching to the agents that Mesopotamia was “nearer to India 
and more like their own country than East Africa”, the Railway Board thought to “have less 
difficulty in inducing Indians to go [...].”145 Railway companies responded with apprehension, 
especially because the Board had not supplied any terms and conditions of service in 
Mesopotamia, a matter that companies’ agents complained was absolutely necessary to bring 
to the staff’s attention.146 While Board officials themselves seemed not quite sure about 
circumstances of employment, they probably knew that services in the country would be only 
of a provisional and short-term character, thus holding back as much information as possible. 
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After all, inducing civilian labour and staff to volunteer for a war zone with circumstances 
and duration of employment highly insecure proved difficult enough. With the Board finally 
issuing some of the conditions, adding that these would be the maximum concessions allowed 
and where possible staff may be promised less, one agent understood it as request for heads of 
departments “to haggle with the men”.147 Officials denied the latter of course, explaining 
instead that the directive’s intention was to give railway authorities some discretionary power 
in arranging the terms, making it thus not a “question of haggling with the staff, but of 
offering only what the recruiting officer considers to be sufficient.”148 Arguably, authorities 
knew that some men would not volunteer without incentives being given, over which the 
recruiter could decide on the spot, while others probably took terms of service at face value. 
In fact, the Indian railways proved very crucial throughout the war period in 
transporting troops and material, as well as in manufacturing and supplying tracks, 
locomotives, wagons, rail, and ammunition. They were largely responsible for supplying 
adequate resources for the functioning, maintaining and administering of its counterpart in 
occupied Iraqi territory. After the end of the war, the Indian railway system – drained off so 
many of its resources while not being invested into – and needed time to replenish.149 Besides 
material advanced from Indian resources, the contribution included substantial numbers of 
railway staff at various levels.150 Even in December 1920, authorities in Mesopotamia were 
sure that their “[…] railway policy in the future will be vitally affected by our arrangements 
with the Government of India in regard to recruitment of labour.” Trying to abstain from 
unskilled labour from a certain point, they knew that in regard to skilled labour they were 
“[…] unable to dispense with it for many years.”151 The labour supply was to last even after 
the occupation and long into the 1920s, when the Iraqi railways for want of trained staff still 
employed thousands of Indians in their services.152 
 
At Empire’s instant service: war demands and the mobilisation of labour 
Above, I have addressed some of the ways in which Indian labour found its way to the 
Mesopotamian war theatre. It is important to note here that the labouring or, for that matter, 
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non-combatant population imported from India had diverse backgrounds and arrived in 
Mesopotamia under different auspices. The line between combatants and non-combatants or 
followers, who were nominally part of the Indian Army and by far the largest contingent of 
non-combatants, seems to blur during course of the war. They carried out works in the 
soldiers’ vicinity and quite close to acts of war. On the other hand, further labouring groups 
were present that mostly executed works not directly connected to war proceedings, but tasks 
in the wake of advancing military forces providing infrastructure, including construction, 
maintenance and operating services. These had usually not been part of the Indian Army 
before, but were recruited as civilians to work under military authorities in Mesopotamia. 
It was especially in regard to vast requirements of the latter group that colonial 
authorities had to find ways and means for addressing respective segments of the Indian 
labour market in order to mobilise and obtain them. This happened every now and then by 
sidestepping those regulations and procedures originally designed to protect emigrants. Being 
considerably involved in the campaign and perceiving of certain stakes in Mesopotamia’s 
fortunes, the colonial government was willing to make exceptions in regard to emigration 
procedures during the war economy. Arguably, there were several reasons for this. Despite 
the extensive use of local and other external labour, military authorities reverted to Indian 
labour in case of urgency, when requiring special amount and nature of skills, or when local 
labour was insufficient, either as a result of former reasons, or because the area of work was 
scarcely populated. Indeed, military authorities were able to convince authorities in India. 
With labour requirements becoming urgent during 1916, the Home department suggested that 
local governments approach emigration agencies in order to assist in labour recruitment. As 
the Secretary stated: 
“Under ordinary circumstances Government of India would not favour anything which 
gives direct patronage to emigration agents of this kind but the needs in Mesopotamia are 
so urgent that if local Government find labour not otherwise procurable resort to these 
agencies under such control as local Government can devise becomes matter of 
necessity.”153 
 
The colonial state adhered to making readily available labour when demands arose and its 
import became necessary in situations of urgency. Often, labour was recruited only for very 
short periods on contracts of a limited time, even less than the usual contract for other 
services in Mesopotamia, for works that had to be speedily done, after the execution of which 
the labourers were sent back by authorities. 
                                                
153 Secy, Home Department (HD), GoI to Chief Secy, Government of Madras (GoM) and Government of United Provinces 
(GoUP), 15 Sept 1916. CI, Emi., Oct 1916, 2 B. 
‘Entangled Boundaries’: British India and the Persian Gulf Region 
 51 
Take, for instance, the difficulties growing more and more serious in Basra during 
February 1916 of coping with the number of river crafts that had been rendered useless 
because of the lack of facilities for overhaul and repair. The crafts, often of Indian make and 
commandeered by Indian troops or drivers, were heavily used throughout the campaign, and 
very important for the supply of troops over the waterways in Iraq.154 The continued use of 
such crafts seemed absolutely essential for any future war plan. But with labour sparse on the 
Basra docks, many crafts could not be attended and actually broke down. The General-
Officer-Commanding Force ‘D’ reported that another one and a half month time would pass 
before new personnel, then already being collected, would arrive to deal with works of repair 
of the existing fleet and fitting out additional craft and barges. Every other source of supply 
already drawn upon and insufficient to cope with the situation, he requested the Railway 
Board and Port Trusts of Bombay and Karachi, the nearest possible sources for such labour, 
to spare some fifty carpenters, riveters, boilermakers and blacksmiths for this crucial period in 
order to assist him during the coming weeks. The men were to be despatched immediately, 
bringing tools with them. Without such temporary reinforcements, the Commandant saw little 
hope that expected crafts could be fitted out and put to use in time.155 The Railway Board 
once more informed their subordinate companies throughout India and necessary labour was 
despatched to Basra.156 
The colonial state used other methods as well to ensure that labour was obtained. One 
was to keep labour, especially all available military labour resources, constantly ready to be 
shipped out to Mesopotamia. This was to be the case even in 1920, when the war campaign 
had already faded out. In Madras, for example, the local Chamber of Commerce demanded 
that to avert grave problems to the city’s electricity and telegraphic infrastructure labour corps 
coolies be employed in works of public utility.157 The Army department did not object at all 
to the employment of labourers from the local Pallavaram Labour Corps Depot, amending 
only that all personnel of that particular depot had to “remain available at any time for 
despatch as reinforcements to units in Mesopotamia at short notice.”158 
There was even more at stake and the Indian government had yet many more devices 
to ensure a constant labour flow from India. Once more, Indian emigration laws became the 
centre of such considerations and afforded a particularly intriguing device to use migrant 
                                                
154 During the earlier campaign, problems arose with the provisioning of such crafts. After the War Office had taken over the 
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Bombay. Satia, Developing Iraq, 234-240. 
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labour, either by applying or by sidestepping the provisions laid down. In order to strengthen 
the supply of labour, the Indian government had curtailed all emigration from India in 1917, 
except to war theatres and minimally also to Ceylon and the Malay States. However, this was 
not sufficient to attract enough labour. In addition, authorities had decided earlier to put a 
military cloak over labour recruitment for Mesopotamia and to sidestep the formalities of the 
Indian Emigration Act of 1908. This dealt several advantages to authorities. While labourers 
came under military command and were subjected to military discipline and punishment, 
sidestepping the formalities of the Emigration Act resulted in subtler execution of labour 
recruitment, distant from the Indian public’s criticism, which it would have otherwise gotten. 
In this regard, one has to keep in mind larger contemporary political situation and demands. 
The overarching issue confronting authorities during these years was the question of 
indentured emigration under which emigrants were bound to contracts for longer periods and 
liable to penal provisions. The Indian nationalist movement agitated against further practice 
of this institution and increasingly campaigned during the war years. Thus, whenever the 
public claimed such, authorities were able to distance themselves from any form of 
indentured emigration with the new regulations.159 Hence, labour requirements, whether for 
military or civil purposes, were treated outside the scope of the Indian Emigration Act and 
described as war necessity. 
Clear evidence in the following case corroborates this argument very well. In the 
middle of December 1915, irrigation officers at Basra had started flood prevention work on 
the local protective bunds. With some 400 Arab coolies already engaged on this work in 
January 1916, more local labour could not be obtained and the existing Arab labour was 
allegedly not very good at earthwork. The Basra authorities aimed at completing the bunds 
before March of that year when floods were expected, making the speedy import of coolies an 
imperative necessity.160 Later that month, the Commerce and Industry Department in the face 
of Mesopotamian demands finally decided to arrange for the recruitment and shipment to 
Basra of some 4,000 coolie labourers from the United and Central Provinces. Informing the 
responsible authorities about the arrival from Basra and recruitment activity in India of the 
officer in charge, the Commerce and Industry Department stated in this particular case that 
the coolies’ recruitment and embarkation 
“[…] technically come within the scope of the Indian Emigration Act, 1908 […], but it 
has been decided by the Government of India to treat the recruitment of coolies as a war 
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measure and allow them to proceed to Basra without relaxing the provisions of the Act by 
a Notification under Section 107.”161 
 
This decision had been arrived at, mindful of the two options that the authorities cited in such 
cases, i.e. either to declare coolie emigration as a war measure, in which case nothing had to 
be done, or publicly notifying and thus exempting the coolies’ recruitment from any 
provisions of the Indian Emigration Act. Some officials of the Commerce and Industry 
Department were quite sure that a notification had to be issued to relax the provision of the 
Act in the case of Basra, which could not be regarded as part of British India being merely in 
military occupation and therefore definitely coming into the scope of the Emigration Act. One 
was even personally convinced that it should be notified because otherwise “and if any 
question arises subsequently, it will be rather difficult to explain exactly why the Act was 
ignored.”162 
However, a decision was taken towards the opposite. One officer in strong support of 
treating the recruitment as a war measure had two intriguing arguments. One was the 
undesirability, for political reasons, to draw attention to the fact that “we are recruiting a large 
number of coolies from the very unwarlike tracts of Gorakhpur and the East U.P. for work in 
however safe a portion of the war area.” And second, it seemed “undesirable to treat these 
coolies as emigrants thereby putting them in a position to make afterwards complaints of a 
nature which may be troublesome.” Confident that everything else had been done by him and 
his colleagues for the coolies’ well-being, he was quick to present answers to possible 
objections raised in future as regards disregarding the technical position of coolies. Among 
his alibis one finds especially evocative argument that coolies were only technically emigrants 
and sent out as war measure, that whatever emigration law one would have relaxed, enough 
would have remained to give military authorities some trouble, and lastly the desirability of 
maintaining secrecy that was impossible if gazetting these notifications.163 
Thus, colonial authorities in British India willingly avoided the provisions of the 
Indian Emigration Act to be able to respond to urgent needs from military authorities in 
Mesopotamia without much bureaucratic haggling and without publicly announcing their 
efforts. While Willcocks’s pre-war requests to obtain Indian coolie labour for irrigation works 
had received equivocal answers, the war engagement and pressing labour demands in 
Mesopotamia made colonial authorities bypass the laws hitherto held up, at least technically. 
However, the measure alluded to was just one of many that Indian authorities applied in 
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obtaining labour for employment in war theatres. In fact, Mesopotamian labour requirements 
were satisfied throughout the war and after by tapping into a variety of sources from different 
ends of the subcontinent’s labour market, whether already existing or to be ‘discovered’.164 
 
After Kut-al-Amara: the campaign’s reorganisation and its impact on British India 
Shortly after the occupation of Basra in November 1914, various military authorities 
already discussed the possibilities of further advances of British Indian forces. Authorities in 
Britain sanctioned going up to Qurna, a city just 50 miles north of Basra, but objected to 
anything beyond, while especially Indian officers at the head of the forces were eager to push 
forward, as far as Baghdad. The latter group of highest-ranking army personnel and political 
officers, comprising inter alia field commander General John Nixon, Percy Cox and Arnold 
Wilson allegedly acted upon signals from Viceroy Hardinge and particularly from the 
Commander-in-Chief, General Harry "Beauchamp" Duff. They ultimately succeeded in 
pressing for further advances, sanctioned by British authorities. 
Following the fall of Amara in June and Nasiriya in July 1915, Kut-al-Amara was taken 
by September of that year. Despite lengthening lines of communication and reinforcements 
wanting, General Nixon felt strong enough to push further to Baghdad. Especially impressed 
by the sheer prestige of capturing the city and relying on Indian opinion in regard to possible 
reinforcements, authorities in Britain finally sanctioned the advance to Baghdad. This 
decision played out as fatal. Set out to capture the city, the 6th Indian Division under General 
Townshend lost thousands of soldiers and had to fall back on Kut-al-Amara in November 
1915 in order to rest and await reinforcements. Surrounded by several ten thousand Turkish 
troops under command of the German Field Marshall, Goltz Pasha, in early December, their 
situation had turned into a trap. While British attempts to relief the encircled troops failed 
thrice, this was the beginning of a five month long siege. At its end, some ten thousand 
remaining soldiers of initially thirty thousand British Indian forces that were not killed or 
starved to death surrendered to the Ottoman Army in April 1916.165 
Already before the fall of Kut-al-Amara, it seemed clear that “India was incompetent to 
conduct an overseas campaign of this scope”,166 and the War Office in February 1916 took 
over responsibility from Indian military authorities for the ‘Mesopotamian Expeditionary 
Force’, as it was now called. When the defeat became fact, authorities in Britain instituted the 
Mesopotamia Commission Inquiry during the same year, which extensively interviewed those 
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involved and collected material. Its aim was to report on the defeat’s causes and to find 
culprits for the plight, but also to make suggestions as to the further project of the campaign. 
The report made unmistakably clear that Indian authorities were to be blamed for the events, 
in particular Viceroy Hardinge and General Duff, who allegedly showed “little desire to help 
and some desire actually to obstruct the energetic prosecution of the war.”167 Both were 
relieved from their positions in India soon afterwards. Furthermore, the report critiqued 
Indian authorities for the ill advised decision to advance on Baghdad as much as for 
inadequacy of supply to the force and a policy of economy especially displayed in sectors of 
river and rail transport and port facilities. Overall, the mobilisation of resources was regarded 
as insufficient. 
 
Picture 6. An Indian Army sentry stands guard at one of the gateways to Baghdad, c. 1917.168 
 
Especially after the capture of Baghdad in March 1917, a lot changed in the way India 
contributed to the war effort. Already earlier, the Indian government and industry seemed to 
have absorbed the commission’s critique and accomplished the tasks set out in the project of 
developing Iraq. Especially the supply of adequate river transport improved considerably 
besides other sectors of supply obviously functioning better. Antedating these developments, 
a tremendous transformation took place in certain sectors of India’s industry specializing in 
certain fields of war requirements. Henceforth, war engagement in Mesopotamia also became 
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a way of proving “progressive Indian imperialism in the region as a mark of India’s growing 
independence from and parity with the metropole […].”169 
Despite these important contributions, mistrust and uneasy feeling arose on the side of 
Indian authorities. The Commander-in-Chief in India, General Charles Monro, complained in 
October 1917 to the War Office about steadily increasing requirements of the force for 
personnel for inland water transport. Demands of marine ratings had in effect reached such 
high levels that authorities anticipated severe difficulties in maintaining current figures and 
meeting future demands. Particularly the Indian shipping industry suffered for want of men, 
while ship owners pressed for having lascars made available for winter service in the north 
Atlantic and other routes. The circumstances had a devastating effect on private shipping 
already in that vessels with undersized crews were detained in Bombay, or setting sail with 
some amount of untrained men. General Monro accused establishments in Mesopotamia of 
miscalculating the amount of required labour, inefficiently utilising the personnel sent, not 
substituting marine ratings when other labour was equally available, and overall of a lack of 
co-ordination among the various labour employing directorates not resulting in economy of 
resources. In order to look into these matters and to advise whether demands of such 
personnel could be reduced, he proposed to enlarge a commission under General Freeland 
already set up to enquire into and advise on the more efficient utilisation of railway personnel, 
by three members with experience in river transport.170 
The commission’s final report produced only partly the results hoped for by Indian 
authorities. Especially in regard to staff and labour for the railways it questioned – despite 
accomplishments so far of regional railway companies – whether “more cannot be done by 
them in persuading and sparing their skilled Indian employés to serve in Mesopotamia […] 
[and that] steps should be taken to ensure pressure being brought to bear on him [the Indian] 
by his immediate superior officers.” Arguably, the overall situation still had an air that “the 
urgent necessity for greater effort is not fully appreciated.”171 The separate report of the 
Government of India Mesopotamia Transport Commission by the same team responded at 
least somehow to the complaints of the Commander-in-Chief. It finally recommended that 
sea-going marine ratings were to be returned to India and steps undertaken to prevent their 
recruitment. An officer should also be appointed to a position for co-ordinating and 
supervising all transportation directorates as to ensure economical utilization of labour. The 
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report recorded that authorities in Mesopotamia had no ground for complaint in regard to the 
number of labour; only the quality of some categories of personnel could be improved, and 
this should be frequently brought to the notice of all employers in India and more care was to 
be exercised when carrying out trade tests of skilled labourers recruited from India.172 
Of course, this indicated the unabated need for Indian labour. In fact, it was more in 
demand than ever before, despite attempts of Indian authorities to pull out these resources. 
The War Office then in charge of the campaign seemed better able to obtain and actually 
procured more labour from India compared to the campaign being Indian-led, possibly 
because they made Indian authorities adhere more to military needs and apply war principles 
even more strictly. The number of Indian labour even overtook the amount of locally 
procured labour at one point, as labour returns between 1917 to 1919 show.173 (Cf. table 2) 
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4. Undoing Indian Immigration into Iraq 
Developments came forth with war activities drawing to a close towards the end of 
October 1918. Questions then evolved around how labour could be secured from India under 
the impression that war had ended and thus military necessity lapsed, and concurrently 
whether or not and under which circumstances Indian immigration would have any future. 
Although overall labour returns had drastically gone down, the need for labour forces 
continued to prevail. Establishments connected to the military occupation dismantled their 
operations and set labour free, but establishments of further importance to the country’s 
development in the post-war period continued to rely on external labour. The railway and 
irrigation departments especially comprised Indian menial, skilled and office labour. Showing 
a continued interest in external labour supply from India, the Irrigation Directorate disposed 
of some 465 subordinates and clerical staff and 515 menials and followers, including artisans, 
mates and khalasis, with some exceptions exclusively Indian towards the end of 1918. In fact, 
long delays in the further arrival of subordinates and menials from India meant that in many 
districts Irrigation officers had little or no establishment to assist them.174 On the other side, 
authorities were not able to retain certain sections of the hitherto diverse labouring population. 
Convict Labour Corps, for example, whose duty was to last only “for the duration of war”, 
were increasingly withdrawn and despatched to India.175 Authorities respond to these 
developments by securing a further continuous source of labour supply, for example, in 
regard to labour that had come on contracts for the duration of war. These were released from 
the old contracts and given new one-year contracts. 
Another pressing issue in need of settlement was the future immigration of Indians into 
Iraq, which seemed connected also to the larger question of demobilisation. Already in 
September, Wilson reminded authorities in London in a note that a definite policy in this 
regard was necessary on the termination of war. He especially foresaw a possible demand of 
certain classes in the Indian Army for grants of land to enable them to remain in the country 
after the war as cultivator. While a notable influx of Indian Hindu, Muslim and Parsee 
shopkeepers and small traders into Basra had already taken place, he had no doubt that Arab 
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opinion was opposed to Indian immigration of any sort.176 Yet, for the time being, nothing 
was undertaken in this regard, also because labour requirements were so large that 
immigration could not be totally dispensed with and the country’s political future had not 
been decided. 
However, this changed slightly when authority in Mesopotamia passed into the hands of 
the Civil Administration in February 1919. Arnold Wilson expressed the view that the 
country would continue to rely – for want of labour surplus – on imported labour for 
development purposes and was prepared to accept responsibility for supplying all the labour 
by the civil administration after the peace declaration, provided that he was allowed to take 
over the present labour organisation. He therefore proposed to Indian authorities a notification 
under section 7 of the Indian Emigration Act as to enable the civil administration to further 
obtain labour. Several Indian officers rejected the advanced proposals outright since obtaining 
labour on a civil basis would not function without resorting to the indentured system. The 
matter of labour immediately tied into the question of the future administration of 
Mesopotamia and the policy towards Indians, the Indian authorities pleaded for some time of 
consideration, while preferring in the meantime a continuation of the labour system on 
military footing.177 
Illustrating the large dependence of Mesopotamia on India in regard to those 138,000 
labourers at present in the country and some 30,000 labourers as proposed post-war 
establishment, Viceroy Chelmsford voiced the same contentions vis-à-vis the India Office. He 
opposed any plan of a civil labour establishment considering that “Indian opinion would not 
tolerate any form of indentured labour in Mesopotamia, especially if it were combined with 
any sort of restriction or even discouragement of free Indian emigration.” Nonetheless, 
knowing that “Mesopotamia will not be able to get the labour it requires without some form 
of indenture […]”, Chelmsford agreed to the army continuing “to recruit labour corps for duty 
nominally as part of the garrison of the country, though that duty may be of a purely civil 
character.” Moreover, he interpreted the dependence nonchalant as sufficient reason to claim 
a larger Indian say in the matter of Mesopotamia, as it seemed to be impossible “for 
Mesopotamia to claim administrative independence of India when she is dependent on the 
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latter for almost everything she requires – even unskilled labour.”178 London responded 
positively. The War Office had agreed on the proposals for the transition period, solely 
amending that additional labour should be enlisted only up to a limit of civil administration’s 
estimated requirements, and the India Office assured that the labour supply by India was 
“conditional on grant of reasonable facilities for Indians to settle in Mesopotamia.”179 Soon 
afterwards, recruitment for labour corps to the extent of 32,000 men started over again, with 
depots receiving about 5,000 a month.180 
As shown above, labour issues also bore witness of and were closely connected to 
questions picking up simultaneously regarding future Indian immigration into the country. 
Obviously, there was a cleavage between the restrictions on Indian immigration into 
Mesopotamia versus the demand of Mesopotamia for Indian labour. But with the peace 
process and respective talks over the future of the country starting in 1919, it was decided to 
leave, for political reasons, the question of free Indian immigration for settlement until after 
the future of Mesopotamia was decided. Instead, Mesopotamian authorities drew up Passport 
Regulations in 1919 for immigration control, under which no person could enter the country 
without permission from local authorities. The Civil Commissioner had, for example, 
informed the Foreign Secretary early on about Indian and Chinese labourers desiring to settle 
down in Basra. With “considerable local prejudice” against them, he professed that 
population would soon demand immigration restrictions. For the time being, however, their 
movements were restricted by military passport regulations in place, which could deny travel 
permission to all persons neither connected to the force nor residents. Indian officials, on the 
other hand, were reluctant to act upon such information, and instead decided to wait until 
questions regarding the country’s future administration and the policy to be adopted towards 
Indian immigrants were settled.181 
As late as April 1920, the Indian Government responded officially to the changed 
environment in Mesopotamia, thus adapting its emigration devices and supplementing pre-
existing modes to obtain labour. Alleging that military needs were still predominant in 
Mesopotamia, Viceroy Chelmsford issued an ordinance consenting to the continued 
recruitment of military labour corps in India and their employment by Mesopotamian civil 
authorities. Subjecting the regulation to four conditions, the government aimed at foregoing 
problems and critiques that had surfaced earlier. Thus justifying and sanctioning continued 
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labour emigration to Mesopotamia, the government addressed the sentiment of Indian 
nationalists’ and the broader public as well, expressing that “no form of indentured 
emigration to Mesopotamia can be allowed (…).”182 It served to exclude, rhetorically, the 
occurrence of any such form of emigration, while labour overseas was recast primarily as 
military labour. The ordinance furthermore proved to be applicable to an astonishingly wide 
spectrum of labour, having a decisive impact especially on the railways. General Lubbock, 
Director of Railways in Baghdad, was sure that the term “military labour corps” covered all 
forms of unskilled labour, whether formed into labour corps or not. But he desired intimation 
from the Indian authorities as to the further extent of the term and was informed that it applied 
“to all subordinate personnel, or labour (skilled and unskilled) recruited in India for the 
Mesopotamian Administration.”183 Eventually, the provisions were so broad as to easily 
satisfy diverse labour requirements under one singular heading. 
While this measure helped in securing a further labour supply from India, actual 
recruitment in substantially high numbers went on only for a short period. It was to be a 
matter of a few months until Indian immigration into the country was set on an altogether 
different footing. Important developments in the international system were about to effect the 
administration of the country, and hence issues of immigration in general. Negotiations over 
the future of the country began at the Peace Conference in Paris during 1919, taking definite 
shape only after the San Remo Conference in late April 1920. Among other League of 
Nations mandate, the conference decided on the terms of the British Mandate over Iraq. This 
was entrusted to Great Britain with the Treaty of Sèvres of 10th August 1920 finally dividing 
the Ottoman Empire. 
When initial arrangements of Arab administration began to take shape, first notices 
were received already in July 1920 that recruitment was to “be confined within narrowest 
possible limits if not stopped at all.”184 The Civil Commissioner responded that substitution of 
Arab for Indian personnel was proceeding rapidly in many departments, but several works 
were still so vital in importance that he begged recruitment be permitted to continue, assuring 
this would not include unnecessary additional recruitment.185 He felt impelled only shortly 
afterwards to comment on recent debates in the House of Commons and a leader in the Times 
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regarding the alleged unpopularity of Indians in Mesopotamia. Offering a multi-sighted 
observation of different classes, he tried to attenuate the picture that had been created, finally 
stating that he would further pursue the policy of replacing Indians by Arabs wherever 
possible, but that his experiences emphasized the “necessity of training Arabs before they are 
replaced in such positions and indicates desirability of cautious rather than drastic 
reduction.”186 Wilson, an old and experienced Indian hand and important in various stages for 
decisions favouring his connections to India, was not yet willing to let go of this connection. 
 
Insurrection 
In fact, drastic reduction in recruitment and setting free of labour became the order of 
the day when internal constraints following the country-wide insurrection from the summer 
until the end of 1920 proved too cumbersome, and the following political development of a 
mandate system by Great Britain prohibited a further de-nationalized state character. Thus, 
government officials were increasingly in favour of breaking off the ties with India. Whether 
it was the actual awarding of the mandate to Britain, or the high-handed nature of Wilson’s 
administration during his office as Civil Commissioner is not clear. But in the ensuing 
months, the situation in the country became quite difficult with Shia and Sunni, different 
tribes and other Arabs staging protests and attacking British and Indian officers directly in 
several districts.187 
This necessitated preparing for further withdrawals under the assumption that disorder 
would become general, and employees of civil departments were sent back to India in large 
numbers. Authorities in India decided not to send any more personnel for certain directorates, 
asking whether that held true for other directorates as well, since they were anxious to avoid 
sending men who would be immediately returned. But Wilson wanted them to supply further 
unless specifically cancelled. The situation in Mesopotamia got more and more difficult. Also 
installations of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company at Naft Khan had been looted, with 
                                                
186 CC, Baghdad to SoS for India, 26 Jul 1920, Ibid. The Article by ‘A Student of Politics’, The Times, 24 June 1920, 16, 
reported of the debate in Parliament of the preceding day in which representatives had pleaded that the British government 
should work for a “Mesopotamian civilization, and not an Anglo-Indian civilization.” A general feeling was “that if 
Mesopotamia was to be manageable at reasonable cost we must get rid of the Indian mortgage”, also observing that “Arabs 
and Indians (…) cannot get on together.” According to him, Arab prejudices existed on religious grounds against non-
Muslim Indians, “against certain backward races and classes of Indians whom they regard as inferiors in civilisation and to 
whose general conduct they take exception”, and against Indian petty shopkeepers in Basra, who had been able to secure 
trade, otherwise gotten by Arabs. Wilson cites murders of Arabs by Burmese motor drivers in the Kirkuk divison to be 
responsible for their prejudice against “backward classes”. However, there was no racial prejudice against Indian troops, 
whose conduct was said to be exemplary allowing many of them to visit principle shrines in the country, nor against Indian 
Muslim officials employed in executive positions in the Civil Administration. When Wilson met a number of notables and 
chiefs of the Baqubah district, they complained of the insufficiency and corruption of Arab subordinate staff who had 
replaced Indians in the irrigation department, and asked for more Indians to be sent again in order that loss and unfair 
division of water might be prevented. 
187 Haldane, J.A.L. (1922), The Insurrection in Mesopotamia, 1920. London: William Blackwood & Sons. 
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employees being safe. However, to Wilson’s surprise, no Indian officials of any kind had 
been murdered, except when connected to raids on railways. Instead, several Indian officials 
had been captured and were in enemy hands, but were not treated badly by the tribes 
irrespective of their religion.188 
With troop requirements in Mesopotamia quite severe during the revolution and 
reinforcements from India still on their way, also members of labour corps were enlisted as 
combatants. This was to be another case for the Indian nationalist movement to pick on. A 
letter was published in the ‘Young India’ issue of 10th November 1920 that contained a 
resolution passed in Baghdad in honour of the inauguration of Gandhi’s non-cooperation 
movement, addressing the alleged compulsory enlistment and sending of labour corps to the 
firing line as “lawless butchery” by military authorities. Also the order prohibiting Muslims in 
the force to visit country’s sacred places found objection. Gandhi criticized the British lust for 
wealth and their desperate trying to keep up a tottering privilege. The information seemed 
correct, although the military authority’s perspective was quite different. Accordingly, they 
had called for volunteers from former soldiers now in labour corps to enlist as combatants 
while waiting for reinforcements from India. Reportedly, the rush of applicants was so large 
all trying to improve their status and pay, that several garrison battalions were raised from the 
source and hence employed.189 Later on, several thousand Indian troops arrived in 
Mesopotamia again in order to subdue the riots. By late 1920, the country returned to a state 
of ongoing, but not open revolution. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Numbers recruited for Labour Corps in Mesopotamia during 1920, per month190 
 
By this time, continued Indian immigration into Iraq had merely come to a halt and 
recruitment of labour had been put on halt. (Cf. table 3) According to an official census, the 
                                                
188 CC, Baghdad to SoS for India, 13 Aug 1920. AD, Simla to CC, Baghdad, 19 Aug 1920. CC, Baghdad to AD, Simla, 21 
Aug 1920. CC, Baghdad to Foreign Secy, GoI, 26 Aug, 5 Sept 1920. FPD, Sec. E., Feb 1921, 93-214. 
189 Extract from the Bombay Fortnightly Report, 1st half, November 1920. Memorandum, Col. Nevill, 4 Dec 1920. HD, Pol., 
Jan 1921, 21 B. During 1920 the number of Indian Labour Corps units employed in Mesopotamia had drastically decreased 
from 31 to 12, thus eliminating those which were used for civil purposes. The number of Indians recruited for the Labour 
Corps also came down sharply and halted almost in November 1920, since the “period of war” men had been replaced by 
then. 
190 Memorandum, Col. Nevill, 4 Dec 1920. HD, Pol., Jan 1921, 21 B. He stated: “The recent fall is due to the completion of 
demand for replacement of “period of war” men. 
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number of Indians living in Mesopotamia by mid-1920 had not changed in contrast to the 
numbers of the pre-war period, the number amounting to some 3,000 excluding those 
connected to the military force and civil administration.191 Nonetheless, the Indian 
Government expressed at a meeting in September 1920 that the Mesopotamia Passport Rules 
should be modified so as to meet their objections to existing restrictions on Indian 
immigration. If it was not adhered to the continuing recruitment in India of military labour 
corps and their employment could not be continued much longer because of opposition by a 
growing mass of Indian opinion. They repeated their demand of complete withdrawal of the 
embargo on Indian immigration in December 1920, to which the High Commissioner in 
Baghdad complied in July 1921, removing the restrictions on immigration of Indians by 
issuing an Immigration Proclamation. Awaiting the approval of the British Government, the 
Indian government thought it necessary to declare by notification that Mesopotamia was a 
country to which emigration was henceforth lawful.192 
During the course of a lecture to the Central Asian Society in London, Arnold Wilson, 
recently retired from his position of Civil Commissioner and immediately afterwards 
employed as APOC’s resident director in the Persian Gulf, dwelled on immigration issues 
pertaining to Mesopotamia. Turning to India, he expressed his contention that country itself 
offered greater attractions to the “stalwart Mohammedan cultivator, who alone could make a 
successful settler.” Citing “national prejudice in the minds of Arabs in Mesopotamia […] 
against any alien who seeks to settle in his ancestral acres”, he assured the audience that 
“immigration might have been possible before the war, but not now.”193 Once a strong 
supporter of Indian immigration into Mesopotamia and of generally high Indian stakes there, 
Wilson’s opinion had finally turned, at least in regard to this country. 
With the army of occupation and those establishments and labourers connected with it 
gradually retreating, authorities largely stopped importing Indian labour and effectively 
curtailed undesired Indian and other immigration into the country. While the future of Indian 
immigration into Mesopotamia was thus decided, labour migration to the oilfields in southern 
Persia witnessed a notable transformation positing itself interestingly against the 
developments in neighbouring Iraq. Newly employed by APOC, Arnold Wilson was to play 
yet again a decisive role in maintaining the imperial connection with the Indian subcontinent 
in all matters of the company’s interest, especially the supply of labour. 
                                                
191 Census in Mesopotamia. FPD, Ext., Aug 1920, 382-286 B. Accordingly, the highest number of Indians (2,524) lived in 
the former Baghdad vilayet, most prominently in the Baghdad and Dulaim divisions. The other major division with Indian 
emigrants was Basra (493). 
192 Foreign Secy, GoI to HC, Baghdad, 21 Oct, 11 Dec 1920. Note, FPD, 16 Jul 1921. FPD, Sec. E., Dec 1921, 1-179. 
193 Wilson, Arnold T. (1921), ‘Mesopotamia, 1914-1921’, lecture to the Central Asian Society, London, 15 April 1921. 
Journal of the Central Asian Society, VIII, Pt. 2, 151. 
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5. Employment of Indian Labour by APOC 
The Anglo-Persian Oil Company employed Indian migrant labour right from the 
outset of their Persian operations in 1908 until the 1950s, reaching a high in the years during 
and immediately after the war. This comprised mostly skilled labour for work in the Abadan 
refinery and clerks for office work, but to a limited extent also skilled labour for the oilfields, 
and probably as well unskilled labour to considerable extent. During the time under review 
here, i.e. from 1908 to 1921, most migrant labourers were engaged directly from the 
subcontinent through offices of the company’s India agent, Shaw Wallace & Co., who had 
offices in all major cities, such as Bombay, Calcutta, Karachi and Madras. They took on the 
task of seeking and directly recruiting Indian labour, engaging them mostly on three-year 
labour contracts. For their initial operations, APOC also received experienced British and 
Indian technical staff and labourers on secondment from its Burmese parent company.194 
The stated and implicit or hidden reasons for this overall recruitment from India are 
tricky, though. Most importantly, they do not disclose whether the company actually used 
both unskilled and skilled labour for its operations. The company itself professed and most 
accounts hitherto written about its labour force state that it employed only skilled labour for 
reasons of the local labour market. While a continuous employed of unskilled labour is open 
to question, archival evidence suggests that they did so at least during the war that was about 
to close in and in its aftermath. A division between forms of unskilled and skilled labour was 
quite arbitrary and as we shall see the company and colonial authorities used certain 
discretionary measures to allow also the recruitment of unskilled labour. One reason for 
claiming to use only skilled labour was afforded by the nature of the company’s operations in 
Persia. Contrary to Burma, where the BOC was not liable to any concessions or treaties with a 
country’s government since it belonged to British India at that time, APOC ran operations in a 
territory that was not part of the Empire, and therefore liable to the wishes of the country’s 
authorities, stipulated in the first oil concession agreed to in 1901. This was also true in case 
the company wanted to recruit and employ foreign labour. According to stipulations, the 
company was nominally allowed to revert only to external skilled labourers in case the local 
labour market lacked of the quantity and skill of such labourers.195 Nominally, this left in turn 
only local labourers to fill positions of unskilled work. Under pressure from the Persian 
government to use if at all only external skilled labour, the company prepared internal audits 
from a certain point to be sent to local authorities. These observed whether the company’s 
                                                
194 This agent also undertook the recruitment for BOC as well as the marketing of its petroleum products until 1927. 
Townend, A History of Shaw Wallace & Co. See also Ferrier, The History of the British Petroleum Company. 
195 Seccombe/Lawless, Foreign Worker Dependence. 
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conduct adhered to the treaty. Hence, Indian labour found entry into statistics and occurred 
only under the skilled category while it possibly included unskilled workers as well. 
Apart from such basic considerations, one can find several further reasons for the 
company’s recruitment of Indian labour during the early before the inception of World War 
One. The British Minister to Persia, Sir George Barclay, noted that given the unsatisfactory 
nature of local labour the company had been compelled in early 1910 to import foreign 
labourers, considerably from British India, regardless of a provision in the concession 
stipulating that only Persian subjects were to be employed for other than technical work. 
While labour forces existing locally were said to be “under no pressing necessity to look 
beyond their crops and flocks for employment and a living”, the import of almost all artisans 
and labourers from elsewhere seemed a virtual necessity. Still, British officials felt relieved 
not to have attracted too much attention to the circumstances, after the responsible British 
consul at Mohammerah had reportedly expressed anxiousness as to the attitude of the Persian 
Imperial Commissioner.196 The latter’s ambiguous position and task was provided for in 
Article 11 of the D’Arcy concession. Being appointed by the Persian Government but paid £ 
1,000 sterling annually by the company, his office included providing consultancy and 
information to APOC as well as establishing “by agreement with the Concessionaire such 
supervision as he may deem expedient to safeguard the interests of the Imperial 
Government.”197 That the company paid the Commissioner for his services may have been 
contradictory to the supervisory role he simultaneously performed for the Persian 
government.198 
Reporting in late May 1910 about the local labour situation, Arnold Wilson, then 
employed as British consul in southern Persia, concluded that no local resentment was “[…] 
likely to be caused by your importing foreign labour to fill vacancies which, it is universally 
accepted, cannot be filled locally.”199 However, with the Imperial Commissioner objecting 
especially to the employment of Ottoman subjects, Greenway projected “serious difficulties 
unless […] the employment of so many aliens” was satisfactorily justified. He pressed and 
finally convinced APOC’s initially tenacious managing agents to compile comparative labour 
                                                
196 Annual Report on Persia for the year 1910. In: Bourne, Kenneth/Watt, D. Cameron (Eds.) (1985), British Documents on 
Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print. Part I, From the Mid-Nineteenth Century to 
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197 For the concession’s text see Appendices, Ferrier, The History of the British Petroleum Company, 642. 
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statements according to nationality, the first appearing in January 1911.200 Thereafter, these 
statements in regard to the nationality composition of the company’s labour forces were used 
forthwith. However, this seems to have been used as a tool to justify further recruitment of 
Indian labour of various sorts, which was allegedly not obtainable locally. Indian labour had 
two advantages, which included higher skills at a time when Persia’s national labour did not 
dispose of it yet, and also that this labour was easier to let go off during times of low 
production. All this ultimately created a circulatory migration from the Indian subcontinent 
towards the Persian Gulf. 
Given experiences in oil exploration as well as in minor operations such as farming 
grain and experimenting with vegetable and cotton growing on their own model farms, 
company representatives knew in general that “the Persian was […] a good labourer, but 
[that] he had too many irons in the fire, and could not be relied on to remain with anyone 
during the whole year, especially when the date and grain seasons came round.”201 In 
addition, the company claimed that of skilled labour practically none was available, so that 
even before the war, the import of much needed labour from India was necessary. The 
company’s clandestine policy of importing labour had an astonishing effect. Over the four-
year period up to 1914, the absolute number of Indians employed increased seven-fold 
compared to the first year, which equalled a relative increase from nine percent to a quarter of 
all employees within the company. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Anglo-Persian Oil Company staff and labour in Persia, 1910-1921, in absolute numbers, and 
share of Indian employees202 
                                                
200 Ibid., p. 154. 
201 Trade Openings in Persia – Labour the Greatest Difficulty. The Times, 23 Oct 1919, 11. The APOC representative C.A. 
Walpole addressed the Persia Society at London on issues pertaining to trading prospects. 
202 Ferrier, The History of the British Petroleum Company, 276, 401. 
Indians Year Persians 
No. % 
Others Europeans Total 
1910 1362 158 9,3 146 40 1706 
1911 1801 379 16 127 56 2363 
1912 2449 553 17,6 97 43 3142 
1913 2899 917 22,7 175 44 4035 
1914 2744 1074 25 395 64 4277 
1915 2203 979 28 187 80 3449 
1916 2335 1366 35 104 120 3925 
1917 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1918 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1919 3979 2641 39 47 117 6784 
1920 8447 3616 29 35 244 12342 
1921 9009 4709 34 51 271 14040 
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The colonial state and labour for APOC during wartime and after 
Apart from the special relationship between company and colonial state as described 
initially in this chapter, another crucial aspect of the intersection between the government’s 
imperial oil policy and APOC emerged in respect of labour emigration to southern Persia and 
the way in which the Indian government assisted in this process. While the government’s 
attitude was helpful even before and after the war, it was especially during this period that the 
assistance was of quite an extraordinary nature. There were two reasons: on the one hand, 
obtaining local labour proved allegedly quite difficult for the company during the war-period, 
especially as the demand for labour in wartime Mesopotamia affected and drained the local 
labour market of southern Persia. These constraints of labour supply all around the region 
necessitated external supplies. On the other hand, the prefix of a war economy allowed for 
exceptional decisions in regard to a sensitive topic such as emigration. This resulted in the 
company’s rhetoric of increasing demand for Indian labour. 
At times, the government’s assistance took the shape of physical engagement in 
processes of recruiting and conveying labourers to Mesopotamia or Persia. In fact, Indian 
military authorities occasionally agreed to transport labourers on warships frequently plying 
between Indian ports and the war region.203 The same authorities stunningly suggested as well 
to recruit and maintain APOC’s labour on a basis and on terms similar to Labour Corps in 
Mesopotamia, for “discipline can be better maintained amongst men enrolled under military 
law than amongst men on purely civil contract.”204 However, the Indian government’s 
assistance was most markedly in technically allowing for and facilitating labour recruitment 
in the first place. This implied a convulsion of various modes at different stages. Sometimes, 
valid laws were not enforced or observed to the extent they provided for, resulting in quietly 
allowing the company’s action to bypass even if it was not lawful. At other times, the Indian 
government consciously took appropriate legal decisions to accommodate an outcome that 
was hoped for. The company, on the other hand, was actively seeking to bypass regulations 
designed to protect migrant workers. Overall, they made great use of their status in imperial 
politics, of the war exigencies and the connected legal weaknesses to import Indian labour. 
The company perceived of the Indian Emigration Act of 1908 as one of the biggest 
detriments to the supply of Indian labour for the company’s works in southern Persia. 
APOC’s chairman, Charles Greenway, proposed already in March 1915 an exemption from 
                                                
203 Shaw Wallace & Co., Karachi to Embarkation Commandant, Karachi, 3 Nov 1917. Quartermaster General, Delhi to 
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the operations of that Act of areas occupied by the company’s installations at Abadan, 
Mohammerah and the oil fields. According to him, the restrictions and formalities prescribed 
by that act unduly magnified in the emigrant’s imagination and acted as serious deterrent to 
obtaining and inducing men to leave for Persia from such ports as Bombay, Rangoon, or 
Karachi. It also resulted in very high rates of pay in order to obtain any men at all, while the 
labour was not of the best quality. The ultimate aim of the act being to safeguard Indian 
emigrants, Greenway enumerated provisions for its further assurance in case the company 
was actually exempted. The Persian Coast and Islands Order of 1907 afforded one provision, 
according to which British Indian subjects in the Persian littoral were allegedly entirely under 
the jurisdiction of local British officials and liable to British Indian laws. The company’s 
Indian employees would thus be under the direct supervision of Consuls at Mohammerah and 
Ahvaz. Pending legislation in regard to the act, he proposed a general permission be given 
once for all ports for the company’s recruitment and the need for appearance before the 
Protector of Emigrants to be dispensed with. The proposals met with little sympathy in the 
concerned department. Officials did not see as clear a connection between the provisions of 
the act and the reasons of emigrants not opting for the Gulf, and suspected the company of 
trying to obviate troubles for themselves rather than freeing possible emigrants from these 
formalities.205 
To Bombay authorities the act did not appear to deter any of the labourers of that 
Presidency from taking up employment in Persia. The formalities imposed were in fact very 
slight, while labourers reportedly recognised them to be prescribed in their own interests. 
APOC’s general assertion of the act’s negative effect was rejected as unfounded, and 
arguments advanced for the exemption from the Emigration Act were not convincing. For the 
purpose of this question, Persia as a foreign country could not be compared to Ceylon or the 
Straits Settlements, that were under the administration of the British government, as the 
company proposed. In regard to the general permission for the company once for all ports to 
engage labourers, the Bombay authorities did not see any material assistance in the 
recruitment of labourers, but were willing if considered desirable to grant a general sanction 
to the engagement of artisans up to a certain definite number to local firms acting on APOC’s 
behalf. On the other hand, they objected totally to any alteration of the procedure for 
emigrants to appear before the Protector of Emigrants, as it constituted the principal safeguard 
                                                
205 Chairman, APOC to Secy, CI, GoI, 17 Mar 1915. Notes, 3, 23, 29 Apr 1915. CI, Emi., May 1915, 3-6 A. Originally, 
Charles Greenway had been a partner of Shaw Wallace & Co. in Bombay, when representatives of Burmah Oil asked him to 
join the company during the start-up phase in 1909. He was important for most of the company’s early history, serving as its 
president until 1934. Ferrier, The History of the British Petroleum Company, 691. 
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for the emigrants’ interests. The company was duly informed, also receiving back a slightly 
amended form of agreement for engagement of labourers.206 
While the government had rejected APOC’s representations in 1915, they arrived at 
decisions to the contrary under allegedly aggravating conditions of labour supply during the 
latter stage of the First World War. In February 1918, the Indian government finally agreed to 
experimentally suspend the Indian Emigration Act for the areas of the company’s works in 
Persia in case of both artisans and labourers required by APOC. They considered it 
inadvisable, however, to issue a notification under section 107 of the act.207 This effectively 
treated emigration of both artisans and labourers for the company as war measure. Such a 
differentiation between ‘artisans’ and ‘labourers’ was also another way of blurring boundaries 
between skilled and unskilled labour. While the company used both to describe skilled labour, 
those coming under the category of ‘labourers’ were probably unskilled coolie workers. 
The tangled ways of government to finally decide in this manner were quite noteworthy. 
Company officials had responded neither to government’s rejection of their earlier request for 
exemption in 1915, nor to the amended form of agreements to be used henceforth for 
recruiting labourers.208 Instead, they moved the then Deputy Chief Political Officer at Basra, 
Arnold Wilson, to represent to Indian authorities on their behalf how emigration laws 
continued to negatively affect the company’s labour supply. Fully aware of the strategic 
importance of APOC production to the war effort in general, Wilson favoured an exemption 
on lines earlier proposed. He displayed the extent to which security and legal order prevailed 
under local British officers, to whom emigrants had always access, while pointing to the 
presence of many unskilled and skilled labourers at Basra, hired by different firms, 
contractors and departments of which none had recourse to the Protector of Emigrants. 
APOC, on the other hand, had to deal with provisions of the act and especially with an 
attitude of the Protector of Emigrants being generally “unhelpful and calculated to encourage 
a litigious spirit in a class who usually already possess it in the amplest measure.” Thus, with 
the company objecting to the formalities, “irksome” to the labourers and the company, for 
good reason, Wilson expressed his hope that the Indian government would be able to 
reconsider its standpoint on the issue and accede to the company’s request.209 
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Fully aware of the strategic importance of oil operations, the Indian government 
requested the views of Bombay authorities on the whole question, and especially if they were 
to stay with their verdict given some two years earlier that in fact the emigration act did not 
hamper the company in recruiting Indian labour. Referring to the report from Basra, they 
suggested however that the Protector of Emigrants would be of greater assistance to the 
company if he exercised his functions more sympathetic, without at the same time neglecting 
his duties in the interests of emigrants. Given the company’s acute labour shortage, Percy 
Cox, Political Resident at Baghdad and first High Commissioner of Iraq a few months later, 
pushed in December 1917 for early action in that regard as well. Apparently, labourers 
originally brought out to the Gulf by APOC for performance of government contracts had 
been taken over by military authorities, thus coming under military rules. The Foreign Office 
had approved in October 1917 of an emergency King’s Regulation to be issued by the 
responsible Consul General providing for the continued service under the APOC of their 
employees in Persia. Cox pointed out that this regulation already conflicted with the 
provisions of the Indian Emigration Act, making labour liable to stay in Persia. He urged 
authorities in India once more in late December 1917 to act on proposed lines as the “spirit of 
[the] Act and manner of its operation are wholly unsuitable for war conditions”. Difficulties 
in obtaining labour, under which he subsumed present Indian emigration laws, had resulted in 
a shortage of tinned kerosene oil used primarily for pumps in the agricultural sector that 
would soon be adversely affected if this situation were to remain.210 
In what followed, namely the handling of labourers as war measure, the Indian 
government not only fulfilled the company’s demands, but also exceeded them considerably, 
allowing for an exceptional status of the company in regard to labour supply from India for 
years to come. British authorities in London had somehow superseded the Government of 
India earlier in its decision over the emigrants’ status by issuing the King’s regulation. Thus, 
there seemed no reason to keep regulations in force that were undermined anyway. By late 
September 1917, the sentiment in concerned government departments was of a decidedly 
different nature than earlier. Despite dissonances, officials now largely reclaimed that the 
company should not be hindered in the smooth working of their operations by receding from 
the position taken up two years ago, especially as the political conditions had altered, and to 
allow freer recruitment of labour without imposition of the Emigration Act. Even in regard to 
procedure to be followed, the officers agreed quite soon that they could not do it by means of 
a notification under section 107 of the Act. Citing earlier precedence of recruitment of coolies 
                                                
210 Secy, CI, GoI to Chief Secy, GoBomb, 26 Nov 1917. PR PG, Baghdad to Foreign Secy, GoI, 13, 26 Dec 1917. FPD, 
Gen., June 1918, 79 B. FO to Dy. Chief Political Officer, Basra, 9 Oct 1917. FPD, Gen., April 1918, 53 B. 
‘Entangled Boundaries’: British India and the Persian Gulf Region 
 72 
for flood prevention work at Basra and for railway work, they decided to treat labourers for 
the APOC as war measure, and not go through the form of exempting their recruitment from 
any provisions of the Emigration Act. As in the cases mentioned earlier, a formal relaxation 
would have given a certain amount of trouble to the exercising institution, this time the 
company, and maintaining secrecy about the procedure was better than letting the public 
know.211 Ignoring provisions was easier than to address them, with labourers coming under 
military rules hence. 
When suspending the Emigration Act for the company as war measure, authorities 
reserved their right to insist on its re-introduction should it be found necessary. Discussions as 
to the discontinuance of the act’s suspension began already towards the end of the war, but 
authorities actually decided for its re-introduction only in 1920. Instead of placing emigration 
on regular footing then, authorities allowed the company to henceforth recruit labour in India 
under Chapter XI, “purely as a temporary measure”, while not notifying it as lawful under 
section 4 of that Act.212 This decision, in fact, continued once more a practice of both, 
company and colonial state, of the last several years to forego provisions contained in 
emigration laws such as the appearance of labourers before the Protector of Emigrants. 
There were several reasons to finally change the footing on which emigration took 
place. Authorities increasingly received complaints from Indian labourers as to their treatment 
by the company. In August 1918, for example, seven employees engaged by Shaw Wallace & 
Co. one year earlier and hence engaged on the oil fields reported to be prevented from 
returning to India after expiration of their contracts. Accordingly, their notice had been 
rejected by pointing to the “Munition Act of Abadan of 1917”, being hence first threatened 
with imprisonment and then actually interned for 18 days.213 Inquiries into the case, however, 
soon silted. The concerned departments did not receive any report in regard to labourers’ 
allegations until November 1919, while Bombay authorities received several further 
complaints from other employees. The Protector of Emigrants was not capable to interfere 
with these and other cases of emigrants as long as the exemption continued. With complaints 
becoming thus frequent, officials also voiced the desire to bring the company back again 
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within the operation of the act, especially since necessity of the company’s exemption was 
over with the termination of war.214 The Civil Commissioner at Baghdad strongly opposed 
any alteration of the present form, owing to extensive works going on to increase existing 
refinery capacities, which were to satisfy oil demand also of the Indian government and the 
railways. Instead he displayed that shortage of labour was acute and that the company would 
gladly employ another 2,000 or 3,000 men, besides the fact that they already utilized the 
services of Labour Corps as special concession. Indian authorities could as well constitute the 
British Consul at Mohammerah a sort of Protector of Emigrants at that place, so to safeguard 
their interests. In any case, the Indian government had to refer to the British government 
before taking action, as national interests would be seriously endangered by the act’s re-
introduction. Other officials in India acknowledged these apprehensions, knowing 
simultaneously that existing law was effectively disregarded. With Bombay authorities 
favouring a discontinuance of the current practice as well, the Indian central authorities 
decided to disallow the wartime practice of foregoing laws, and to bring it back under the 
Emigration Act. However, they were willing to allow continued recruitment in India of both 
labourers and skilled artisans, purely as temporary measure and in order to give the company 
time for other arrangements.215 In November 1920, the Foreign Secretary of the Government 
of India finally addressed APOC’s chairman on the issue of exemption from emigration laws 
acquiesced in as war measure. Given labourers’ widespread complaints as to alleged ill 
treatment and since war necessity no longer existed, the company’s current practice of 
importing unskilled and skilled labour without reference to the emigration act would be 
dispensed with. The Indian government would hence notify January 1921 as the date from 
which emigration was brought under respective laws, and that those forms of agreements had 
to be accepted by the company that were sent already in 1915.216 Arguably, the government 
could no longer tolerate this illegal position and practice of the company. 
However, the next chapter shows that the company was virtually exempted from the 
operation of the emigration act until 1925, when it was found, almost accidentally, that 
emigrants were not properly treated according to emigration laws. While Indian immigration 
into Mesopotamia was more and more curtailed during 1920, Indian labour migrants were 
greatly in use by the oil company, albeit under different circumstances. 
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III. British India and Post-War Gulf Developments 
The Gulf region still experienced the immediate after pains of the First World War up 
until the early 1920s, but important changes were already under way. Especially after the Iraqi 
uprising during 1920 and the subsequent rise of Arab nationalism, the British government 
decided to run the mandate over Iraq without the former Indian contribution, and in the 
following decade before the state’s independence in 1932 also to withdraw its own political 
stakes from the country as soon as possible. For the British government found itself in a role 
of having to conform to international norms in regard to the mandate, while it needed to 
reduce expenditure because of its weakened strategic and economic position. Publicly 
devolving power to the country’s politicians thus seemed a prerogative, while keeping in view 
its economic stakes and position under the mandate. This resulted in an “Arab façade” of 
government under the mandate, which more and more switched from the former Anglo-Indian 
to an Iraqi administration.217 After its independence in 1932, the Iraqi state aimed to establish 
those laws usually connected to a modern nation-state. These addressed the nationality of its 
inhabitants, the state’s sovereignty in regard to its boundaries, but for example also in regard 
to the labour market. 
The First World War ushered a diversity of foreign troops all over the territory of 
neighbouring Persia as well. While it had the political implication of widening the long-
standing rift in Iranian politics, it also laid the basis for a severe political transformation.218 In 
1925, the Pahlavi dynasty came to power starting a programme of nation building and 
national development. This included a strong, centrally led government that would not any 
longer accept Great Powers rivalry over the country.219 It had also the effect that APOC came 
increasingly under critique for its practices in regard to royalties for the Persian state as well 
the employment of foreign labour. The coming into power thus started a period in which the 
country divested itself of the earlier informal influence of the British and Russian Empires. 
While the two states bordering on the northern Gulf were able to increasingly divest 
themselves of subordination to British power and interests, the states in the southern Gulf 
became new objects of late British imperial power, which was to stay for several more 
decades to come. The post-war Gulf saw the rising oil economy of Iraq and the smaller Arab 
Gulf states, where British and American companies started operating. The earlier Turkish 
Petroleum Company, which had received a concession shortly before World War One, was 
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renamed Iraq Petroleum Company and started operations under a consortium of several 
European and American stakeholders, among them also APOC. By the late 1920s, several 
companies started operations in the southern Gulf, and APOC had important stakes especially 
in Kuwait. The British Empire therefore continued to have large interests in the Gulf States 
especially for these countries’ large natural resources and as interstation for imperial air 
communication between Britain and India in keeping up Empire.220 
These developments again transformed interregional relations between India and the 
Gulf countries, in which some of the earlier links sustained, while others broke off and new 
links emerged. This chapter is about continuity and change in the relations earlier depicted 
that had accrued over pre-ceding decades, accounting for where continuations existed and 
discontinuations occurred. 
 
1. ‘Persianization’ of Anglo-Persian’s Labour Force? 
Within the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, labour unrests and strikes of local and Indian 
labour, at times separate from and sometimes with each other, occurred on quite many 
occasions during the early 1920s. The company history records that especially Indian labour 
expressed their discontent during this time, with “many of the predominantly Hindu Indian 
clerks, artisans, orderlies and cooks […][finding] the Persian ambience unsympathetic to their 
customs which contributed to their discontent”.221 Yet, instead of blaming contemporary 
social relations on Indians’ alleged “cultural claustrophobia in an alien and not always 
sympathetic environment”222 and thereby divesting the company’s management of all 
responsibility, one can retrieve arguments of what actually unsettled the labour force. 
Arguably, resentment sparked for political reasons as much as for discontent over working 
and living conditions.223 
According to company sources, a semi-organised political agitation had broken out 
among Indian labour consequent to the Jallianwala Bagh massacre in Amritsar during April 
1919. This together with anger over high cost of living, poor living conditions and low 
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remuneration resulted in a strike in early December 1920 of some 3,000 Indian labourers. The 
company conceded to their demands, increasing wages by 80 per cent as well as sanctioning 
other improvements. Persian and Arab labour stroke the following day, and their demands 
were likewise accepted. Another strike of Indian labour in May 1922 yielded no solution, and 
some 2,000 men were hence repatriated to India in early 1923. Arguably, this provided 
Persians an opportunity to fill vacancies, as the refinery was undermanned and the company 
decided not to fill these posts with Indians anymore. When Indian labour struck work yet 
another time in 1924, the company was allegedly better able to handle the situation, for it had 
built up a resource in Persian labour. The company history asserts that this reduction of Indian 
and increase of Persian labour led to a much more satisfactory state of affairs.224 
Obviously, the strikes had various effects. Earlier the company conceded to labourers’ 
demands for better remuneration or living conditions, while repatriating disobedient Indian 
labour later. Most importantly, it was alleged that the company decided on the basis of such 
re-occurring strikes during this period for the more extensive use of local labour, and to 
henceforth implement training and educational programmes for Persians. Thus enabling the 
company to rely less on external labour, it is interpreted as seed for nationalizing the labour 
force that ultimately resulted in a diminishing share of Indian labour during ensuing 
decades.225 This chain of argumentation is problematic in several ways. Firstly, it views the 
several conjunctures in such a process of nationalization as constant, as if the implementation 
of training programmes and the decision to nationalize the labour force were immediate 
effects of the increasing use of local labour. Secondly, it bases the decision to increasingly use 
Persian labour only on the occurrence of strikes during this time without scrutinizing the 
environment of external labour supply from India. Thirdly, by magnifying the early impact of 
nationalization it neglects and cannot explain the continued use, albeit on a small-scale, of 
Indian labour for almost three decades to come. 
When reviewing available data in regard to its labour situation, one recognizes that the 
company continued to employ Indian labour, besides other external labour, extensively even 
after the period between 1920 to 1922 and in the time under review. In fact, the share of 
Indian labour drastically decreased from 1921 onwards after the Indian government had 
curtailed the wartime allowance of recruiting labour from India, but continued to be above 10 
per cent before 1929. From then on, it fell below 10 per cent and decreased even more during 
the 1930s. 
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Therefore, the argument expressed here is that the company continued to use Indian 
labour throughout the 1920s extensively and that the relative share of Indian labour was 
continuously below 5 per cent only after the agreement of a new concession with the Persian 
government in 1933. (Cf. table 4 and 5) The first concession had obliged the company already 
to employ only Persians for unskilled jobs, but this new agreement also extended to 
employment of skilled labour as far as possible: 
The company shall recruit its artisans as well as technical and commercial staff from 
among Persian nationals to the extent that it shall find in Persia persons who possess the 
requisite competence and experience.226 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Anglo-Persian Oil Company staff and labour in Persia, 1922-1938, in absolute numbers, and 
share of Indian employees227 
 
Only the company’s nationalization in 1951 totally dispensed with employing Indian 
labour. Taken together, many more reasons seem to exist in order to explain the declining 
number of Indian labour engaged following the early 1920s. It was certainly not the case that 
the company itself charitably aimed all of a sudden of training local labour, but that 
exigencies required their action. The company’s need for continued use of Indian labour is 
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Indians Year Persians 
No. % 
Others Europeans Total 
1922 18441 4285 16.4 2940 490 26156 
1923 20762 4715 17.5 849 644 26970 
1924 18384 4731 19 648 738 24501 
1925 15820 4890 17 7201 994 28905 
1926 15843 3588 13.5 6042 1020 26493 
1927 17887 3272 11 7009 1055 29223 
1928 16382 3050 12 5365 1000 25797 
1929 15245 2518 10.5 5273 980 24016 
1930 20095 2411 7.7 7549 1191 31246 
1931 14797 1675 8 3178 989 20639 
1932 10343 1420 9.6 2346 744 14853 
1933 15941 795 4.5 277 749 17762 
1934 22020 925 3.8 254 901 24100 
1935 25240 954 3.5 119 1035 27348 
1936 24948 779 3 76 1055 26858 
1937 30779 786 2.4 66 1185 32816 
1938 45978 1342 2.7 84 1524 48928 
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evident not only from such numbers, but also from the company’s representations towards 
and discussions with Indian authorities. 
 
New agreements for clerks and artisans after 1922 
The company’s need for a further and continuous supply of certain labour types from 
India, under the changed environment, exemplified during 1922 to 1925 when Anglo-
Persian’s agent in India, Shaw Wallace & Co., was eager and proposed to amend considerably 
the forms of contracts for future recruitment of Indian clerks and artisans. Authorities in India 
consented, for example, to the company’s suggestion of expanding the type of work recruited 
under the agreement for clerks, professing the extent to which they still employed Indian 
clerical and comparable labour. The agreement was henceforth so broad as to cover as well 
sub-assistant surgeons, dressers and compounders, shift engineers, switch board attendants, 
refinery foremen, draughtsmen, overseers, permanent way inspectors, telegraphists and the 
like occupations hitherto not expressly covered. One further witnesses in similar undertakings 
the company’s wish to conclude contracts in their favour, and in disfavour of Indian 
employees. The company aimed for example at and succeeded in blurring the boundaries 
between skilled and unskilled work in respect of artisans, for whom they were able to change 
the duration of contracts from one to two years. Allegedly, technical work in the oil industry 
was of a nature that it took even qualified artisans about six months to become really useful to 
the company, and if the present clause was to remain in force, they would loose the greater 
part of their skilled labour just as the men were becoming efficient in their various 
occupations. Basically arguing that even skilled labour was not skilled enough yet for their 
occupations, they were able to seize a binding contract and to ensure the labourers presence in 
one place for an extended period. 
Yet another issue arising in respect of clerks was the duration of notice being 
stipulated in respective agreements. The company succeeded in lowering the time of notice to 
one month from three months for both contracting parties, and in stipulating that they did not 
have to given any reason for dismissing. Their desire for such action would only be enforced 
by the company in the event of a seditious employee attempting to disaffect his fellow 
employee by the continual recitation of imaginary political or other grievances, but committed 
at the same time no overt act that justified his dismissal under another clause of the 
agreement. Thus, the company tried to obtain forms of agreement favouring its rights over the 
rights of employees, and to implement in contracts ways to let go off unnecessary or seditious 
employees. 
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In times of a generally decreasing number of Indian workers for various circumstances 
this was a way to put into action the company’s wishes. According to company concerns, the 
clause in its present form allowed an employee to sign an agreement in Bombay with a 
deliberate intention of exploiting the company. In such a case it would be possible for an 
employee to give one month’s notice immediately on his arrival in Persia, thereby putting the 
company to the expense of engaging him, of a second class return passage to the Gulf and of 
paying him two months’ salary for one month’s work. The first month’s work of a newly 
engaged hand would be seldom of great value to the company as it took some time for new 
men to accustom themselves to the altered conditions of life and work. Thus, the unaltered 
clause would place undesirable powers in the hands of a class, many of which would not 
hesitate to exploit the company for their own hands. On another note, the company was not 
willing to employ a dissatisfied man a day longer than was absolutely necessary, while three 
months notice would necessitate their keeping the employee in Persia for three months or 
discharging him at once giving three months’ wages. 
In this case we also witness that while Bombay authorities were willing to endorse the 
company’s request without much ado, the Indian government was not willing to let go at least 
of the most minimal rights of employees. The central authorities objected, for example, to the 
company’s wish of stipulating the cessation of paying a labourer’s salary from the date of 
notice being given should his length of service not amount to twelve months service. 
Recognizing that the effect of ceasing the pay from the date of such notice would practically 
deprive the employees of the right of giving notice, the central authorities wanted the 
company to fully omit this sentence.228 Such lamenting over terms of engagement for Indian 
labour was one example showing the company’s paradigm. While decisions had been taken to 
reduce Indian labour, their presence was still a necessity. Arranging contracts in such a way 
as to allow the company to easily discard labour seemed imperative then. We witness another 
instance of how the company was still affected by supply from India in the early 1920s. 
 
Labour for Persia and the Indian Emigration Act of 1922 
 As described in chapter 2, APOC had been exempted from the operations of the 
Emigration Act of 1908 experimentally in 1918, with the agreement officially rescinding 
again towards the end of 1920. However, APOC’s recruitment in India for its Persian 
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operations was effectively exempted until 1924 from the operations of the Indian Emigration 
Act. The latter had been amended in 1922, which resulted in constraints on Indian emigration 
following protests of the Indian nationalist movement against indenture especially during 
World War One. Emigration of unskilled labour was prohibited henceforth except to such 
countries and on such terms and conditions as the Governor General specified by notification 
and both chambers of the legislature approved of. Skilled emigration was still permitted on 
the lines of the former law. The act further provided for the appointment of protectors of 
emigrants with advisory boards in the various provinces of British India and for agents to look 
after the interests of emigrants in places outside British India.229 
Already in 1923, a report clearly mentioned Shaw Wallace & Co.’s activity of 
recruiting skilled labourers from Karachi and Bombay on the basis of an exemption from the 
operation of the emigration act. According to the Protector of Emigrants action had to be 
taken to enforce the provisions of the act in regard to Indian employees of the company, of 
which roughly 2,000 were dispatched in 1923, laying bare that the present position was 
actually illegal and highly irregular. While the new act did not appear to provide for any 
exemption, the company was still allowed to continue to enjoy an exemption granted before 
that act had come into force. There were thus no valid grounds for continuing the exemption. 
Officials in Bombay, however, recognized the exemption’s continuance only in October 
1924, reporting that the provisions of Act VII of 1922 had not been applied to employees of 
the company until recently, allegedly owing to oversight. Indian government officials noted 
that this oversight had no doubt resulted in a loss to central revenues; one estimated a sum of 
around 16.000 Rupees, expressing his desire to compel defaulters to make good such losses. 
For the future, the application of the act was to be extended to employees of the 
company, which would involve an enormous increase in the work of the Protector of 
Emigrants, who had to deal with ten times as many emigrants as before given the high amount 
of labour sent to the company from Bombay under the skilled category. This number had 
actually increased greatly since 1918. Therefore, the Indian government sanctioned the 
posting of an additional Assistant Collector of Customs, to whom the duties of the Protector 
of Emigrants were to be entrusted. Henceforth, the company had to pay a fee of three rupees 
per emigrant proceeding from Bombay to the Gulf.230 This juncture not only shows that the 
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company profited until 1924 from the exemption in that no emigrant appeared before the 
necessary authorities until that year. This non-appearance could eventually lead to the 
company importing whatever labour it wanted. In this regard, the steep rise in numbers from 
1918 to 1923 either suggests that the company actually employed only more labour under the 
skilled category, or that it was able to recruit under the skilled category also labour nominally 
under the category of unskilled labour. 
 
Jurisdiction and labour 
Besides an interest in further labour supplies from the Indian subcontinent, the 
company also perceived of the importance to control and maintain the Indian labour force 
already present in Persia. British jurisdiction over its Indian subjects was very important in 
this regard. As explained earlier, jurisdiction and capitulary rights in Persian territory had 
prompted the Indian government to permit, at least rhetorically, emigration to these parts. 
However, extra-territorial rights and jurisdiction received another important facet in disputes 
between the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and its Indian employees. While cases with Persian 
labour were most probably referred to local courts, British Consuls or Vice-Consuls at 
Mohammerah and Ahvaz handled civil and criminal cases involving APOC’s Indian 
employees, either against other Indian employees or against the company itself, from around 
1911, after the two posts had come into the orbit of the Persian Coast and Islands Order in 
Council of 1907.231 Invested with magisterial powers and presiding over the local British 
consular court, the Judicial Assistant of the Ahvaz Vice-Consulate tried seven criminal cases 
involving Indian employees during 1920. Out of these, he served two sentences of rigorous 
and one of simple imprisonment between a month and a year for breaches of contract and 
trust, and the payment of fines from either of the parties in the other four cases according to 
the Indian Penal Code.232 
In addition, the company tried in fact to obtain for themselves rights usually reserved 
for certified consular officers. During 1923, they proposed to Indian authorities through the 
Political Resident at Bushehr that some of their British employees be invested with consular 
and magisterial powers. The company allegedly “volunteered to undertake gratuitously” in 
helping out British political officers with registration tasks, increasingly constrained by the 
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number of British subjects employed and their scattered whereabouts all over southern Persia, 
if senior British employees were authorised to act as Vice-Consuls or the like. The Indian 
government and the British Minister had no objection to this proposal. Moreover, the Indian 
government considered another proposal to invest these officers with magisterial powers. As 
per the Minister in Tehran, conferring such powers was a strong desire, so to enable the 
company to deal promptly and legally with fracases occurring “among the heterogeneous 
elements of which the Abadan population is composed” or at the oil fields where the 
“presence of a number of extremely rough American and Polish drillers” rendered the 
position even more difficult. The Foreign Office judged the proposal out of proportion and 
disagreed to grant consular ranks to employees, especially since British subjects would not 
understand that “holders of the title were not officials to whom they could carry […] 
grievances which such persons are in the habit of referring to regular consular officials.”233 
Admittedly, at this stage I can neither finally judge the circumstances leading to such 
proposals, nor their effects if instituted. While the consular rank was probably denied to 
company employees, the archive does not share evidence whether magisterial powers were 
granted or not.234 However, this incidence somehow reveals the multiple ways and means of 
the company in trying to get a better grip over its employees, that would finally result in a 
more disciplined work force under 
contemporary constraints of the oil 
industry. One such constraint probably 
lay in the nature of the region’s oil 
operations. Exploration sites and 
pumping stations were often far away 
from the company’s refinery 
installations at Abadan. (Cf. map 3. 
Major Iranian Oilfields,235 for a 
contemporary view) This necessitated 
the circulation of labour over vast 
tracts, but resulted at the same time in 
the undesirable condition of a 
fragmented labour force, already 
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regarded as unruly, whose maintenance became even more difficult. Legislation in the 
proposed manner would have been quite advantageous to the company. If state institutions 
and company interests overlapped, migrant labour may have had a limited choice to present 
their grievances to the state under whose purview they nominally fell and to the company for 
whom they worked. 
Even if the above proposals did not work out, there were other provisions to ensure a 
smooth and uncomplaining functioning of Indian labourers. From December 1920 onwards, 
all agreements between the company and employees included an arbitration clause inserted as 
to discourage litigation by employees on return to India. This clause stipulated that “Any 
dispute arising in this agreement shall be submitted to H.B.M.’s Consul at Ahwaz for 
arbitration, whose decision shall be accepted as final and binding on both parties.”236 Some of 
the arising cases discussed in the following show that decisions of local British political 
officers invested with judicial powers were rarely advantageous to Indian employees, but 
confirmed more to company’s interests. One case deserves special mention in this context. In 
June 1926, the Consul-General at Bushehr instructed the Vice-Consul at Ahvaz to arbitrate in 
the case of C.H. Abdullah versus the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. Re-engaging the former 
after earlier employment as clerk in December 1924, the company had discharged C.H. 
Abdullah in February 1926 under clause 10 of the respective agreement for clerks on the basis 
of an anonymous letter written to the company that accused the petitioner of certain 
malpractices. Although the letter was found being forged with its author admitting his action, 
the Vice-Consul arbitrated the employee’s discharge to be lawful. As stipulated by clause 14 
of the agreement between company and employee, any decision of an officer of the British 
government exercising judicial powers was final and conclusively binding on the parties in 
case of any difference or dispute between them. Thus, he also rejected all claims of the 
company’s former employee in regard to payment due to him for the time under contract and 
compensation for injury to character and career, amounting to some 13,000 rupees altogether. 
The case developed only with the employee’s lawyer bringing it to the attention of the 
central authorities, and especially to the department responsible for emigration. Officials here 
protested vehemently against the company’s utilization of clause 10 of the agreement. This 
                                                
236 Following the introduction of a revised form of agreement in early 1925, the clause was altered to: “If any differences or 
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clause had been common to all agreements concluded with skilled personnel, recruited in 
India, for employment in countries abroad, conferring upon foreign employers a wide 
discretion to dismiss their employees, provided due notice was given. However, the clause 
was not intended to dispense with the moral obligation resting upon all employers to exercise 
this power only for good and sufficient reasons. It was clear to officials in the emigration 
branch that the company had been guilty of the gross misuse of that clause. They further 
referred to the Vice-Consul’s drawing attention to the comparative frequency with which the 
company had been availing themselves of this clause to discharge certain of their employees. 
It seemed therefore necessary for them that something had to be done to stop the company 
from these quite frequent acts of injustice towards Indian emigrants. They went so far to 
propose the issuance of a warning to the company through the Bombay authorities that if any 
more cases of discharge under clause 10 without good cause were brought to the local 
government’s notice they would be compelled to make use of powers invested into under the 
Indian Emigration Act to withhold permission to the further emigration of skilled labour for 
employment under the company. Addressing the arbitrary character of the company’s action, 
the department’s Secretary thought a warning would perhaps not suffice and proposed to 
amend the clause with a phrase that expressed the employer’s necessity for good and 
sufficient reason in their actions of dismissing employees. 
In turn, the Foreign Secretary suggested disposing of the matter and securing some 
compensation for the injured man by preliminary action through the Resident in Bushehr who 
was in close contact with the company. The resident in turn informed the company that harm 
would result to the company from publicity being given to a case of this nature, emphasizing 
the necessity of preventing the occurrence of such cases and suggesting that the claim of C.H. 
Abdullah should be disposed of out of court. The company agreed and reportedly requested 
their Bombay agents Shaw Wallace & Co. to arrive at a settlement with their former 
employee. Central authorities hoped that the company had learned a lesson and that no further 
instances of such nature would arise.237 
 
Indian Employees’ claims against the Company 
In yet another case one observes the kind of relations between the company, labourers 
and officials of the colonial state in a time of increasing employment of Persian, but 
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continued dependence on Indian labour that seemed to considerably define working 
conditions in Persia’s early oil industry. Dissatisfied by the general nature of treatment the 
company had meted out to him and other Indian employees, S. Muthuswami resigned from 
his clerical services in December 1930. The kind of free accommodation provided, leave rules 
and indirect enforcement of labour on Sundays and holidays without compensation were 
further reasons for his cancellation, apart from the alleged insecure and intolerable position of 
Indians in the company. Allegedly, neither the company nor the responsible Vice-Consul at 
Mohammerah was willing to change these circumstances or redress grievances. After the 
notice being served, Muthuswami accused the company of not paying overtime due for 
clerical work exacted from him on Sundays and holidays continuously for a period of more 
than two years. While not able to gain redress during his remaining stay in Persia, he 
addressed authorities in India regarding the issue only on return thereto. 
 
 
Picture 7. Electrical Squad with Indian Foreman Hana, 1926238 
 
Officials in the concerned government department deemed him not legally entitled to 
receive payment for overtime, as the forms of agreements entered into with clerks stated 
nothing in this regard. His continued representations to the Indian government however 
released an official enquiry from APOC on the circumstances of this case. Company officials, 
in turn, stated that the position of Indians in their services was not so secure anymore due to a 
severe depression in the oil industry, and given that the Persian government brought 
increasing pressure to bear upon the company to replace Indian nationals by Persian subjects. 
                                                
238 BP Archive, University of Warwick. Archival Ref. 30471_002. 
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Despite such factors making it difficult for the company to guarantee continued employment 
of Indian nationals, they boasted themselves to still employ five hundred Indian clerks and 
one thousand skilled Indians. In fact, they cited accusations in the Persian press of treating 
Indians preferentially at the expense of Persians. In respect of overtime work they argued that 
the practice of calling upon personnel of the First and Second Class to work on Sundays or 
holidays without extra pay when exigencies of the company’s business made it necessary was 
a know condition of service. From the company’s perspective, Muthuswami had always been 
treated and paid well throughout his service, being surprised at his attitude then seeming to be 
biased by political views and opinions. Finally, government officials did not see any right to 
claim extra-remuneration for overtime. If at all, he would have had to demand redress while 
in the company’s service. In addition, the agreement did not stipulate any limitation of 
working days or hours. Peculiarly, colonial officials saw also no necessity to include such 
provisions for hours of work in future agreements, as relations between APOC and their 
Indian employees had allegedly seen considerable improvement in recent years.239 
 
 
Picture 8. Knocking-off time at Abadan Refinery, c. 1926240 
 
                                                
239 S. Muthuswami, Madras to Secy, FPD, GoI, 5 Apr 1933 and enclosures. Notes, FPD, 3, 6 Jul 1931. S Muthuswami to 
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1931. Notes, FPD, 8, 11, 27 Oct 1931. Muthuswami to Foreign Secy, GoI, 24 Oct 1931. FPD to S. Muthuswami, 2 Nov 
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Taken together, one can establish that a number of reasons served the fact of the 
company employing less Indian labour during the 1920s. The existing literature on the early 
Persian oil industry has mostly emphasised either the company’s decision to switch to Persian 
labour as a result of increasing strikes of Indian labour, or the Iranian state’s increasing 
demand for employment of nationals. Both arguments merely address the nexus of local 
circumstances within the company and arising nationalist politics, without assessing the 
nature of labour supply from India and developments in its labour market and policy. Further 
reasons for the company’s policy change might therefore include the changing nature of 
contracts, the stop of exemption from Indian emigration laws and overall a change in the 
Indian government’s approach to the company’s use of Indian labour. After the new 
concession agreement in 1933, the company adhered to the demand of the Iranian state. 
Besides the obvious change to its new name Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1935, it also 
increasingly dispensed with the employment of Indian labour. 
 
2. Reminiscences of Indian Staff and Labour in Iraq 
In Iraq, the developments taking shape in late 1920 continued. By 1921 at the latest, 
decisions had been taken and brought into effect of lowering the number of Indian officers 
alongside the number of artisans and labourers working in Iraq’s military and civil 
administration. This development materialised in all sectors and in various employments. In 
regard to employment of government officials, Iraqi authorities increasingly discarded Indian 
officers during the time of the mandate. While some 2,000 Indian officials were still 
employed in the government in 1920, this number came down to some 36 in 1931. 
Obviously, the Iraqi government prepared for independence and being handed over authority 
at the end of the British mandate in 1932. 
 
 1920 1923 1926 1929 1931 
British Gazetted Officers 364 181 148 130 118 
British Nursing Sisters 23 27 23 17 14 
British Non-Gazetted Officers 484 361 53 35 28 
Indian Officials 2,035 1270 250 53 36 
Total 2,906 1,839 474 234 196 
 
Table 6: Total number of British and Indian officials in the employ of the ‘Iraqi Government, 1920-1931241 
 
Especially those departments, which were formerly heavily using Indian expertise, such 
as the Irrigation, Surveys, Veterinary and Health Department still employed Indian officials in 
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1931 for want of locally obtainable staff.242 These numbers show how drastically Indian 
employment in the civil and military authorities was cut down between the years 1920 and 
1931. But developments were less abrupt than one thinks them to be, and Indians were needed 
and employed in the development of Iraq even after decisions had been taken to largely stop 
Indian recruitment in the early 1920s. Therefore, the decrease in numbers does not adequately 
represent the extent and processes behind the fact of Indians, though few, still being 
employed in various positions in the country. Nor does it say anything particular about the 
fates of those who had once decided to participate and had come in the wake of war as 
officers, soldiers, labourers, policemen, et cetera, to the country, making it their home for 
several years with some hoping to settle down eventually. 
A series of three articles in the Bombay Chronicle in 1926 voiced similar 
apprehensions, mostly in regard to Indian officials but also slightly referring to other labour 
then still employed in Iraq, by recounting how the contemporary situation had been arrived 
at.243 Accounting for the large number of Indians serving in different positions during the war, 
they argued that many had come out to Iraq with the aim of settling and under the impression 
that the Indian government’s policy was to develop the country and to find an outlet for 
Indian immigrants. Allegedly, Indians were later on considered in the British Parliament to be 
the cause of disturbances in Iraq during 1920, from which date on Arabs learnt to hate Indians 
for the first time, hatred being the “consequence of a policy to throw the blame for local 
disturbances on the Indianisation of Iraq during the period of the Civil Administration”, while 
the administration was actually British-run. 
With the great dismissal and repatriation of large numbers of Indians, Arabs even 
began to demand the dismissal of the remaining few Indians. This policy of lowering Indian 
participation however did not enable the British or the Iraq government to send away those 
“technical” Indians, whose services were badly needed in several technical departments, 
sometimes giving tuition to those Arabs who were to replace them later. While needed by the 
state, their situations became increasingly insecure, as assurances of further employment were 
not addressed in any treaty, such as the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1922, and their contracts largely 
disappointing. All this included other forms of labour beyond Indian officials. The article 
especially referred to Indian personnel employed with the Royal Air Force in Iraq, most of 
whom were followers enlisted for technical and other kinds of labour. Reportedly, they had 
been recruited by military authorities in India on definite military agreements that were more 
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disadvantageous than those of civilians. It argued that these personnel were not soldiers but 
civilians attached to the RAF, and deserved better treatment than was currently given to them. 
Asking rhetorically whether India was to be the source of labour supply for all colonies where 
derogatory terms of service are to be offered to Indians and citing provisions of the Indian 
Emigration Act, the article called for agitation to revise these derogatory terms of Indians’ 
employment. 
 
Continued use of Indian labour in Iraq 
From October 1922, the Royal Air Force had taken over command over all remaining 
troops of the Air Force and British and Indian Army troops in Iraq, and was to remain in 
charge until the early 1930s. These troops were actually employed in several small-scale 
skirmishes in the country, and air forces were used to facilitate the policing of large areas by 
air, for bombardments of villages and tribes when necessary, and for imperial air 
communication.244 These troops’ employment resulted in a network of air bases, camps and 
barracks that necessitated several maintenance and operation services. 
For a long time, Indian labour continued to be employed in different occupations in 
these places, for example as dhobis, khalasis, sweepers, bhistis, coolies, peons and orderlies. 
The labour was recruited under the orders of the Adjutant General in India continuing 
arrangements first adopted during the war until December 1925, when its control was directly 
transferred to the Air Officer Commanding at Baghdad. The forecasted number of unskilled 
labour then required by the force was 213 persons during 1926 and 1927, while skilled labour 
amounted to some 1,238 during both years. However, it was this change in responsibility of 
recruitment, which resulted in a new discussion of the topic, as the recruitment for forces in 
Iraq was to be executed by a private firm in Bombay. This posed certain problems in the way 
of supplying this labour. It was illegal in regard to unskilled labourers, as no notification 
existed under the provisions of the new Emigration Act of 1922. Hitherto, its recruitment had 
been carried on continuously ever since the war and the change in the legal position brought 
about by the new act was allegedly not noticed. Thus, authorities had to find a way of dealing 
with the issue.245 
While skilled labour could be organized and despatched through the agency of Messrs. 
Ashton & Company under control of the Bombay government in accordance with chapters 4 
and 5 of the emigration act, the Indian Army Department requested the Air Officer 
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Commanding at Baghdad in March 1926 to obtain any unskilled labour locally for the time 
being, as the procedure of obtaining such labour from India had changed. The latest 
amendments of the Indian Emigration Act stipulated that emigration of unskilled labour was 
illegal until notified by government and approved by the Indian legislature, which was to 
convene again only six months later. Indian central authorities therefore started earlier 
gathering information on requirements in Iraq to be laid before the Governor-General in 
Council and both houses of the Indian legislature for consent. The High Commissioner in Iraq 
explained that unskilled Indian labour was necessary to certain classes of employment, for 
example local khalassis and watermen for the were found unsatisfactory.246 
However, in later discussion it was found out that the forces in Iraq needed only a 
limited number of this unskilled labour. Despite of bringing the issue in front of the 
legislative chambers, where such a proposal could have been denied, the Governor General in 
Council at the end of 1926 declared the occupations of khalasis and watermen – usually 
regarded as unskilled work – as skilled work for the purposes of the Indian Emigration Act, 
and authorities hence allowed their recruitment through the recruiting agency in Bombay as 
well.247 This example shows that the Indian government still had some discretionary power to 
evade stipulations in force in that they simply designated unskilled workers under the skilled 
category. In such a way they were easily able to send labour overseas, even without consent 
of the legislative chambers that was necessary according to the new emigration laws. 
As shown above, the fact that a vast number of Indians had been released from 
services in Iraq elides that recruitment of the Iraqi government in India continued unabatedly, 
albeit on a comparatively small scale. Whenever new Indian men were needed for the Iraqi 
railway or port directorate, they were acquired through offices of their agents in Bombay 
established there after the administration of Iraq had been handed over to civil authorities. 
Being newly appointed in 1933, the agent for the Port of Basra Directorate requested 
permission from Bombay authorities to continue recruiting activities of skilled Indian labour 
for service under that directorate in Iraq, on the same lines as the former agent for the Iraqi 
railways had recruited labour. The application effectively implied that the agent and the Iraqi 
government were freed from payment of any security deposit for the due observance of the 
agreement and the proper treatment of the person recruited, the only requirement being an 
assurance to the latter effect. The Iraqi government agreed on this.248 
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Indian Association in Iraq 
During these years, some of the Indians remaining in Iraq reacted to their changing 
environment Under the impression of the earlier British Indian administration in Iraq breaking 
off and the number of Indians in government services and elsewhere ever decreasing, the 
more a sense of community and belonging seemed emerge of those few staying behind and 
not returning to India, with community activities becoming a special meaning. When 
becoming clearer that Iraq was to be an independent state with British Indian presence in Iraq 
receding ever more, members of the Indian community established the Indian Association in 
Iraq in 1921. As the only recognized body of Indians in Iraq, the association’s objects were, 
among others, to promote the spirit of union amongst Indians in the country, to develop social 
and moral advancement and to encourage temperance through a library, reading room and 
recreations, and to watch the welfare of Indians.249 
 
 
Picture 9. Cover of the constitution of the Indian Association in Iraq.250 
 
The Indian government had first heard about the association in connection with its 
fourth annual report for 1925 being sent to them in 1926, allegedly because the community 
was under attack from local inhabitants.251 In April during that year, some five hundred 
Indians attended the association’s anniversary in its premises on Baghdad’s Residency Road. 
By that time, the association already had branches in several towns throughout Iraq such as 
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Mosul and Kirkuk, enlisted thirty life members from India who occasionally came for visits, 
and had immensely widened its activity. They maintained a school for Indian children in 
Baghdad, assisted in the repatriation of destitute Indian subjects, made representations for the 
provision of regular passports to British Indian subjects, and overall tried to obtain better 
conditions of service for Indians employed in government service in Iraq. They had also 
assisted in Iraqis in the recent floods. The Association was also integrated into larger social 
networks, with several British and Indian officers in the employ of the Iraqi government 
facilitating its establishment. During the ceremony for the opening of the association’s 
premises, the High Commissioner Sir Henry Dobbs, advised its members to ignore any 
attacks on the good works of Indians from irresponsible quarters.252 
In its report for the year 1927, the Association had to concede to the strong reduction 
and repatriation of Indian personnel in various civil and military departments, which affected 
the membership numbers. (Cf. Picture 10. 
Cover of the 1927 report of the Indian 
Association in Iraq; on the right)253 With 120 
members leaving to India during the year, 
only through strenuous efforts by members to 
keep up these numbers and promote new 
enlistments, the strength in March 1927 was 
at 226. The future did not look particularly 
bright, with the subscriptions dwindling in 
the same speed as the community strength. 
Affects for some of the community activities 
were feared, such as the school, which was 
attended by 20 boys and 2 girls only. 
Nonetheless, the association still made 
progress in some areas. It arranged for 
example with local authorities in Baghdad a 
cremation ground for Hindu and Sikh members of the community and deceased Hindu 
soldiers of the Royal Air Force authorities. The association’s welfare activities furthermore 
organised meetings that aimed to counter allegations made in the press in India and Iraq in 
regard to the mode of living of certain Indians. To this effect, they convened people of 
various occupations in order to eradicate or mitigate any social evils existing in the 
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community. When Indian workmen employed in the Salchiyah workshops of the Iraq 
Railways were about to be fired in September 1926, the association brought about an 
amicable settlement between both, with a reduction in wages of the workmen. In addition, 
they engage in efforts to grant facilities to British Indian subjects, who wished to bring their 
families to this country. As reported this time, the association was not the only club that 
represented interests of Indians, but it cooperated with the Jamiat el Islamia, the Arya Samaj, 
the Central Sikh Committee, the Christian Brotherhood in Iraq, the Indian Railway Institute, 
the Palm Dale Club and the St. Antony’s club. The association’s strength continued to 
decrease, making up only 68 members including 16 life members by 1936. While actually a 
good number of Indians lived in Baghdad and its vicinity at that time, they rather deliberately 
kept out of the institution. The association kept on making representations on behalf of the 
Indian community employed on the Iraqi Railways, and again in the case of proposed laws 
that were to negatively affect Indians in Iraq. Finally, the association appealed to their 
countrymen in Iraq, to think only in terms of Indian Nationality, as “a man’s religion or creed 
is after all a thing between himself and His Maker and not an excuse for bringing about 
faction and unending strife and misunderstanding among mankind.”254 
 
3. Nationality and other legislations in Iran and Iraq 
Decreasing numbers of Indians in the region, as above bemoaned by the Indian 
Association in Iraq, were part and parcel of several larger transformations at work during this 
time. Between the mid-1920s to mid-1930s, nationality laws and related legislations came 
into force in Iran and Iraq following increasing nationalist demands. After long periods of 
occupation and foreign dominance in these countries, which had prompted many immigrants 
in the first place to come for work and sojourn, such laws marked the beginning of newly 
emerging territorial states that demanded control over its national population and overall 
tightened the basis for foreigners to stay on. As I will show, these legislations somehow 
affected Indian residents in these countries adversely and lead to a decrease in their overall 
numbers. While the number of Indians resident in Persia amounted to some 3,900 in 1922, 
there were around 500 (exclusive Indian employees of APOC) in the country at the end of 
1933. Of the once numerous thousands of Indians in Iraq during the war campaign and under 
the occupation, 2,596 Indians were left in 1932, 60% of which were considered permanent 
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settlers.255 In both countries, the specific environments had a peculiar outcome affecting 
Indians resident in these countries in various ways to which I refer in this section. 
 
Developments in Iran 
Already in 1923, the Persian Nationality Law that had existed for several decades 
already seems to have been more effectively and stringently enacted by Persian authorities. In 
this way, authorities on both sides came to claim several subjects whose nationality was, for 
example, in the interstices of Persian and British Indian nationality due to their moving lives 
in between these realms. One such example was Mirza Ibrahim Isfahani, a partner of the 
British Indian firm Messrs. Isfahani and Sons of Calcutta, then representing the company in 
Persia. British authorities claimed him to be a British-born grandson of a Persian naturalized 
British Indian resident in India, and the nationality of the firm apart from that of the 
individual appeared undoubtedly to be Indian according to British authorities. However, 
according to the Persian Nationality Law, the Persian government was not able to recognize 
the claim of British subjects of Persian origin or descent to enjoy their rights as British 
subjects in Persia because they had not obtained the permission of the Shah to change their 
nationality. The Government of India’s view was quite laid back on this, admitting that the 
said man could not in Persia claim the status of a British subject, unless his grandfather had 
attained his status as British Indian subject by permission from the Shah. However, British 
officials in Persia were not willing to let go off this case so easily, as suggested by Indian 
authorities, knowing that it would have far-reaching effects and would enable the Persian 
government to lay claim to British subjects who for many generations may have been born in 
British territory. Finally, the British Foreign Office decided that the claims of Mirza Ibrahim 
Isfahani to the status of British Indian subject in Persia were lawful, and that authorities in 
Persia and India were to act accordingly.256 
Despite such decisions, several others had to further deal with hardships when facing 
Persian Consuls in India or when travelling as British Indian subjects to Persia. In 1926, a 
member of the Persia Society in Bombay informed the corresponding body in London about 
circumstances in that place. He referred to a large colony of Persians settled especially in 
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Bombay, who all proceeded to Persia under very irregular arrangements, some as British 
subjects and some with two passports, while others dealt with each port of entry according to 
circumstances of the day. Under such circumstances, the local Persian Consul made himself 
somewhat unpopular by his rigid adherence to some rules whereby children born in India of 
parents born in Persia were regarded as Persian subjects and that the Persian visa on their 
British passport was refused to them. Instead they were asked to proceed to Persia under the 
Persian passport.257 In late 1926, the action of refusing to affix visas to British passports of 
naturalized British subjects of Persian origin wishing to visit Persia went on. Allegedly, this 
action of Persian consular officials was in line with a circular to Persian officers in India by 
the representative of the Persian government in India. The circular warned consuls in India to 
abstain from issuing such visas by any means, and to warn everybody who did so of a fine to 
be paid according to law, and of being disallowed to enter or being expelled from Persia.258 
In May 1928, the system of capitulary rights, which had existed for several centuries 
under different auguries and to the detriment of Persia especially in the later stage, was 
finally abolished. Then, all special privileges hitherto enjoyed by foreign nationals lapsed, 
and all foreigners became, inter alia, subject to the jurisdiction of Persian Courts. This 
resulted in different amendments in turn affecting British Indian subjects. One such issue 
concerned the Compulsory Arbitration Law passed during the same year, under which 
arbitration was compulsory at the request of either of the parties concerned in a dispute. The 
law stipulated that the respective parties appointed one arbitrator each, and the local court 
appointed as third arbitrator a Persian subject. The British Indian mercantile community, 
especially of the provinces Seistan and Kain and of Khorasan, objected to this law, fearing to 
be put at great disadvantages and being prevented from satisfactorily settling their claims. 
The majority of the cases involving British Indian traders were claims for money in 
connection with commercial transactions against Persians. Under these circumstances, two 
Persian arbitrators would oppose one Indian arbitrator, thus making a fair award in such 
cases almost impossible.259 Despite changes in regard to jurisdiction, British and Indian 
authorities were able to secure guarantees to safeguard the interests of foreign nationals after 
the termination of the capitulations. One of these safeguards entitled British non-Muslim 
nationals to have matters relating to personal status, property and family rights to be decided 
by courts in British India. As far as jurisdictional arrangements were concerned only cases of 
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non-Muslim British Indian subjects settled or residing in Persia and domiciled either in 
British India or in Persia were to be provided for. Overall, it concerned 1,589 and 57 non-
Muslims respectively, and the court in British India under consideration for cases to be 
referred to was the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in Sind.260 
In ensuing years, these and other laws became even tighter and constrained the stay 
of foreigners generally, and of British Indian subjects, ever more. From around late 1928, the 
Persian government interpreted and enforced more strictly a section of the Nationality Law, 
hitherto loosely applied, that effectively limited ownership by foreigners of landed property 
in Persia. To paraphrase: Whoever possessed landed property in Persia was recognized as 
Persian subject and any claims to foreign nationality were rejected. The new Persian 
Nationality Law passed by the Majlis in September 1929 aggravated the situation of those 
persons considered in India as British subjects but in Persia as Persians.261 In 1931, the 
Majlis passed a law to the effect that all foreigners had to obtain authorisations to enter, 
reside and pass trough the country from a competent Persian authority. Inter alia, permission 
to remain in Persia permanently or temporarily had to be obtained from police authorities in 
the district in which the person wished to reside. All foreigners were compelled within a 
certain period to notify their address and register their names with police to receive a 
certificate.262 The latter law affected many British Indian subjects in Persia adversely, and in 
several cases Indians were actually expelled from the country without any reasons.263 While 
its stipulations mentioned several classes to whom entry was to be denied, the law allegedly 
came to be applied even to persons who had been resident in Iran for years. The Consul at 
Meshed reported, that “Although most British Indian subjects realise that they may at any 
time be expelled and are reducing their liabilities as far as possible, there are still many who 
have been for years in the country and have capital sunk and for whom sudden expulsion is a 
serious matter since they cannot collect debts due, or dispose of property except through 
third parties and at great loss.”264 
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Developments in Iraq 
 Similar issues arose in Iraq following the end of the war and especially after the end 
of the British Mandate over Iraq. The situation of foreigners in the country in general had 
become increasingly constrained already in 1923 after the issuance of the Iraq Residence and 
Passport Laws, the latter superseding the Mesopotamia Passport Regulations of 1919. These 
regulated the entry into, residence in and exit from Iraq. For all these stages, a permit of 
travel or a passport was necessary in order to document identity. In addition, any person 
allowed to enter had to register at the police headquarters of the district of residence within 
fifteen days of arrival.265 
But at that time, government service, to which several of the Indians then living in 
Iraq belonged, was still possible for non-Iraqis. However, only three years later at some point 
in 1926 the Iraq Government seemed to have promulgated a notification or law restricting 
non-Iraqis from service with the Iraq government. In order to obviate their dismissal from 
services, many Indian nationals actually opted for changing their nationality into Iraqi 
nationality. We can trace details of their lives such as names, places of birth, numbers and 
dates of their naturalisation certificates, proof of British origin produced on applying for Iraqi 
nationality as well as their sheer numbers from official archives. Between 1926 and 1935, the 
colonial state received for the duration of almost ten years lists of British subjects that were 
granted Iraqi Naturalisation Certificates. These lists include 221 individuals altogether. 
Among them were several persons who had lived in Iraq their entire life, while most of them 
were born in India. Some had actually come to Iraq on pilgrim passes, while others were able 
to prove their identity with passports issued in various places of origin all over India or by 
producing witnesses testifying to the applicants’ former nationality in sworn statements. 
While most individuals were Muslims, also Hindus and Christians opted for Iraqi nationality. 
The lists abruptly end with certificate number 1396 in November 1935, when opting for Iraqi 
nationality was either not possible any longer, or no foreigners left in government service.266 
In case Indian nationals were not willing to change their nationality, they had to 
terminate their services immediately and were repatriated to India. One such case was 
afforded in mid-1929, when the services of eight Indian policemen working in the Basra 
Police Force for durations between eight to thirteen years were dispensed with. They had 
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decided not to accept Iraqi nationality, but instead to revert to India on agreement with 
superiors that their legitimate claims and rights in Iraq were settled before being put back 
into the positions employed in prior to war. The promises not being upheld in regard to 
outstanding pay, the policemen did not leave the country. The Iraq government agreed only 
after several petitions to pay the amount due, after which the policemen started reverting to 
India.267 
In Iraq, nationality legislations further aggravated after the end of the British mandate 
and following the state’s independence. Towards the end of 1935, the Iraqi government was 
about to legislate a new law for the protection of certain trades to Iraqis. Besides defining 
several trades, such as printing, photography, barber’s work, carpentry, masonry, tailoring, 
painting, services of motorcar drivers, steam engine and carriage drivers, as exclusively for 
Iraqis, the law was to include also a prohibition to do selling transactions in shops. Only those 
labours were exempted in which the government had special treaties with companies, or 
according to special arrangements and contracts, those services in foreign consulates, and 
private servants in homes.268 The issue soon aroused great fracases in public opinion 
throughout India, expressing fears that such law would harm the interests of Indians resident 
in the country. Some thought the Iraqi government’s approach to be contrary to current 
international law. With the termination of the British mandate over Iraq and the state’s 
admission to the League of Nations in October 1932, the Iraqi government had given 
guarantees to all foreigners in the country that their status would henceforth not be interfered 
with, and that their property and rights hitherto acquired were protected. These stipulated that 
all foreigners had to be allowed to stay in Iraq on the basis of their positions, even when Iraq 
was to become independent. 
Under the fresh impression of several Indian shop-owners and tradesmen having 
received notices to leave Iraq shortly, one Indian merchant at Basra, M.N. Dean, reported 
about even greater grievances for Indians to be expected from such legislation to protect 
certain labour and trades. On the one hand, he accounted for how India had and continued to 
benefit Iraq more than vice versa, through economic and religious ties bringing money thereto 
and sacrifices of Indians during the war in throwing off Turkish rule and thereby only 
allowing Iraq’s status as independent state. Referring on the contrary to Iraqis that were 
allowed to live freely and without any restrictions and harassment in India, unlike Indians in 
Iraq, he expected the Indian government to secure by all means for its own people the same 
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freedom and privileges it granted to Iraqis in India. He went so far as to suggest reciprocal 
treatment, and that if India were to put similar restrictions on Iraqis, the Iraqi government 
would have to think twice before launching out such suicidal policy.269 
Following this, the Indian government received questions from individuals and 
institutions taking up the cause of Indian diasporas as to the action they contemplated taking 
in the matter with a view to safeguard the legitimate interests and rights of Indians lawfully 
domiciled in Iraq.270 Soon afterwards, newspapers filled with articles concerning procedures 
in Iraq, often citing or repeating in full M.N. Dean’s letter to several important political 
figures in India.271 The topic seemed to be a very sensitive one, with Indian public opinion 
allegedly voicing loud demands for retaliatory action, forecasting grave consequences for 
Iraqi nationals and trade relations in case the Indian government were forced to take such 
action.272 Furthermore, between December 1935 and early 1936, almost a dozen notices of 
questions in the Legislative Assembly over this matter poured in, with government 
responding to a number of them. They basically stated over and over again that notices on 
Indians in Iraq had nothing to do with the new labour legislation but with the Iraqi Residence 
Law of 1923, to which some Indians had not adhered to correctly, and that the new law was 
not against Indians only, but foreigners in general.273 
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With Indian sentiment running thus high on these questions, Indian officials about that 
time took seriously the demands of those pleading for retaliation in case the law would pass. 
Officials in the Foreign and Political Department proposed and actually started getting 
information as to the number and professions of well-to-do Iraqi Arabs living in certain 
Indian districts, knowing that the Iraqi side would interpret this action as preliminary to 
retaliation once they heard about it and possibly make them think about their procedures. 
Despite receiving information on the point, officials seemed to understand in mid-January 
1936 that there was no necessity any longer for retaliation plans.274 
After all, the Iraqi Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs had professed 
earlier already that the law was not meant to be against Indians at all. Rather, they understood 
it as necessity to enable their government to oblige numerous Iranians living in Iraq, and in 
their eyes a fruitful source of political trouble, to become Iraqis or quit the country. The Iraq 
government thus not willing to abandon the law fully, they showed efforts to incorporate a 
new article excluding from the law’s provisions subjects of those states in whose territory 
Iraqi subjects were allowed freely to practice their crafts and trades. India was such a state, 
and officials seemed satisfied with such an amendment, knowing they were not able to stop 
the whole law from passing. The law, including the proposed amendments, was finally passed 
towards the end of February 1936.275 Public uproar in India calmed down for the time being. 
However, further reports on the alleged maltreatment and expulsion of Indians from 
Iraq trickled in after some time. A newspaper report later in 1936 alleged that the situation of 
Indians in Iraq had actually turned to the worse. The article cited another letter written from 
an Indian in Iraq to Rabindranath Tagore, stating that every possible occupation was closed 
down to foreigners, and especially to Indians, as no protective treaty had been agreed between 
India and Iraq about the future of their nationals in the country. On another note, in case an 
Indian would leave Iraq for private affairs in India, he would not be allowed re-entry into the 
country, which meant “when any Indian leaves the country he has to leave it for ever.”276 
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There was more evidence on the worsening situation for Indians in Iran and Iraq. The 
Indian merchant Alimohamed Dawoodbhai of Abadan reported in July 1936 about the 
stiffening of trade relations in Iran, especially since exchange of foreign currency was 
disallowed. On trying to visit Kuwait for possibly developing his trade there, the merchant 
was refused a visa by the British local official. In July 1936, the Political Resident remarked 
that Indians were being driven out of Iran and Iraq and were hence keen to try their luck in 
Kuwait. Allegedly, this problem had not come up before, because it was only recently that 
exclusion of Indians had become a serious part of the policy of these countries bordering on 
the northern shores of the Gulf.277 While laws in Iran and Iraq were probably promulgated 
against all foreigners, the laws affected particularly Indian migrants. Arguably, some left 
these countries therefore, instead trying to anchor on the Arab side of the Gulf. 
 
4. New Prospects for British Indian Engagement in Smaller Gulf States 
Seemingly, a new field for Indian engagement opened up in smaller Gulf States. In 
this particular instance, however, the Sheikh of Kuwait himself was eager to keep out 
prosperous Indians desirous of setting up as merchants, for he “was afraid, that owing to their 
ability to live more cheaply than his own people and to their greater business capacity, they 
will drive many of his own merchants out of business. Moreover, much of the profit that the 
Indians would make they would remit home.”278 The Political Resident speculated on his 
reasons to take such position. After all, Bahrain, Muscat or the Trucial Sheikhdoms had not 
placed any obstacles in the way of Indians desirous of going there, and they profited from the 
merchants’ capital in tow, which might happen in Kuwait as well. However, he envisaged that 
Kuwait had no need of Indian capital and rather denied them entry for they would create 
economic and political trouble from competition with the ruler’s subjects. The number of 
Indians in Kuwait was approximately some half a dozen in 1936 only, which is why the 
argument of saturation seemed not at all viable.279 In other states the number of Indians was 
higher. According to census data of 1933, Indians in Bahrain numbered some 500, roughly 
half Hindus and half Muslims, and 441 in Muscat, the latter number not including “hundreds 
of Indian Muslim devotees permanently settled”.280 Towards the end of the 1930s much of 
this settlement changed due to the oil economy. 
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In all matters oil, many of the precedents set out in southern Persia from the 1900s 
emerged also in other constituents surrounding the Gulf during the 1920s and 1930s. While 
APOC’s main investment and operations remained in southern Persia until the company’s 
nationalization in 1951, their activity became quite diverse by the 1930s. Besides operations 
of the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), APOC’s further interest applied considerably also to 
prospects in smaller Gulf States.281 Supported by local British residents and diplomats, the 
company was able to obtain oil concessions from several Arab Gulf rulers during the 1930s, 
finally establishing companies and starting to operate there under patterns similar of southern 
Persia. In Kuwait, APOC and the US Gulf Oil Company jointly instituted the Kuwait Oil 
Company (KOC) in 1933, striking oil before the inception of World War Two. APOC, or 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company as it was called then, subsequently obtained concessions in Qatar 
(1935), the Trucial States (1936) and Oman (1937) and worked them under the Petroleum 
Concessions Ltd. (PCL). 
With APOC’s increasing interest in these countries’ resources, also those legal aspects 
were transferred to the southern Gulf, which had become important earlier in Persia. Already 
in October 1921, Arnold Wilson drew the Political Resident’s attention to the desirability of 
the Indian government issuing an Order in Council for Kuwait. If APOC’s contemporary 
drilling in that territory would turn out successful, he foresaw employment of a large number 
of British and British Indian subjects. Their employees’ jurisdiction being a source of anxiety, 
he referred to the immunity from serious trouble with labour in southern Persia because of 
that particular legal institution and expressed his desire for similar safeguards in Kuwait 
before large-scale exploration started. While the Resident endorsed these views repeatedly, 
the Indian government was not in a position to act. For the time being, Kuwait was not under 
Indian administration, but under the High Commissioner in Baghdad, Percy Cox, until the 
British government’s further decision on its future political control. With Cox’s office ending 
in 1923, the British and not the Indian government assumed direct political control over the 
Arabian Gulf littoral. Further considerations of issuing and maintaining an Order in Council 
for Kuwait were therefore left to the Colonial Office, which finally promulgated a respective 
ordinance in 1925.282 From then onwards up until 1961, the British and not the Indian 
government formally handled jurisdiction over British subjects, including Indians, in Kuwait. 
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Indeed, such jurisdiction was now defined and determined by the British government. 
It had already earlier emerged over British and foreign subjects at Bahrain, where APOC did 
not explore oil. Instead, the Standard Oil Company of California (SOCAL) was able to 
establish its British subsidiary, the Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO), and solely work 
Bahrain’s oil resources. With British and not American presence still reigning supreme in 
Bahrain, the company had to adhere strictly to all prerogatives of being a British company. 
Hence, all their activities and the British and Indian labour mostly employed by BAPCO 
besides Bahraini labour came under British jurisdiction. This was also true at least for Qatar, 
where government officials directly connected APOC’s oil exploration with the establishment 
of extra-territorial jurisdiction in 1935 for the smooth operation of future oil fields.283 
Following oil strikes in ensuing decades and comparatively late commencement of large-scale 
production in some of these countries, a new inflow of Indian workers into Arab Gulf states 
began connected to these companies. Theoretically, oil concessions in these places again 
obliged them to certain provisions, such as the use for the most part of local labour. Applying 
similar arguments of overall scarcity in labour and skills, APOC’s subsidiary companies 
simply disregarded such provisions and employed labour from the Indian subcontinent.284 
As expressed earlier, these developments in the southern Arab Gulf shores were 
nothing new, but built on previous patterns of labour migration and consumption proving 
crucial to the exploitation and marketing of Persian oil from the early 20th century. In fact, oil 
operations attracted more Indian labour to Iran than to all other Gulf countries taken together 
until 1947, a fact altered only by the onslaught of KOC’s large-scale oil exploration during 
1948, when some 3,000 Indians were employed.285 With large-scale production in several 
countries, Indian labourers continued to be used in the oil industry until these were in turn 
nationalized during the 1960s and 1970s, with local labour substituting Indian labour. 
From around the late 1930s, however, other sectors in the southern Gulf increasingly 
started employing Indian labour as well, and with mercantile connections becoming ever 
stronger between the Indian subcontinent and the Arab side of the Gulf an increase in the 
overall presence of Indian merchants and labourers followed. Increasingly, countries in the 
Arab Gulf became a market for Indian products and a field of employment. Especially 
Bahrain and Kuwait took a lead in this expansion of Indian employment and trade. Large 
remittances were sent to India from these places. The overall number of British Indians 
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registered in Bahrain, for example, grew from some 450 in 1930 to 1,550 in 1938.286 By this 
time, different companies and stakeholders on the Arab side of the Gulf broadly conceived of 
Indian labour as valuable and important resource, and Indian merchant capital was able to 
foster in these regions, finally laying the basis of a migration system continuing – although 
under different pretexts – to this very day. 
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IV. Conclusion 
I have tried to analyze and describe in this paper a system of migration and exchange as 
it evolved between the Indian subcontinent and the Persian Gulf region during the period of 
transition from empires to nation-states between the late 19th and early 20th century. While 
strong connections existed already in the earlier period, the transition amplified especially in 
the massive expansion of interconnections between British India and the countries bordering 
on the northern Gulf shores, i.e. Iran and Iraq, during the First World War. With these 
countries increasingly voicing and reverting to nationalist claims and starting to reject foreign 
influence, migration and exchange processes once set into motion reverted strongly. Only the 
emergence of oil economies and the growth of labour demand in the Arab Gulf States 
contributed again to this interregional system and resulted in a resumption of connections. 
While the system’s inception predated the period under review, the ascendancy of 
British industrial and Indian merchant capital in the Gulf region from the late 19th and early 
20th century maintained connections of various sorts with the Indian subcontinent and over 
and over again invigorated the lines on which the system ran. Apart from securing resources 
and fostering empire, the First World War was a watershed event in that it mobilised – under 
the prefix of a war economy – the Indian subcontinent’s labour resources to an unprecedented 
extent. The peculiar exigencies materialised in a large-scale emigration of labour for the 
purpose of developing the infrastructure and resources of occupied territories, thus adding a 
new component of labour migration into this interregional system. It also prepared the ground 
for the technical and political infrastructure in turn enabling the inception of large-scale oil 
exploitation during ensuing decades. At the same time, it was under this military complex that 
Indian labour became first agreeable to and used to a large extent by one British Oil 
Company. As a result from further British influence in the region, the company’s subsidiary 
operations enlarged throughout the Gulf during the 1920s and 1930s, when it again favoured 
Indian over other labour for various reasons and willingly employed it. 
As for actors participating within this emerging system, one can definitely establish 
traders, pilgrims, and labourers as important stakeholders. Various reasons and circumstances 
attributed to these actors’ migrating or partaking in exchange. For Indian traders and pilgrims, 
the emergence of Anglo-Indian commercial influence in the Gulf since the late 19th century 
facilitated to some extent their circulation. In connection to this, they had a certain privileged 
position because of the system of capitulary rights to which they could revert in case of 
economic loss or in matters relating to personal law. Apart from this, they were often fully 
inserted into their host societies and at times freely opted for a change in nationalities. This 
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changed during the later period in regard to traders and shopkeepers, when emerging nation-
states and rulers of other state formations resented their positions. 
Labour migration during the later period took place on an all-together different note. 
While I could speak only to a limited extend about labourers’ motives for and environments 
of emigrating from India to the Gulf region, I was able to show that assumptions of ‘free’ 
migration got disturbed time and again throughout this period. This was connected on the one 
hand to certain measures of the colonial government of inducing labour emigration by special 
legislations, or the lapse thereof, which had once been instituted for the protection of 
emigrants. In addition, rights of labour migrants during this period were subordinate to 
demands of military discipline or the specificities of the oil industry. Labourers were not able 
to move freely about the place. Instead, they were confined to work camps and liable to 
binding contracts that allowed for penal action if labourers defied orders or claimed better 
conditions. 
The oil industry influenced politics and social relations in the Persian Gulf and 
increasingly also in India during the 20th century. During the time under review, and for many 
more decades until the inception of nationalization programmes, labourers from the Indian 
subcontinent proved quite crucial to the countries’ oil industry, of which India itself had only 
a small resource. Developments during the late 1930s already indicated that the importance of 
Indian labour supply to the Gulf increasinged also in sectors apart from oil. While oil 
companies were soon nationalized in the Arab Gulf as well, the developments described in 
this paper built a precedent to future systems between the Indian subcontinent and the Persian 
Gulf proving important during the massive oil boom of the 1970s and after. 
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